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ABSTRACT
GARY DORRIEN, STANLEY HAUERWAS, ROWAN WILLIAMS,
AND THE THEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION
OF SOVEREIGNTIES
David W. Horstkoetter, B.S., M.A.
Marquette University, 2016
Christianity’s political voice in US society is often situated within a simplistic
binary of social justice versus faithfulness. Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas,
respectively, represent the two sides of the binary in their work. Although the justicefaithfulness narrative is an important point of disagreement, it has also created a
categorical impasse that does not reflect the full depth and complexity of either Dorrien’s
or Hauerwas’s work. Their concerns for both justice and faithfulness differ only in part
because of their different responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Under all those
issues are rival accounts of relational truth that indicate divergent understandings of
reality. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and differences are the issues
of God’s sovereign agency and humanity’s subjectivity and agency. Dorrien emphasizes
love, divine Spirit, human spirit, and freedom for flourishing. Hauerwas stresses gift,
triune creator, human creaturehood, and flourishing in friendship. Those divergent
positions issue forth in rival responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s panentheistic
monism is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects the
state’s hegemonic sovereignty as an attempt at autonomy that rejects God’s gifts and
aspires to rival God’s sovereignty.
While Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s discussion might then appear at an impasse, it
can be opened and developed in reference to Rowan Williams’s horizon. Although his
political work overlaps with much in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, Williams goes
beyond them by calling for the transformation of the modern nation-state’s sovereignty
and by supplying a vision of it transformed. Williams’s advance opens Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s disagreement by freeing them from their common assumption, the
permanence of state sovereignty. Williams’s political horizon is underwritten by his
theological horizon, which fuses love and gift within triune mutuality and plenitude. This
account offers critical help to issues that Dorrien and Hauerwas find problematic in each
other’s position. Such development thereby opens the possibility of a fresh and fruitful
discussion. Therefore, Williams’s work offers important help for Dorrien and Hauerwas
to address the heart of their disagreement over divine and political sovereignty, and
human subjectivity and agency.
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INTRODUCTION
I. The Conventional Problem in Theology and Social Ethics:
The Impasse between Social Justice and Christian Faithfulness
A simplistic binary of either social justice or faithfulness structures much of the
discourse about the political meaning of Christianity in the United States. Some have
used this binary to describe a split between academic theologians and the churches,
respectively. Ethicist-theologians Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas can be construed
as representing this justice-faithfulness binary. Although that description of Dorrien and
Hauerwas is oversimplified and superficial, the binary is exacerbated and re-enforced by
the theological milieu.1
Dorrien’s project seems to be an argument for social justice. He has written two
significant books on the history of social ethics. In both he argues that social ethics as a
discipline began as, and largely continues to be, a progressive movement of liberal
theology for transforming society through the pursuit of justice and related ideals.
Further, he understands himself to be in continuity with liberal theology––the mainstream
of social ethics––and its transformative mission. Dorrien consistently argues for

1

For the academy-church differentiation, see Raphael Warnock, The Divided Mind of the Black Church: Theology, Piety, and Public
Witness (New York: New York University Press, 2014). As here, sources to support sentences without quotes will be placed at the end
of the paragraph and generally in an order that matches the paragraph. Citations associated with a sentence that has a quote in it––
although not necessarily for the quote itself––will be directly attached to the sentence with the quote. The source of the quote will be
cited first and set apart from the other sources for the sentence that follow. This citation strategy enables a significant reduction of
footnotes and the repetitive naming of the same sources. The latter saves significant space beyond the norm not only because Gary
Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, and Rowan Williams have each written a great deal. But also, when they make their normative,
constructive arguments, they do so in what is functionally an essayist style. That includes even Dorrien. His articles, wherein he is
often more explicit about his normative position, are the tip of the iceberg, the rest of which are his histories upon which his articles
draw and sometimes summarize. So in order to connect his normative voice to his historical descriptions, much less connecting
different issues spread across different articles and books, one can see how simply citing Dorrien could become long and complex.
That does not include Hauerwas and Williams on their own, or even more burdensome, putting them all together. But as much as
space is saved, I have endeavored to maintain the connection between what I argue and what I cite. This link is achieved by generally
mirroring the flow of the non-quoting sentences in the paragraph in the order of the cited works in the footnote to the end of the
paragraph, and by immediately citing the quoted source distinct from but still with other sources supporting issues in the same
sentence as the quote. By following these two citation methods, the amount of the citations are spread out and reduced while still
connected to the argument.
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economic justice like his social gospel forbearers, as well as for liberation theology and
ecological process theology. Like Reinhold Niebuhr and Union Theological Seminary
(NYC) formed by his legacy, Dorrien articulates what Hauerwas calls “advocacy ethics,”
social ethics in support of critical activism for liberative justice.2 Social ethics for
transformative, liberative social justice has indeed been crucial to Union’s place, if not
mission, in the theological world. Such focus is why Dorrien embraced his appointment
to the Niebuhr chair there in 2005. The subtitle of Dorrien’s recent Economy, Difference,
Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice makes Dorrien’s project clear.3
In contrast, Hauerwas has broken from social ethics as a discipline and instead
seems concerned with faithfulness to Christian identity rather than justice. He agrees that
justice is central to social ethics as a discipline, but he points out that such a focus is
problematic. The goal of social ethics as a discipline is about “making America work,”
which is about transforming society or making Christianity relevant on the United
States’s terms instead of Jesus’s.4 Generally ‘making America work’ is achieved by
deriving a universal, moral ethic from Christianity in order to serve US interests or to
make society more just. Implicit here, according to Hauerwas, is the disconnection of
Christian social ethics from the church and ultimately from Jesus. Liberal theology’s
diverse positions, he continues, are unified by their agreement about the pursuit of justice,

2

Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity (Grand Rapids,
MI: Brazos, 2000), 61 (hereafter BH).
3
Gary Dorrien, Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social Christianity (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1995)
(hereafter SS); Gary Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)
(hereafter SEM); Gary Dorrien, Economy, Difference, Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2010), 407 (hereafter EDE). The cited chapter in EDE was previously published as Gary Dorrien, “Social Ethics in the Making:
Method, History, White Supremacism, Social Salvation,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 61, no. 1-2 (2008) and American Journal
of Theology & Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2008). Two points of clarification. First, a couple of Dorrien’s USQR articles were reprinted in
AJTP. I will note that when such an article is first cited. However, I will use the USQR articles for citation purposes. Second, Dorrien
began at Union in 2005, but he was not officially inaugurated into the chair until January 2007.
4
Hauerwas, BH, 33, 62. See also Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in a Christian Colony (Nashville,
TN: Abingdon, 1989), 37 (hereafter RA).
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not doctrinal topics like the Trinity. Furthermore, a disconnection between ethics and the
church allowed Christian ethics to move from seminaries to graduate schools. But the
result has been that Christian social ethics has forgotten its theological roots and has
become a vague religious ethic among other university disciplines. Hauerwas concluded,
therefore, that Christian social ethics “has come to its end.”5 He was so disillusioned with
it as a discipline that he abandoned the book he was writing on its history.6
In response, Hauerwas’s project is about maintaining the theological core: to
remain within the church and explore what it means to be faithful to the Christian part of
Christian ethics because “only theology overcomes ethics.”7 Rather than propound a
Christian theory of social ethics to augment US interests, Hauerwas has long argued that
the “church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic” as it faithfully
embodies Jesus.8 So Hauerwas abandoned the path Dorrien has developed. In contrast to
Dorrien’s Soul in Society (1995), once used as history of social ethics, Hauerwas wrote In
Good Company: The Church as Polis (1995) and A Better Hope (2000). In contrast to
Dorrien’s mature history of social ethics, Social Ethics in the Making (2009), Hauerwas
co-edited The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (2004), where the focus is on
“the practices of Christian tradition” rather than “the turn to the subject.”9 Dorrien and

5

Hauerwas, BH, 67.
In Dorrien’s SEM, Hauerwas is placed within the chapter “Disrupting and Expanding the Tradition” because Hauerwas broke with
social ethics as a discipline after a long struggle (Hauerwas, BH, 67-68). Before giving up on the project, Hauerwas described it in
Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1992), 23-50 (hereafter AN); Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1995), 193-194 n. 18 (hereafter DF). For the rest of the paragraph: Hauerwas, BH, 32-34, 61-62, 66-68;
Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 19 (hereafter STT).
7
Hauerwas, BH, 117-128. See also Hauerwas, AN, 9-10, 23-44.
8
Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),
99 (hereafter PK). For more see ibid., 100-111, 131-133; Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 9-12, 37, 40, 90-92 (hereafter CC).
9
Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “Why Christian Ethics was Invented,” in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, ed.
Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 29; Stanley Hauerwas, A Cross-Shattered Church: Reclaiming
the Theological Heart of Preaching (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2009), 154 (hereafter CSCH). Others have seen the difference
6
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Hauerwas, consequently, seem to be in conflict over whether the church should have a
social ethic or be a social ethic.10
Even worse, they appear to be in irresolvable conflict in light of the Niebuhr
brothers’ immensely influential legacy. Hauerwas’s variation on Anabaptism holds that
the world does not know it is the world without the witness of the church being the
church. This ecclesiology has been panned by critics over the past few decades as a
fideist, tribalist, sectarian withdrawal from society. Yet the substance of those criticisms
is not new. H. R. Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture typology developed the substance of his
earlier, Weberian and Troeltschian charge that the Anabaptists are “sectarian.”11 R.
Niebuhr made the same critique nearly two decades earlier. Although he granted that the
Anabaptists’ “sectarian perfectionism” was an important witness, it was also an
unrealistic political vision that leads Christianity into an irresponsible withdrawal from
society, and thereby Christianity into irrelevance.12 Similarly, Dorrien has criticized
Hauerwas for “isolationism” based on his rejecting the biblical command to pursue social
justice and on his “dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans.”13 In fact,
Dorrien once argued that Hauerwas is the mirror opposite to R. Niebuhr. But Hauerwas
argues that Niebuhr’s quest for securing Christianity’s relevance in society ironically

between Dorrien and Hauerwas on giving an account of the history of social ethics. See Richard A. Davis, review of Social Ethics in
the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition, by Gary Dorrien, Studies in Christian Ethics 24, no. 3 (2011): 389.
10
Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) (hereafter
IGC).
11
H. R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (N.p. Henry Holt and Company, 1929; repr. New York: Meridian Books,
1959), pp. 17-21 and chp. 2, esp. pp. 37-39; H. R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (N.p. Harper & Row, 1951; New York: HarperCollins,
n.d.), chp. 2; Hauerwas, RA, 39-42.
12
Reinhold Niebuhr, “Why the Church is not Pacifist,” The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses, ed. Robert
McAfee Brown (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 104. See also Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
(N.p. Harper Collins, 1997; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 115-117; Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study
in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 263-277; Dorrien, SEM, 249-251; Hauerwas, IGC, 58-57.
13
Dorrien, SS, 359. See also ibid., 374-375. I will return to Dorrien’s critiques of Hauerwas in chapter one.
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made Christianity irrelevant through deep unfaithfulness. Under the guise of reality’s
demands, R. Niebuhr allowed political liberalism’s versions of justice, freedom, and
unity to supersede the politics of Jesus in the public sphere. Thus, the appearance of an
incompatible division between Dorrien’s social justice and Hauerwas’s faithfulness stems
from unresolved conflict within the Niebuhr brothers’ legacies.14
This appearance of incompatibility makes it difficult to perceive any deeper,
substantive difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas than the reified dichotomy social
justice versus faithfulness. But even worse is that the incompatible appearance has been
promulgated in the theological milieu in such a way that incompatibility turns into
impasse. Consequently, the milieu surrounding Hauerwas and Dorrien exacerbates, and

14

Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 2, Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 1900-1950 (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox, 2003), 436, 555-556 (hereafter MALT, 2); Dorrien, SEM, 226, 242; Hauerwas, CC, 246-247 n. 5; Hauerwas,
DF, 104; Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom?: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice and a Christian Nation are Bad
Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996), 36 (hereafter AC); Hauerwas, CC, 91-92; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 94; for the
charges of fideism, tribalism, and sectarianism, see below; Dorrien, SS, 358-359; Hauerwas, AN, 30-32, 36; Hauerwas, DF, 98-104;
Hauerwas, AC, 31; Stanley Hauerwas with Michael Broadway, “The Irony of Reinhold Niebuhr: The Ideological Character of
‘Christian Realism,’” in Stanley M. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), esp. 50, 54-56 (hereafter the volume is WW).
The terms of the charges against Hauerwas come from James M. Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on
Theology, the Church, and the University,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society 40 (1985). For response, see Stanley
Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between (Labyrinth Press, 1988; repr. Eugene, OR:
Wipf and Stock, 2010), 1-19 (hereafter CET). Nevertheless, Gustafson has repeated his critiques, and most recently in James M.
Gustafson, An Examined Faith: The Grace of Self-Doubt (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 37-44, 85, 88, 113 n. 3. For
Hauerwas’s response, see Stanley Hauerwas, The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 165 n. 3 (hereafter SU).
Ten years after Gustafson’s critique, similar concerns were repeated by Gloria Albrecht and Dorrien. See Gloria Albrecht,
“Myself and Other Characters: A Feminist Liberationist Critique of Hauerwas’ Ethics of Christian Character,” Annual of the Society of
Christian Ethics 12 (1992); Gloria Albrecht, The Character of Our Communities: Toward an Ethic of Liberation for the Church
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1995); Gloria Albrecht, review of In Good Company: The Church as Polis, by Stanley Hauerwas, Scottish
Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Dorrien, SS, 18, 355-360, 374; Gary Dorrien, review of Dispatches from the Front: Theological
Engagements with the Secular, by Stanley Hauerwas, Journal of Religion 75, no. 4 (1995). For Hauerwas’s respective responses to
Albrecht and Dorrien, as well their own to Hauerwas, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Failure of Communication or a Case of
Uncomprehending Feminism: A Response to Gloria Albrecht.” Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Gloria Albrecht,
“Response,” Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Stanley Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of
Social Christianity, by Gary Dorrien, Modern Theology 13, no. 3 (1997); Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the
Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” Cross Currents, Fall 1997, 378 n. 1.
Nearly another ten years after Dorrien and Albrecht, similar concerns were noted by Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and
Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Stout’s and others’ criticisms of Hauerwas will be later.
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perhaps creates, the appearance of conflict along the lines of faithfulness versus social
justice.15
Hauerwas’s rhetoric has been his own worst enemy in contributing to the
theological milieu’s divide. His polemical rhetoric is integral to his “aporetic” pedagogy
intended to challenge fundamental assumptions.16 But his intended offensives to provoke
can distract from his subtlety, or whatever sympathy he has for the position he critiques.
For instance, Jeffery Stout faults Hauerwas’s rhetoric, in part, for disconnecting justice
and faithfulness in After Christendom, where Hauerwas has his (in)famous chapter on
justice.17
Even Hauerwas’s rhetoric in his constructive work has undercut its reception. He
once likened the church to a colony in order to set the church and world “in stark
contrast.”18 Yet colony gives the impression of faithfulness through seclusion, even
though he qualifies the colony metaphor by stressing the active, outgoing ways that the
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The impasse has been used by others albeit in a slightly different vein, like Eugene McCarraher, Christian Critics: Religion and the
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Shrinking Common Ground in the American Church,” America, Feb. 14, 2014; Michael Baxter and William T. Cavanaugh, “More
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America, Apr. 21, 2014; Kelly Johnson, “Commentary on Occupy Religion by Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan,” and Joerg Rieger, “A
Response to Kelly Johnson,” Syndicate Theology, Dec. 23 and 24, https://syndicatetheology.com/commentary/theology-at-the-serviceof-humanity/. See also Christian Century, Oct. 1, 2014, pp. 22-34, for a brief symposium on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Hauerwas
and Willimon’s Resident Aliens where the various responses fall into the faithfulness versus social justice narrative (informed by the
legacy of the Niebuhr brothers) in one way or another for the most part, see Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove’s “Better Religion,” Willie
James Jennings’s “The Wall of Identity,” Brian D. McLaren’s “Targeted Medicine,” Jennifer M. McBride’s “White Protestants aren’t
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2001), 50. See also ibid., 56-58; Hauerwas, DT, 181-182; Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of
Nonviolence (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2004), 22 (hereafter PF); Stanley Hauerwas, “Remembering John Howard Yoder: December
29, 1927-December 30, 1997,” First Things, Apr. 1998, 16.
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Michael J. Quirk, introduction to “Stanley Hauerwas: An Interview,” in Stanley Hauerwas, Disrupting Time: Sermons, Prayers, and
Sundries (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2004), 204 (hereafter the volume is DT); Dorrien, SEM, 481, 485; Stout, Democracy and
Tradition, xi, 119, 140, 149. Stout’s own rhetoric, however, gives a limited reading of Hauerwas in relation to justice and of
Hauerwas’s sympathy for “grassroots coalitions.” Romand Coles, “Democracy, Theology, and the Question of Excess,” Modern
Theology 21, no. 2 (2005): 305, 310-312. For Stout’s response to Coles and Hauerwas, which accounts for Hauerwas’s development,
see Jeffrey Stout, “Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess,” Journal of Religions Ethics 35, no. 1 (2007): 7-13.
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church should engage the world. Hauerwas appears to have recognized the problematic
baggage of colony language, because he replaced it with other metaphors like polis and
wandering in the wilderness. But the damage had already been done. Stout’s Democracy
and Tradition concludes with the colony metaphor to make Hauerwas look like a
reclusive, sectarian over-reaction to John Rawls’s liberalism.19
Stout’s line of argument typifies the criticisms made of Hauerwas by theological
liberals, liberationists, and hybrids of the two that follow the Niebuhrian critiques of
Anabaptists and pacifists. Miguel De La Torre’s critiques of Hauerwas are a particularly
helpful illustration of the incompatible appearance shaping an impasse in the theological
milieu. Although God is for justice, De La Torre argues, Hauerwas is ultimately not
because he withdraws into a sectarian fantasy, rather than engages society with a
liberative vision. That critique does not make a critical advance. Instead, it solidifies the
limited justice-faithfulness narrative in the theological milieu because De La Torre
distills the criticism for both teacher and student audiences.20
Other aspects of De La Torre’s constructive work and critical engagement with
Hauerwas are more fruitful. But also reflecting the impasse in the milieu, De La Torre’s
critiques of Hauerwas are fatally dated. It is as if Hauerwas and Hauerwas ‘types’ have
not made important developments and clarifications since Jeffery Stout’s criticism of
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Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 51-52; Hauerwas, IGC, 58-59; the metaphors polis and wandering in the wilderness are from the titles
of IGC and WW respectively (Hauerwas drops the colony metaphor when explaining RA in IGC, 54); Stout, Democracy and Tradition,
296. In later work Stout re-emphasizes that his problem with Hauerwas is the latter’s “rhetoric.” See “Response by Jeffrey Stout” in
“Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Jeffrey Stout’s Democracy and Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78,
no. 2 (2010): 441.
20
Miguel De La Torre, “Stanley Hauerwas on Church,” in Beyond the Pale: Reading Ethics from the Margins, ed. Stacey M. FloydThomas and Miguel A. De La Torre (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 219-223; Miguel De La Torre, Latina/o Social
Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 21-27, 30-31; Floyd-Thomas and De
La Torre, introduction to Beyond the Pale, xxi. Also see the back cover: “This book offers a reader-friendly introduction to Christian
liberationist ethics.” Even though De La Torre is a liberationist, that does not disqualify him since Dorrien argues, as I note in chapter
one, for making liberal theology a subset of liberation theology.

8

Hauerwas in Democracy and Tradition, if not earlier. Unfortunately, the initial but old
points of disagreement and not present developments are still the primary lens for
interpreting either side.21
So it is as if Hauerwas-types and liberals-liberationists are preoccupied with their
own projects. If they ever come near each other, they pass like ships in the night, or ships
at war. Or they stand silently side by side in an elevator, as Hauerwas and Gloria
Albrecht once literally did. Yet, the narrative of impasse between social justice types and
faithfulness types is rooted in a misunderstanding about the real source of conflict, which
keeps the theological discourse fragmented and distracts us from crucial work. Despite
the prevalence of the social justice versus faithfulness narrative, I reject it because I will
show that it is, at best, a partial truth that pervades and shapes the theological milieu.22
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Politics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 34, no. 3 (2007), 381; Phillip W. Gray, “‘Peace, Peace, but there is No Peace’: A Critique of
Christian Pacifist Communitarianism,” Politics and Religion 1 (2008); Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, Christianity,
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Neither Dorrien nor Hauerwas are so simple as the standard narrative. The justicefaithfulness impasse should raise justified frustration in those who carefully read either of
them. Dorrien is not just “one of the finest interpreters and theologians of liberalism
writing today.”23 Although he has yet to do more than to briefly and occasionally sketch
out his normative theology, it unites the diverse plurality of voices in liberal theology’s
history and in liberal theology’s current, “unnoticed renaissance.”24 Dorrien thereby
offers hope that liberal theology can still be a viable project and a coherent movement
rather than continuing to subsist in disconnected theological niches. But Dorrien also
acknowledges Hauerwas’s significance. Hauerwas’s bristling rhetoric contains a
constructive, post-Christendom, Protestant alternative to Protestants like Dorrien.25
This acknowledgment is based on the fact that their real place of disagreement
lies deeper than the surface grammar, hasty interpretations, or the conventional boundary
lines marked by trenches and foxholes. Relocating the difference makes all the difference
for upsetting the fictional impasse and the actual disagreements. The divide between
Dorrien and Hauerwas is, I will argue, ultimately over divine and political sovereignty,
and human subjectivity and agency. For Dorrien and Hauerwas to get out of their
fractured discussion, I will contend, they need to further account for Rowan Williams’s
political and theological work.
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II. Chapter Summaries
There are many complications that are ultimately fatal to the justice-faithfulness
dichotomy. But I am not concerned with further addressing directly the standard narrative
of social justice versus faithfulness. Doing so would grant its superficial, categorical
impasse that leads to silence in an elevator. I will, therefore, show implicitly the standard
narrative’s poverty in chapter one by going beyond it. Sometimes the standard narrative
is broken through when the ‘social justice’ side proclaims that they are attempting to be
faithful too. But the discussion generally ends with that proclamation. So near where that
leaves us, I argue in chapter one that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness
to different accounts of relational truth undergird their rival evaluations, sometimes
similar critiques, and wildly divergent responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Near
the end of chapter one, I contend that their accounts of relational truth are actually rival
descriptions of reality.26
But even reality, humanity’s relational existence, is created and shaped by some‘thing’ more. Chapter two shows that divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and
agency are at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different theologies. Dorrien
characterizes divine sovereignty in terms of universal Spirit and love; Hauerwas
maintains divine sovereignty in terms of the triune gift-giver revealed by Jesus in his
particularity. Both accounts construe divine sovereignty as creating and shaping human
subjectivity and agency, and in turn, intra-human relations. But Dorrien and Hauerwas
differ by construing humanity’s existence as reducible to spirit or creature, humanity’s
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relational agency as underwritten by love or gift, and humanity’s flourishing as realized
in relations for human freedom or relations in friendship.
Chapter two touches on politics since human relations are politics broadly
construed. Chapter three, however, focuses directly on political sovereignty. I will
contend that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences over divine sovereignty and intrahuman relations issue forth in strikingly divergent positions on political sovereignty.
Dorrien’s critiques of empire notwithstanding, his understanding of Spirit’s sovereignty
is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty at a basic level. But Hauerwas
argues that the state’s sovereignty is hegemonic. Under the guise of keeping unity and
peace, the state seeks to secure and expand its power over citizens, self-interest, and
death by marginalizing and replacing Christianity.
I add my own work on the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison
d’état (reason of state) for two reasons. First, the French political concepts initially
develop Hauerwas’s position. Second, my larger end is to show how much further
Dorrien and Hauerwas diverge on how to respond to political sovereignty because they
diverge on how to understand the relation between divine and political sovereignty. Such
divergence is not simply a separation; it is a significant fracture. Yet there is hope that it
can be overcome. Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a political surplus; that is, their
positions cannot be fully understood in terms of political sovereignty’s status quo.
So how can their political fracture be overcome? How can their visions of radical
democracy be realized for a more fruitful discussion? Those questions drive chapter four.
Despite Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s dramatic difference over state sovereignty, I will
contend that they still assume, in their own way, the permanence of the state’s
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sovereignty as it stands today. Rowan Williams’s work on procedural secularism and
interactive pluralism supplies a political horizon that, on the one hand, meets Dorrien’s
and Hauerwas’s concerns and engages their political surplus. On the other hand,
William’s political horizon goes beyond them by challenging the permanence of the
state’s self-serving sovereignty and by avoiding Constantinian presumptions. Williams
seeks to transform the state’s hegemonic sovereignty into a pluralist form of subsidiarity.
The latter is oriented by the common good found through public discussion among not
only individuals, but also social bodies.
To transform state sovereignty may seem far-fetched, despite my focus on a
practical way to do so. Even I am still in shock that I ended up with such an argument
that I affirm. However––besides all the other reasons I will raise––the transformation of
state sovereignty is indeed very much necessary if I am correct about the depth of
Dorrien and Hauerwas’s difference and about the character of their political surplus.
So chapter four is about freeing Hauerwas and Dorrien from the source of their
political impasse. But if that were the final end, it would reduce Williams’s work to
strictly a political position for pragmatically bridging between two ethicist-theologians.
Such a pragmatic bridging is unacceptable since I hold that ethics and theology are
united, and Christian faith is inherently political. All politics is, then, theopolitics. The
final conclusion returns to focus on divine sovereignty, the God-human relation, and
intra-human relations. This time, however, the horizon is Williams’s trinitarian work and
his according theopolitics. I argue, to one degree and another, that his trinitarian fusion of
love and gift in God’s triune mutuality and plenitude constructively challenges issues in
Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought that are important for developing their respective
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projects and their discussion. I hope, then, that those influenced by Hauerwas’s and
Dorrien’s work can have a more interesting, fruitful, and fresh discussion than one
formed by the faithfulness versus social justice. Such a discussion opens the possibility of
addressing the real fractures that plague the theological milieu and the political voice of
US Christianity.
In light of the argument, the subtitle to this project, “theological transformation of
sovereignties,” is actually somewhat misleading. Transformations, although breaking
grammatical convention, would more accurately reflect a multiplicity of changes found
directly and indirectly in chapter four and the final conclusion. The obvious change is
that Williams provides an alternative, transforming vision of state sovereignty that shifts
the framework in which Dorrien and Hauerwas discuss state sovereignty. Williams offers
that vision on the basis of divine sovereignty in terms of gift, love, mutuality, and
plenitude. This account can initially call for development in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s
understanding of God’s sovereign agency. That development––although briefly
suggested in chapter four and more implied than delineated in the final conclusion––
shifts aspects of their theopolitics and, in turn, transformatively reverberates throughout
their whole frameworks. In the interest of brevity, those transformations are developed to
one degree or another. In particular, I will have to leave for later a more developed
argument focused on Williams’s account of divine sovereignty directly in relation to
Dorrien and Hauerwas. But even with that direct argument left for later, my return to the
church-world issue in light of Williams, I believe, shows enough development to support
my hope: that the theological fracture can be transformed into fresh, fruitful discussion.
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III. Method and Clarifications
This is a dissertation in systematic theology, but my argument addresses questions
in political theology. I do not see a conflict, however, for two reasons. First, there is no
contemporary consensus over what is political theology. There used to be a consensus of
sorts within each of the first two academic generations, cross-generational variations
notwithstanding. But now what constitutes political theology is contested since the
meaning of political theology has broadened. With the recent influx of a few important
readers and attempts at introductory volumes, some emphasize still the continental
discussion, some use political theology to describe what many others have called social
ethics, and some emphasize a historical discussion reaching back to Augustine and
earlier. Contemporary, constructive volumes share only the term political theology
emblazoned on the cover. So political theology as a term currently appears to be fluid
rather than definitive.27
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Second, the lack of consensus allows me to explore my own understanding of
political theology. It is the attempt to think through and to practice the inherent political
(in the broad sense of polis) implications of Christian theology in ways that engage
fundamental assumptions about social, philosophical, political, and economic theories
and practices that inform everyday life. Political theology as such may appear to be social
ethics in the sense that both would lead to practices like solidarity with marginalized
immigrant workers on the picket line. What differentiates political theology and social
ethics is their foci and methods. Political theology stresses scripture, Christian doctrine,
and theological traditions with their practices and basic categories (systematic theology)
of Christianity. From that position of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, political theology
attends to fundamental assumptions in society, and then tailors action to contemporary
contexts. Social ethics today generally assumes a set of theological principles within a
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16

moral compass for navigating its focus on important political and socioeconomic details.
That guiding of individual consciences is for the goal of empowering nongovernmental
organizations in policy lobbying and other forms of activism.28
Social ethics, then, mostly focuses on analyzing nongovernmental organizations.
But as a work of political theology, here I examine fundamental assumptions about state
sovereignty. My starting point is the doctrine, the practices, and the basic categories of
Christian tradition in history rather than first to historical projects like the liberal state
that requires theologians to be in disguise. So even though Dorrien and Hauerwas both
hold ethics chairs, I will be engaging their theological positions as well. There is plenty
of warrant for doing so, despite the disciplinary boundaries between contemporary
theology (Hauerwas), historical theology (Dorrien), and ethics (Dorrien and Hauerwas).
In fact, I will argue that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement is a
theological issue.29
The definition of political theology and the problem of disciplinary boundaries
raise a few other issues that require clarification. Less fluid a term than political theology,
theopolitics is often used by Hauerwas’s students and their students to indicate that
“every ethic presupposes a sociology.”30 Or as Braden Anderson has put it, “every
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For the definition of political theology, I am indebted to D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 267.
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salvation narrative entails a politics, and every politics presumes a salvation narrative.”31
On those terms the problem is competing politics of salvation. My sympathy for
theopolitics as such distinguishes this work from what is commonly called “public
theology.”32 It emphasizes cooperation, sometimes critical, with the state in pursuit of the
common good but without a clear or systematic emphasis on competing salvific claims.
Since Williams’s theopolitical vision of transforming the state’s sovereignty is about
moving the state away from its hegemonic salvific claims and toward the common good,
I use theopolitics more loosely as a short-hand for the inherent politics of deep
theological doctrines. This is still consistent with Hauerwas because he writes, “if
theology is done faithful to the gospel, it will not only be political but it will be so in a
particular way.”33 With Williams, I hold to a theopolitical vision of particular human
bodies who are created and their relations are shaped by the triune God, whose loving
self-gift and self-giving love is the source of both superabundance and mutuality.
That tips some of my hand. I affirm Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity,
gift, non-violence, and a robust ecclesiology that is counter-cultural and nonConstantinian. But interpreting Hauerwas as a theologian, much less engaging him
appreciatively and critically, can be a precarious endeavor. Besides his polemical
rhetoric, his theological assumptions are sometimes underdeveloped in comparison to his
emphasis on their ‘political’ implications. While I am not one to so easily delineate
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Braden Anderson, Chosen Nation: Scripture, Theopolitics, and the Project of National Identity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
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between theological and political, the issue of those assumptions leads me to agree with
part of Nicholas Healy’s assessment for engaging Hauerwas. There is a significant
interpretive difference between those who know Hauerwas personally and those who do
not. The former can fill-in the unstated assumptions or less developed positions with
unwavering confidence. I do not have the luxury of an ‘inside track’ with Hauerwas
himself in any significant manner. Yet, I am not claiming that closeness or distance is
better than for interpreting him, only that more people read his books than he has the time
to be friends with. So like Healy, I have focused my argument to Hauerwas’s published
work. Dorrien is the only figure with whom I have an ‘inside track,’ insomuch as I was
once his student at Union Theological Seminary (NYC). But I keep largely to his
published work too. Even though they are far from reducible to their published work, it
serves as the ground to prove what I argue about them and from them.34
Although my sympathy for Hauerwas’s theological work runs deeper than mine
for Dorrien’s, my debt to Dorrien is by no means small. I affirm his stress on love divine,
liberation theology, and an activist church. I am also deeply sympathetic with his
democratic socialism, which is one of the aspects in the social gospel I still find alluring.
It is because of my deep appreciation for Dorrien that I will attempt to engage him as a
constructive theologian, not only as an ethicist or historian. No one has done that. In fact,
even Dorrien’s histories have yet to be engaged in any significant way other than in
evaluative book reviews, in a symposium on his The Making of American Liberal
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Nicholas M. Healy, Hauerwas: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014), 3-4. As for my own
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Theology trilogy, and more recently in Christopher Evans’s work. That lack of
engagement is not because Dorrien is not respected, but presumably because his
normative position, theological and often ethical, is developed indirectly through
historical recovery. Further complicating my task is that his subtle editorial voice creates
difficulty in proving the details of his normative position. Thankfully, he has quickly
stated his normative position framed by brief appeals to historical figures. But his appeals
and his historical work are sometimes separated by hundreds of pages of historical work
and sometimes even different publications. These appeals also mean that Dorrien’s
position cannot be sufficiently described without noting other figures. To address these
issues and still support my argument, I cite his relevant historical work and his normative
appeals to it at the same time. I also, as needed, develop his position in light of specific
movements, like the social gospel, personalism, and liberation theology, and in light of
specific figures he engages, like Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Walter Rauschenbusch,
and Nels F. S. Ferré. Even then I have not been able to indicate the full breadth of
Dorrien’s sympathies, especially his work on the hard sciences and process theology.35
Since the dissertation’s argumentative limits prohibit simply reconstructing
Dorrien’s position, since Dorrien’s normative voice is often too subtle to cite as proof of
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20

the reconstructed position, and since I have some more theological sympathies with
Hauerwas than Dorrien, I fear––rightly or not, I am unsure––that Dorrien’s position
might appear as a foil. I have tried my best to keep that from happening. My intention has
always been to do right by Dorrien, especially because no one has yet to gather together
his whole normative position, from Spirit to economics, in extended detail.
But how can I be sympathetic to both Hauerwas and Dorrien? There is little room
to be so as the discussion stands now. Yet there can be room if one, first, goes ‘all the
way down’ to the categorical disagreement, as in chapters one through three. Then,
second, one shifts a few of the categories and follows the reverberations ‘back up’ while
still attentive to Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s concerns, as in chapter four and the final
conclusion.
The shifts to their work are not arbitrary, but instead they flow from their
concerns about each other’s projects. My argument is then an attempt at “ad hominem
practical reasoning,” which is also what I understand William’s political vision to be
about.36 Further, I have in mind other discussions as well. Williams’s theopolitical
framework is similar to the views of Luke Bretherton, an English citizen who has been
working in the US for a few years now. Although chapter four does not have the space to
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D. Stephen Long, “What Make Theology ‘Political’?,” in Calculated Futures: Theology, Ethics, and Economics, by D. Stephen
Long, Nancy Ruth Fox, and Tripp York (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007), 81-82; Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 36. Emphasis mine.
The difficulty of ad hominem practical reasoning is that it “requires the attempt to articulate the implicit presumptions that
shape the character of those making the arguments” (Hauerwas, WT, 14). I hold in high regard the character of Dorrien, Hauerwas, and
Williams; however, I am not out to judge their character. The issue of presuppositions is my concern in this project about their
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is allegedly about, that is, God” (Hauerwas, WT, 25-26). I agree with Hauerwas. I would use terms like “perspective” instead of
“position” as I do, except that my use of “position” allows Dorrien his own space for his technical use of perspective. I also use the
term position because they do maintain different view points that have been solidified over time, such as liberal theology or
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raise Bretherton’s recent, more concretely focused work on community organizing,
chapters four and the final conclusion together begin to meet his equally recent call for
trinitarian arguments to undergird the transformation of political sovereignty.37
Other works focus on the divide between the ‘schools’ represented to varying
degrees by Dorrien and Hauerwas. John Allen Knight has taken up the epistemological
issues between liberal theology and postliberal theology. In a Catholic framework Kristin
E. Heyer addresses the divide in the figures of J. Bryan Hehir and Michael Baxter who,
respectively, stand in for John Courtney Murray and Hauerwas. But Knight’s focus on
epistemology and Heyer’s on the public limit the literal space they have to probe
theological assumptions with sufficient depth. Ephraim Radner has gone deeper
theologically, and there is thematic overlap between his work and my project here.
However, there are simple and complicated divergences between us over quite a few
crucial issues to the point that we end up in rather different places.38
Most of these differences I will have to make clear at another time. But one place
of divergence is over liberalism, which requires some clarification from the start. I do not
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like to traffic in words that end with “ism” because they give the appearance of an all
encompassing and general label that is too often vague. But I initially use the term
liberalism to help describe significant disagreement between Dorrien and Hauerwas, and
so, as the argument proceeds, a description of liberalism shifts and changes accordingly.
Liberalism is partly defined in the first chapter in terms of autonomy and abstract
universality common to both Dorrien and Hauerwas. More frequently, however, the term
liberalism is used in connection to Hauerwas. Perhaps his most holistic and succinct
description of liberalism in one place is the following. It is the name for the
impulse deriving from the Enlightenment project to free all people from the
chains of their historical particularity in the name of freedom. As an
epistemological position liberalism is the attempt to defend a foundationalism in
order to free reason from being determined by any particularistic tradition.
Politically liberalism makes the individual the supreme unit of society, thus
making the political task the securing of cooperation between arbitrary units of
desire.39
Chapter one takes up those themes, and it qualifies the issue of foundationalism by
following Dorrien’s turn from Immanuel Kant to G.W. F. Hegel. Chapter two indirectly
furthers Dorrien’s definition of liberalism by way of his political economy’s debt to,
again, Kant and Hegel. Later chapters develop other themes in political liberalism
relating to the nation-state’s sovereignty and to Rowan Williams’s critical, partial
acceptance of liberalism. Hauerwas maintains, even recently, that the fear of death is used
to legitimate coercion of people into liberalism’s political order. Williams stresses
liberalism insofar as it emphasizes creative participation in governance through dialogue.
Hauerwas similarly emphasizes a local politics in discursive practical reason, but he does
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not attribute that politics to liberalism. So each major figure has at least a somewhat
different description of liberalism, which develops over the course of my argument.
Another important term is liberation theology. In a Catholic context, it is often
limited to liberation theologians contextually situated in Latin American such as Gustavo
Gutiérrez, Jon Sobrino, and others. To differentiate this liberation tradition from others,
adjectives like black, feminist, womanist, ecofeminist, queer, etc. are used to qualify the
label. But I understand Latin American liberation theology as one of many types of
liberation theology for the same reason that I do not feel the need to always use an
adjective to specify the type of liberation theology that I am discussing. Liberation
theologies began to converge decades ago after Latin Americans––predominately
Catholic––working on economics and African Americans––predominately not Catholic–
–working on race discovered the interrelation of the issues that they were addressing and
the similarity of their constructive frameworks. I do not intend to gloss over important
differences among liberation theologies. For instance, queer theology’s rejection of
binaries can be in tension with most other liberation theologies that began and largely still
do––with significant qualification and nuance––work on the premise of an oppressedoppressor dynamic. Although Dorrien is attentive to sexuality issues, he has not written
much on them in his own voice. He focuses mostly on race, gender, economics, and
ecology. So in reference to those issues and the broader horizon of liberation, I will use
the terms liberation and liberation theology broadly. I add adjectives like Latin American
or simply ecofeminist whenever I aim for specificity.40
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In reference to Williams’s position, I use the metaphor “horizon” to indicate a
large but implicit whole that is, on the one hand, composed of a general orientation, a
number of assumptions, and a cluster of secondary sources. On the other hand, the whole
and some of its parts are not a stated or systematically defined frame of reference by the
figure who supplies the horizon. The metaphorical phrase “going beyond” indicates the
avoidance of the pitfalls of a politically or theologically problematic horizon or horizons
by extricating their thought from just such horizon(s). This extraction is achieved partly
by taking on another, more fruitful horizon. In chapter four, Williams’s political horizon
is more fruitful than Dorrien’s or Hauerwas’s since it constructs a political framework for
pluralism as an alternative to state sovereignty as it is generally understood today. In the
final conclusion, Williams’s theopolitical horizon is more fruitful because it coheres with
and realizes best a trinitarian theology that fuses love and gift.
I can see how one might conceive of “going beyond” as a Hegelian framework,
wherein Williams’s horizon sublates Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s. I do put Williams in
discussion with Hauerwas and then with Dorrien because Williams’s horizon overlaps
with theirs but avoids some of their problematic assumptions and/or articulations.
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However, I do not think that Williams’s “going beyond” Dorrien and Hauerwas sublates
their work in a Hegelian synthesis. “Horizon” and “going beyond” are related,
intentionally spatial metaphors that need not connote progress. Not only does Williams’s
horizon have its own lacunae that I simply do not have the space to delineate. But also I
actively eschew that I am attempting to resolve Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement.
Even if I was trying to resolve the disagreement, my work lacks Hegel’s dialectic of
double negation, or even the popular misreading of it as thesis-antithesis-synthesis.
Instead, Williams’s function is to open space for fresh dialogue between Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s horizons in the hopes of some kind of future reconciliation. That attempt to
open space is potentially like Williams’s appropriation of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian mutual
recognition and discussion. However, opening space for reconciliation is not Hegelian
progress through sublation.41
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CHAPTER 1
Faithfulness, Truth, and Reality
Gary Dorrien is an unabashed liberal theologian and ethicist concerned with
social justice. Stanley Hauerwas in equal measure rejects liberal theology and emphasizes
Christian faithfulness. Or so goes the standard narrative as raised in the introduction to
the dissertation. The narrative is insufficient since it does not adequately address that
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference has more to do with their differing evaluations, but
not so much descriptions, of liberalism and liberal theology as they have been commonly
narrated. Dorrien asserts repeatedly that “the way beyond liberalism is through it.”42
Hauerwas proclaims “that Christians would be ill advised to try to rescue the liberal
project either in its epistemological or political form.”43 Such an evaluative disagreement
may still sound conventional, even well trodden, but the truth is more interesting. Their
sharp disagreements and some critical agreements over the legacies of liberal theology
and liberalism proceed from a common goal. Both Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s
“alternative” trajectories to each other are for cultivating a faithful, post-Christendom,
Protestant Christianity in the US.44 How can their disagreement and agreement as well as
their alterity and faithfulness be explained? I will argue that the issue is Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s different accounts of relational truth, which in the end can be understood as
rival accounts of reality.45
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I begin with defining liberal theology in order to establish Hauerwas’s critiques of
it and liberalism, and to argue that his critical position is derived from Christian
faithfulness to a hierarchy of truth known in relation. Then I raise Dorrien’s position as a
response to Hauerwas initially and then to conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s
critique of Hauerwas’s arguments is sandwiched by Dorrien’s agreement with important
criticisms that Hauerwas directs at liberal theology. But rather than side with Hauerwas,
Dorrien’s normative project is about recovering aspects of liberal theology that are not
directly at the center of Hauerwas’s critiques and are not promoted by most liberal
theologians in the US today. Dorrien’s recovery, I argue, is about faithfully maintaining a
multiplicity of truths in mutual relation. Finally, I contend that Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s
differing accounts of relational truth signal rival accounts of reality. By showing how the
divide between Hauerwas and Dorrien is really based on different accounts of truth and
reality, I implicitly demonstrate how the social justice-faithfulness narrative is a
simplistic and superficial divide.
I. Dorrien’s Three Layers of Liberal Theology
Liberal theology is historically and intellectually part of the liberal project of
emancipatory freedom for the sake of autonomy. Significantly, Dorrien and Hauerwas
agree that liberalism and liberal theology did not fully arrive until the middle
Enlightenment when Immanuel Kant gave the philosophical underpinnings for both. I
will employ Dorrien’s definition of liberal theology since he has given a far more
thorough treatment of it and liberalism than Hauerwas. For Dorrien, liberal theology is
primarily a method. It is a “three-layered,” “mediating theology” that navigates “between
orthodox over-belief and secular disbelief” by privileging “reason and experience” rather
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than “external authority.”46 The three layers are described in the table below, which I will
develop in order.47
The Layers of Liberal Theology
Layer 1 Liberalism’s Principle of Autonomy
Layer 2 1. Axiom: The Necessity of Faith
2. Mediating Dialectic Between Autonomy (Layer 1) and
Axiom (Layer 2)
Layer 3 Repercussions of the Mediating Dialectic
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The First Layer of Liberal Theology
The first layer places liberal theology squarely within liberalism. Simply put,
liberal theology roots “all claims to truth” in the primacy of reason and experience over
the “appeal to external authorit[ies]” such as revelation or tradition.48 How this fits within
liberalism requires a short elaboration on the goal of liberalism itself and its philosophical
support. Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that the liberal project is one of emancipatory
freedom for autonomy. Positively, autonomy means that human freedom is its own end.
Negatively, autonomy outright rejects or subtly relativizes contingent determinations like
history or “mythic imagination” that impede “free self-determination.”49 Dorrien’s
analysis of the philosophical basis for autonomous subjectivity as such begins with
Kant’s philosophy of the human being, reason, and experience. Three points are
important for this.50
First, Kant’s understanding of the human knower leads to the “active self.”51 For
Kant, “we know only what we create” because the subject participates in forming its own
understanding, and eventually itself, by reasoning through “transcendental categories”
that order sense experience.52 But the subject’s knowledge is not only an internal ideal.
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Such knowledge must first pass through an account of the subject’s active role in forming
its knowledge, rather than an account of the subject’s knowledge passively received from
revelatory declarations by an “external authority.”53 In this constructive epistemology of
the active self, the experiential and rational activity of the subject replaces external
authority with self-awareness. Crucial for liberal theology is the theological import of the
active self: “the religious bias in favor of spiritual creativity ha[s] a philosophical
ground.”54 So Dorrien takes Kant’s account of the active self as the beginning of
autonomous self-determination. Thereby, the active self is the first philosophical
component of the autonomous subject.55
Second, hand in hand with the active self is a separation between form and
content. Kant construed the active self within his assumption that only phenomena can be
known. The post-Kantians rejected his noumena-phenomena distinction, but they
embraced Kant’s privileging of the active self in an immanent frame (e.g., nature), which
meant an emphasis on experience and reason. Kant’s, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s, and G.
W. F. Hegel’s various forms of idealism privileged individual or corporate experience
and reason. However, as idealists they all assumed that universal, objective truth is more
basic than any individual’s particular experience. The truth of reality is located more in a
universally general idea––the abstract content, category, concept, or ideal like Kant’s
mind, Schleiermacher’s feeling, and Hegel’s Spirit––than how truth is manifested in the
particularity of a specific form. This separation of form and content allows for creative
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insight into the experiences of the active self, and further relativizes external authority.
For the active self to perceive the universal “essence” of the truth (the abstract content)
unmarred and translatable for anyone, it is necessary to either simply eliminate or
dialectically transcend the facade of the particularity in which content like theological
doctrine is expressed (the particular form).56 Dorrien calls the obscuring form “overbelief,” presumably drawing from William James.57 This abstracting of truth from
particularity in order to recognize or construct an abstract, universal truth is vital to
liberalism and the autonomous subject it posits. For both Dorrien and Hauerwas,
accordingly, abstract universals (ideals) are the lifeblood of liberalism and liberal
theology, even when liberal theology claims to be realist.58
Third, the active self, which abstracts experiential and/or empirical data into
generalized universals, depends on an equally universal and autonomous reason. The
active self rationally orders and interprets the true nature of reality in order to leave
behind over-belief and to apprehend abstract, universal, and objective truth. Reason can
play such a role for two reasons. First, it is the objective tool inherent to finite humans for
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accessing abstract, universal truth. Second, then, reason is universally normative for
human life within an immanent frame, or at least beginning with immanence. This form
of reason is “autonomous.”59 It determines its own method and object; it is selfgrounding like the active self rather than conditioned by external authority. Construing
autonomous reason as essential to truth results in a mutually informing interplay between
autonomous reason and autonomous subjectivity. On one hand, the autonomy of reason is
key because it is constitutive of the autonomy of the subject. Only through reasoning
unencumbered by claims of super-sensible knowledge can one discern one’s will in
accordance with universal law and then choose the action to fulfill one’s will. On the
other hand, the autonomy of the subject is crucial to the autonomy of reason. If overbelief is determining the subject, then a partisan facade obstructs reason’s autonomy, and
reason becomes suspect. Many post-Kantians, like Hegel, broke from Kant’s “mechanical
rationalism” and opted for “intellectual intuition” in which reason is dialectically
contingent and autonomous.60 But even then the goal of using reason is still to achieve
autonomy by perceiving a generalized universal within particularity.61
Truth is articulated in universals abstracted from one’s perception of will or
nature through rationally examining the mind and experiences and/or through reasoning
between particularities for insight into the whole rather than through external revelation.
This stress on nature, will, experience, and reason is integral to the account of autonomy.
Rationally abstracting a universal within a solely immanent reality places the subject’s
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rational will to act autonomously within a corresponding autonomously natural ground.
External authority is not even in the picture. So the form-content distinction and
autonomous reason not only roots the subject in a natural foundation, but also extricates
the subject from external authority as the particularities of over-belief. This sense of
autonomy, reason, and experience is what liberal theology accepts when it begins with
the primacy of reason and experience, over the “appeal to external authority,” for “all
claims to truth.”62 The embrace of liberal autonomy in liberal theology, however, is best
illustrated in the next two layers.63
Kant and the post-Kantians combined a philosophy of the mind, of abstract
universals, of immediate sense experience, and of reason all within an immanent frame.
Their purpose was to free the subject to apprehend universal truth. That made it possible
to transcend one’s limited epistemological subjectivity for Kant (to a degree) and
Schleiermacher, and also to develop consciousness for Hegel. The Kantian and postKantian subject is constructed out of abstract universals joined with the active self that
orders its knowledge and its subjectivity through the capacity of objective, autonomous
reason. This unity created an epistemological hermeneutic of an immanent, active subject
that did two things. First, it broke the subject’s connection to particularity and relegated
faith to rational morality. It thereby excluded external authoritative determinations like
tradition, and at least qualified previous notions of communal determination and
revelation. Second, it provided the space to rationally discover (or posit) an abstract
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anthropological foundation and its constitutive categories. The subject is now free to
construct itself; the subject becomes its own sovereign.64
The Second Layer of Liberal Theology
Yet strictly adhering to autonomy excluded even rational theology, not just
orthodox over-belief. The second layer of “integrative mediation” answers how to retain
faith so that one can be both liberal and Christian.65 The second layer is, on the one hand,
its own axiom: “the viability and necessity of an alternative to orthodox over-belief and
secular disbelief.”66 On the other hand, that axiom also explains how one can operate
within the first layer. Born out of apologetic and survivalist concerns, liberal theology
began in the German theology that sought to meet the criticisms of the enlightenment
deists and atheists on their own terms. The German approach used reason and experience
to mediate between over-belief and disbelief. Starting with Kant and the post-Kantians,
liberal theology combined “freethinking” with theological conviction to produce a third
way: human experience and reason largely apart from external authority was privileged
for critically reasoning about God and for developing an account of how humanity ought
to live.67 If faith is primarily based on the external authority of a particular revelation or
tradition, faith is noncompliant and threatens autonomous reason at the heart of
autonomous subjectivity. This understanding of faith is rejected as unscientific, irrational
belief because it cannot be objectively verified by science. It may also be rejected as
over-belief because the partisan form makes it incapable of articulating the fullness of
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universal, objective truth. To make faith compliant and find the universal truth one needs
to apply reason, not the biased particularity of tradition or community, to faith in
experience and/or history. This process strips away or reinterprets the legacy of faith in
Christian history under the rubric of liberal values.68
One result of this distinguishing project is the demythologizing of faith, which
strips or radically reinterprets doctrinal formulations considered mythological or
oppressive in a modern, scientific world. What remains is the perceived true essence of
faith configured according to experience and modern understanding. Schleiermacher, for
instance, may have believed the resurrection occurred, but whether it happened or not for
him is beside the real point, “to know Christ as redeemer.”69 While this first result is a
critical implication of autonomous reason, a second result is constructive. Reason and
experience reconfigure faith into rational morality or feeling and theology into
apologetics. Faith may participate in society by contributing to choosing moral norms,
like choice itself. But faith’s public participation depends on separating faith from its
particular form in order to explain itself within liberal categories and values to society.
For the most part, Kant and most post-Kantians, accordingly, construe Jesus as an
exemplar or moral teacher of enlightenment for and through freedom. For the more
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mystically inclined then and now, Jesus is a symbol. Traditional faith, then, is deemed
over-belief, unscientific, and irrational when such faith is not reshaped by autonomous
reason. But through autonomous reason, faith can be rationally cured from over-belief to
become a rational morality congruent with abstract, universal truth and modern
knowledge.70
The Third Layer of Liberal Theology
The third layer is a catch-all category for the transformative shockwaves once
autonomous reason and experience supplanted external authority in liberal thought.
Thereby liberal theology is further distinguished from other theologies. The first and
second layers, as ways of taking up the liberal project, mean for Dorrien that liberal
theology “is open to the verdicts of modern intellectual inquiry, especially historical
criticism and the natural sciences.”71 The ramifications of this are extensive for Dorrien.
Liberal theology, first, “reconceptualizes the meaning of Christianity in the light of
modern knowledge and values” like the idealist philosophy of the mind and the notion of
the free, autonomous subject.72 Second, liberal theology “is reformist in spirit and
substance, not revolutionary.”73 Change comes from within humanity’s self-development,
and so liberal theology works with society rather than opting for divine apocalyptic in-
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breaking over and/or against society. Third, for liberal theology to be progressive within
a liberal status quo, “it conceives Christianity as an ethical way of life, it advocates moral
concepts of atonement or reconciliation, and it is committed to making progressive
religion credible and socially relevant.”74 Consequently, liberal theology is first defined
by reason and experience over-against external authority. But that is far from the totality
of its work. Liberal theology seeks to plumb the theological depths of liberal autonomy.75
II. Hauerwas Against the Unfaithfulness of Liberal Theology
Hauerwas decisively rejects both liberalism and liberal theology. He does so, I
will argue, because he maintains a hierarchical and relational understanding of truth.
Jesus, in his particularity, is the truth and is known through particular relations. Since
Hauerwas has not articulated his specific opposition to liberal theology in terms of
Dorrien’s definition, I show that Hauerwas’s account of truth informs his rejection of
liberal theology’s three layers. Against layer one, he finds that liberalism’s autonomous
subjectivity and rationality are deceptive, incoherent, and hegemonic. Under the
hegemonic pressure to conform, in layer two liberal theology takes on an incoherent
“double mind” by attempting to balance liberalism’s deception and incoherence with
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Christian faith.76 Liberal theology’s incoherence in layer two then begets deep
unfaithfulness to Jesus in layer three.77
Hauerwas Against the First Layer
Like Dorrien, Hauerwas recognizes that the idealist turn to “the mind” and the
active self is about autonomy.78 But he rejects this first layer of liberal theology since he
rejects as deceptive the idealist epistemological turn to the active self, the autonomous
subject, and the autonomy of reason. Kant’s rational autonomy is deeply problematic and
is far from liberating. It uses rational idealism––or in Hauerwas’s terms, a “disembodied
‘rationality’”––to ignore the contingency of history, of tradition, and an “ultimate telos”
of life in order to clear space for autonomous self-construction through rules and
autonomous choice.79 For Hauerwas, that anthropology and its corresponding politics
refuses to acknowledge a fundamental reality. The subject is relationally constituted by
the historical particularity of social bodies and social contexts, and by the particular Godgivenness of life, of meaning, and of value. So Hauerwas rejects, accordingly, the
construal of human freedom as self-grounding, as the right to arbitrary choice, or what
would be more specific to Dorrien, freedom as its own end. In fact for Hauerwas, Kantian
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autonomy is a “lie,” a “self-deception.”80 In contrast to truth, “lies are nothing less than
contradictions of the word of God and the reality that is created by God.”81 Then what is
the truth? How is it known? Hauerwas maintains truth hierarchically ordered. Jesus,
crucified and resurrected, is the truth that shows “there can be no truth more
determinative” than him and his work.82 An account of Jesus as such focused on his
particularity constitutes Hauerwas’s relational understanding of truth.83
Against Kantian and Hegelian accounts of knowledge as essence and rationalepistemological abstraction, Hauerwas contends that what is “true cannot be secured by a
theory of truth more determinative than the faith itself.”84 Otherwise he quips: “if you
think you need a theory of truth to underwrite the conviction that Jesus was raised from
the dead, then worship that theory––not Jesus.”85 That idolatry of theory creates an
“ideological distortion,” an abstraction of divinity in accordance with a general, religious,
or moral sensibility which Jesus and/or his kingdom is then made to exemplify.86 In
contradistinction to theory and abstraction, Hauerwas stresses that Jesus in his
particularity is simultaneously God incarnate in history and the universal truth. For
Hauerwas, the particularity of Jesus is the truth essential for Christians to be able “to call
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God creator or redeemer.”87 Jesus is inseparable, even theoretically, from his embodiment
and from his teachings of God’s kingdom, for he is the “autobasileia.”88 That is, the
particular ‘shape’ of Jesus is the ‘shape’ of God’s kingdom present in human history.
Accordingly, Jesus-for-all is the revelation of God-for-all in God’s cosmic kingdom.
Jesus as the autobasileia reveals within human history “how God rules” and loves.89
Thereby, Jesus is God’s transformative speech that makes divine peace real in humanity
and to the world.90
Truth, then, is not bound up in a general theory or list of abstract propositions.
Nor is truth ‘neutral,’ autonomous data. Instead, truth is known in humanity’s relation to
the “living God.”91 Jesus, in his particularity, is the living truth who shows humanity “the
truth of ourselves as sinful and misunderstanding.”92 Accordingly, to known such truth
requires living in both relation and particularity. The truth is made known in one’s
relations to others, in the stories of those relations, and in the relational process of re-
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telling and acting those stories. Jesus is made known in and through the church, a living
community in a particular tradition that re-tells the particular story of Jesus by
embodying it. Truth is then found in one’s contingent, always-particular, “historical
existence” rather than particularity as an incomplete facade for universal truth.93 Both
that particular storied tradition and its faithful embodiment are required to know the truth.
Truth, then, refers to human beings’ relation to God and to other human beings.94
However, liberalism’s autonomous subjectivity and reason undermine the
possibility of a particular tradition. The autonomous subject’s freedom is limited to its
self-interest since meaning and value are dependent on the subject and self-construction
is achieved through choice. Neither Kant’s encouragement to be more rationally dutiful
nor Hegel’s more rigorously plumbing of consciousness through the active self
perceiving its relation to the whole will save one from self-deception or move one beyond
self-interest. Not only does autonomous reason fail to develop the habits and skills
necessary to act in accordance with virtues supplied by the true story embodied in a
community, but also the position that “one can judge all belief prior to having any,” like
standing outside a “tradition,” is “illusory.”95 That illusory assumption dismisses the

93

Hauerwas, VV, 123. See also Hauerwas, AE, 77-78; Hauerwas, CC, 52, 61-62, 93-97; Hauerwas, AN, 43, 65; Hauerwas, CET, 40;
Hauerwas, PK, 6, 28-29; Hauerwas, IGC, 37, 158; Hauerwas, STT, 141; Hauerwas, “Why Truth Demands Truthfulness,” 304-305.
94
Hauerwas, CC, 93; Hauerwas, PF, 61-63, 66-67; Hauerwas, AC, 63-64, 143; Hauerwas, VV, 123; Hauerwas, WW, 20 n. 17;
Hauerwas, “Why Truth Demands Truthfulness,” 307; Hauerwas, CC, 18; Hauerwas, CET, 40; Hauerwas, IGC, xiii; Hauerwas, PF, 17,
62-63; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 55; Long, Speaking of God, 300; Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, CC, 43, 49-52, 61, 93; Hauerwas,
CET, 53-54, 58, 61; Hauerwas, IGC, 158-160; Hauerwas, PF, 78 n. 5; Hauerwas, PK, 24-30; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 71-72, 77,
97, 101; Hauerwas, WT, 62 (The emphasis on tradition above is a way of attending to Hauerwas’s stress on Wittgensteinian
grammar/language and qualification of narrative qua narrative, see PF, 137-140.); Hauerwas, AC, 35, 152; Hauerwas, AN, 5-9, 42-44;
Hauerwas, CC, 52, 63; Hauerwas, CET, 54; Hauerwas, IGC, 156, 158; Hauerwas, PK, 28-30; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 28-29, 38,
46-47; Hauerwas, PF, 64, 66-68.
95
Hauerwas, DF, 22; Hauerwas, DT, 194. See also Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 98-100; Hauerwas, STT, 185, 221. Hauerwas’s
charge of illusion may stem from an external critique, but it also has an internal critique. He acknowledges that the rational, lawful,
dutiful, ahistorical, and universal characteristics of Kant’s morality are supposed to keep it from succumbing to arbitrary desires in the
subject’s pursuit of autonomy. However, Hauerwas argues that Kant’s rational morality is ironically all the more arbitrary and illusory
because it centralizes individual self-interest by privileging choice. Hauerwas, CC, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, PK, 3, 10-11; Hauerwas and
Willimon, RA, 98; Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the

42

“contingent” rationality of tradition in order for reason to apprehend abstract universals
over-against the contingency and particularity of storied tradition.96 Accordingly,
autonomous reason explicitly (Kant) or subtly (Hegel) overrides particularity and
tradition with abstract universals that form autonomy, that narrow and thin morality, and
that distort reason into an instrument for serving self-interest in choice. Hauerwas
concludes, then, that autonomy’s denial of tradition for self-interest, reduction of morality
to choice, and instrumentalization of reason recapitulate the “illusions” of “selfdeception.”97 Autonomy itself is neither liberation nor the truth.98
Hauerwas finds that autonomy’s self-deceptive illusions and its ironic
incoherencies are concomitant. His most common criticism of liberal autonomy’s
incoherencies focuses on its refusal of tradition. As shown already, liberalism rejects the
“transcendent perspective of the kind associated with traditional Christianity” on the
grounds of autonomy.99 Liberalism’s largely immanent and ‘natural’ cosmology,
understood through a corresponding autonomous and ‘neutral’ rationality, desacralizes
the world from external sources and over-belief. This deception, however, “fostered its
own tradition” in the centuries-long pursuit of autonomous self-transcendence.100 Indeed,
not only is autonomous reason an oxymoron, despite liberalism’s rejection of a
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“transcendent perspective,” Hauerwas also points out that liberalism aspires to achieve
the same transcendent perspective through autonomous self-transcendence.101
Starting with this fundamental incoherence, an ironic hegemony over political
arrangements rows and perniciously polices Christianity by both explicitly excluding and
subtly supplanting it on liberal terms. Informed by Hauerwas’s account of hierarchical
and relational truth established above, I focus here on his critique of political liberalism’s
incoherent ironies that begin with autonomy rivaling the transcendent perspective and
end with excluding it. In Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s second layer I address
the issue of supplanting.102
Hauerwas’s reflection of death is one way he has developed a critical connection
between liberalism’s incoherence and its political order. Death grounds liberalism’s
desacralized autonomy by replacing ‘external authorities’ with death as the basic reality
of existence. Although liberalism may then appear bound by death, liberalism’s attempt
to overcome death legitimizes liberalism’s re-sacralization, the attempt to achieve a
transcendental perspective. The threat of death justifies political liberalism’s forcing of
people into its political arrangement as citizens with nothing in “common” but “their fear
of death.”103 Desacralizing the world legitimates the liberal nation-state’s claims to
autonomous ownership of and sovereignty over death and life through the state’s

101

For the quote: Hauerwas, WW, 231. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 124-129; Hauerwas, BH, 13-15; Hauerwas,
CC, 78-79; Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and
Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 67 (hereafter CAV); Hauerwas, IGC, 200-201; Hauerwas,
STT, 150-151, 191, 221; Hauerwas, VV, 232 n. 25; Hauerwas, WAD, 7-11; Hauerwas, WW, 52-54; Hauerwas, AE, 114-116; Hauerwas,
DF, 22; Hauerwas, STT, 221; Hauerwas, WW, 84. For Hauerwas’s other accusations of liberal incoherence, see CC, 99; IGC, 170-171;
TT, 55; WW, 112.
102
In relation to the modern nation-state, chapter three will develop issues raised within the theme of exclusion here.
103
Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 169. See also Hauerwas, AC, 64-67; Hauerwas, AE, 124; Hauerwas, DT, 213; Hauerwas, WAD, 48;
Hauerwas, WW, 86. The fact that this forcing is far from voluntary marks a shift in Hauerwas’s work. See Hauerwas, CC, 231 n. 10;
Hauerwas, VV, 219.

44

monopoly on policing violence and its claims to ensure peace. Since such an autonomous
attempt to overcome death is an attempt at self-transcendence, for Hauerwas the liberal
political order is no less than a sacral order that aspires to be an alternative contrary to
Jesus.104
The question for political liberalism is how should a politics be constructed that is
both autonomous and transcendental? How does one affirm the autonomy of individuals
and still unify them in order to keep the peace? Political liberalism answers with a
minimalist anthropology of autonomy and a political order that reflect Kant’s universal
morality as reason and rules. Persons are reduced to rational “individuals…[as] a
particular unit of arbitrary desire”; the good is reduced to one’s right to freely pursue
arbitrary desires.105 These reductions to arbitrary desire are realized through political
rules that are arranged and enforced by the neutral modern nation-state. Key to this
political arrangement is a concept of negative freedom for self-construction by each and
all to construct themselves. In such an arrangement, the major issues are the autonomy of
the individual and the self-serving procedure of rational rules rather than the substance of
the various desires themselves. By reasoning within this empty apparatus, liberalism
ensures political unity. Liberalism immediately affirms individual freedom on the one
hand, and rationally resolves disputes between the conflicting, diverse desires of
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autonomous subjects on the other hand. Justice is the name for this procedural negotiation
between conflicting desires in order to secure freedom and unity.106
Hauerwas grants that the liberal political order claims to be an “empty” “system
of rules” since it does not supply “moral content.”107 But he notes a deep irony in the
difference between the lacunae within the procedural apparatus and the assumed morality
in the apparatus’s procedural structure. The emptiness of the apparatus depends on an
ideology of negative freedom, which itself presupposes liberalism’s autonomous,
universal anthropology called human dignity. What is “moral” is “to satisfy our ‘wants’
and ‘needs,’” but everyone determines their own wants and needs.108 So autonomous,
rational, and “universal principles,” such as human dignity, are the basis for an
autonomous, rational, and “universal ethic,” typified by the idea of universal human
rights.109 All the while dignity and rights are framed in terms of morality. In fact,
liberalism collapses the differences between morality, human dignity, and rights in order
to constitute a public morality. Exemplified by Kant, liberal public “morality only has
meaning when considered as a schema of laws or principles self-evident to any
reasonable person.”110 In that framework, what is morally wrong (injustice) is violating
an individual’s rights and the rules for ensuring those rights. Doing so contravenes the
two ideals ensured by autonomous rational morality. The first ideal is the social space of
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negative freedom for pursuing self-interest. The second ideal is the underlying principle
of the individual and one’s freedom as ends in themselves (human dignity). There is a
moral order then, but it extends no further than individual autonomy and rules necessary
to ensure it. Moral behavior is reduced to following legal procedures in the pursuit of
self-interest.111
Nearly every step in liberalism’s political-moral order is deeply problematic for
Hauerwas. Political liberalism presupposes but neither supplies nor gives its own account
of virtues, of character, of the family unit, and of the other moral contributions to social
life. So although liberalism’s desacralized world denies external sources, liberal society’s
morality is ironically “parasitic” on sources like Christianity that are external, even
contrary, to autonomy.112 That irony, Hauerwas contends, creates harmful ironies as
liberalism incorporates issues, ideas, people, and politics by redefining them in terms of
autonomy. The flashpoint that (in)famously characterizes Hauerwas’s critical position on
liberalism is his rejection of human dignity and rights language. But his position is more
complex than his infamy might lead one to believe.113
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His hierarchy of truth in particular relations, on the one hand, affirms human
dignity in terms of the imago Dei and the creaturehood of human bodies. But on the other
hand, he rejects the abstraction or autonomy of them as ends in themselves construed as
rights within liberal politics. This affirmation and rejection Hauerwas derives from an
historicized, relational frame. Humans are historical creatures constituted by their relation
to God the creator who, as incarnated, entered history to bring about reconciliation. A
“common humanity” does not name the abstract universal of humanity derived from the
species’s universal capacity to reason, a presumption important for liberal peacemaking.114 In other words, human dignity is rooted in receiving and giving gifts in
relation to God and other human creatures, not in pursuing self-interested desires. So
Hauerwas affirms human dignity relationally because he affirms it in light of Jesus, of
human community, and of “friendship with God” as the creature’s “telos.”115
Hauerwas’s relational account of human dignity contrasts sharply with a
fundamental incoherence found in the link between liberalism’s language of human
dignity and rights language. In accordance with the idea that human dignity is its own
end, rights language separates people into individuals and “trains us to pursue our
interests as ends in themselves.”116 The emphasis on individuals and their self-interests
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not only undercuts the possibility to see “common interests or beliefs” and ultimately
undermines the common good.117 More basically “the concept and ethics of dignity, if
pressed too consistently, finally begin to erode the essential sociality of the human on
which any sense of identity is possible.”118 So political liberalism eliminates the very
social ground that it parasitically assumes in its attempt to secure the possibility of
peaceful relations.
From that incoherent irony follows a second: the suppression of difference. In
order to unify disparate individuals and their rival self-interests, political liberalism
employs the liberal epistemology of abstract universals in the political vocabulary of
human dignity and rights. However, those two abstract universals actually hide
significant differences, rather than ensure relations among those with significant
differences. The whole point of rights language, as a public morality in order to secure
individual autonomy, is to employ abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as
fundamentally private. That re-definition creates a minimal political-moral order which
reduces differences and external sources to private desires.119
By reducing difference to private desire, the constructive suppression of
difference supposedly ensures both autonomy and unity without being “coercive.”120 But
for Hauerwas, such “Kantian-like” power dynamics establish an ironic and pernicious
hegemony over public space in the name of ensuring autonomy.121 For instance, the
pattern of employing abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as fundamentally
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private is imposed on Christianity through the category of ‘religion,’ an abstract universal
that construes Christian faith as one kind of individual, private interest. This classification
is done in order to make Christianity cohere with “modern democratic assumptions” of
autonomy vis-à-vis the citizen-consumer.122 Yet that continuity undercuts discipleship as
learning the “craft” of following Jesus from within a tradition and a masterful
community.123 The consequences of that undermining are catastrophic. The privatization
of faith explicitly excludes the particularity of Christianity from the public sphere,
thereby rendering “invisible” Christianity’s distinctiveness.124 This political, external
policing of Christianity then works its way into US Christianity. Faith, construed as an
interior, principled belief by individuals “separable from the social form,” undermines the
church as a socio-political body and the social salvation that the body of Christ is
supposed to embody.125 Liberal autonomy and privatization dissolve the socio-political
constitution of the church, crucial to social salvation, into little more than a private,
“voluntary association” of autonomous individuals.126 So religious freedom can be a
Trojan horse. It polices, silences, and ultimately distorts Christianity by refashioning
Christian self-understanding as a ‘religion’ limited by the state’s category of free but
private belief. Liberal hegemony, Hauerwas concludes, ultimately creates a superficial
pluralism in the liberal order.127

122

Hauerwas, AC, 102. See also Hauerwas, AC, 29-31, 96-99; Hauerwas, AN, 41; Hauerwas, BH, 114-116; Hauerwas, CC, 217-219;
Hauerwas, DF, chp. 4; Hauerwas, IGC, p. 188, chp. 13; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 11; Hauerwas and Wood, “How the Church Became
Invisible,” 64-65, 88-89 n. 5-8.
123
Hauerwas, AC, 103. See also Hauerwas, AC, 95-97, 102-108; Hauerwas, AN, chp. 2; Hauerwas, WW, 116. This framework learning
a skill through an apprenticeship under a master is, by Hauerwas’s own admission, “hierarchical” (DF, 8).
124
Hauerwas, SU, 4, 181. See also Hauerwas, AN, p. 5, chp. 2; Hauerwas, DF, chp. 4.
125
Hauerwas, IGC, 210. See also Hauerwas, AC, 95-100.
126
Hauerwas, PK, 12. See also Hauerwas, AC, 96-100; Hauerwas, CC, 217-219; Hauerwas, CET, 150; Hauerwas, IGC, 201-202.
127
Hauerwas, AC, 29, 95-97; Hauerwas, AE, 129-132; Hauerwas, SU, 60; Stanley Hauerwas and Ralph Wood, “How the Church
Became Invisible: A Christian Reading of American Literary Tradition,” Religion & Literature 38, no. 1 (2006): 64-65; Hauerwas,
AC, 70-74, 84, 88-92; Hauerwas, CC, 72, 77; Hauerwas, CET, 114; Hauerwas, IGC,131-132, 202-211; Hauerwas, WW, 223 n. 13;

50

Hauerwas Against the Second Layer
Recall that Dorrien defines liberal theology’s second layer with reference to the
necessity of faith, and the union of faith with liberal autonomy. Hauerwas describes such
a union with the terms “double mind” or “double-think.”128 Under the guise of apologetic
concerns, liberal theology seeks to explain Christianity by making it reasonable,
“relevant,” and even “credible” on liberal society’s terms.129 In order to do so, liberal
theology knowingly and willingly self-polices external authority out of bounds in order to
accommodate the liberal assumptions of autonomous subjectivity, autonomous reason,
and experience. Liberal theology, then, not only accepts the deception and incoherence of
liberalism. In doing so liberal theology also becomes itself incoherent to both nontheological liberalism and to Christianity.
For Hauerwas, granting too much credence to liberal categories ironically makes
liberal theology incoherent for non-theological liberalism. If abstract universals are
objectively true and can be known through the neutral objectivity of autonomous reason
apart from the supposed bias of particularity, then theology does no more than provide
mythological “confirmation” or “opinion” about what more experiential and rational
disciplines already articulate.130 Whether liberal theology begins with human feeling
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(Schleiermacher) or speculatively reasons about human history in order to transcend it
(Hegel) over-against ‘external authority,’ liberal theology makes all theology a natural
theology that is “tested” or “validated” in light “of the human condition” (R. Niebuhr).131
Theology no longer begins and ends with the particularity of Jesus. Rather, theology
contemplates “‘nature’” through and for constructing an abstract, unifying principle or
principles.132 Such theology is, for Hauerwas, open to Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique.
Theology is no more than the product of sociological formation from psychological
wishing for something more than sheer immanence. Theology, then, is divested of what it
thinks makes it theological because it really is anthropology in disguise. Theology as
such becomes ultimately unnecessary now that it is tantamount to a perverse soft science,
philosophy, or politics according to secular standards. So Hauerwas argues that liberal
theology’s successful mission of accommodation has ultimately reinforced nontheological liberal presuppositions about Christianity. It is a private affair that poorly
expresses natural reality which are better accessed by other means than faith. The
apologetic mission of liberal theology, ironically, made it incoherent and self-defeating.
That is, liberal theology tacitly affirmed that it should be ignored in its pursuit of
relevance.133
Hauerwas rejects the need to cooperate with the demands of liberal rationalism in
order for faith to justify what liberalism deems “irrational.”134 He focuses instead on the
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“content of belief” in order “to make the world credible to the gospel.”135 Christian
categories like baptism and eucharist should reconfigure questions about suicide, capital
punishment, and war. Yet liberal categories undercut the Christian categories crucial to
Christianity’s distinctiveness. So here Hauerwas and liberal theology split again.136
Hauerwas’s position on truth in hierarchy and relation emphasizes the
distinctiveness of Christian witness in the church’s faithful, embodied imitation of Jesus.
The church should first seek to be an alternative to the world because the church aims for
faithfulness to Jesus’s story by embodying Jesus. Jesus’s story is not an ethic judged by
effectiveness; instead, his story “is a social ethic.”137 So rather than first pursuing justice
outside of the church, “the church is a social ethic.”138 That is, the church is a new
“polity” which “demonstrate[s] that Jesus has made possible a new world, a new social
order.”139 The communal faithfulness to Jesus calls for true reconciliation in the form of
friendship among human creatures, among human communities, and between humanity
and God. In the church’s faithfulness to that polity, the church embodies God’s invitation
to the “sinsick” world so that it may see itself in a saving relation to Jesus.140 For
Hauerwas, then, the distinctive and robust embodiment of discipleship and not some
external standard of rationality measures the church’s credibility, makes its convictions
intelligible, and proves the truth of those convictions. So theological discourse is about
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making humanity “intelligible to God” on God’s terms rather than liberal theology’s
apologetic task of making God or the church intelligible to the world on its terms.141
In contrast to Hauerwas’s account of truthful witness, he argues that liberal
theology integrates itself into society not by finding common ground but by “speak[ing]
back to our society baptized idealizations first learned from society itself.”142 Granting
too much credence to liberal categories results in a catastrophically incoherent
redefinition of Christianity. Allowing autonomous reason to “unwarrantedly expand the
realm of the irrational” sets liberal theology on the path of a natural moralism that
defines, critiques, and demythologizes ‘over-belief.’143 Hauerwas’s reaction against
liberal theology’s project is multi-layered. He rebuffs the presupposition of
demythologization: that Kant’s abstract, neutral reason purifies Christian over-belief into
a set of abstract, modern ideals that better access universal truth. That expansion of “the
irrational” raises more fundamental problems. Christianity is situated as another
voluntary belief system “aimed at making our lives more coherent” with a liberal and
capitalist logic of Kantian autonomy as choice.144 To construe faith as such, Hauerwas
argues, misunderstands that Christianity “is a constitutive set of skills that requires the
transformation of the self to rightly see the world.”145 Deeper still, the mediating
apologetics of liberal theology implies that the goal is “to make God intelligible to
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‘modern man,’ whoever that may be.”146 This theological privileging of autonomy,
Hauerwas argues, sets theology on a Pelagian trajectory where “any life-directing
attraction toward God’s creative and redemptive being becomes unintelligible.”147
Instead, Hauerwas maintains that “theology’s task” is “to make ourselves intelligible to
God.”148 Hauerwas does not advocate for a high Christology over a low Christology; he
eschews just such a dichotomy. Rather, he rejects the impulse within liberalism to control
the church by separating it from the particularity of Jesus and marginalizing the church
under the guise of apologetics. Thus the incoherence of liberal theology is produced by
and at the service of the liberal project.149
So from layer one, liberalism’s hegemony of privatizing Christianity and
rendering it invisible means that any public explanation of Christianity on its own terms
is not credible for liberal society. In layer two, liberal theology’s endeavor to make
Christianity intelligible and thereby credible to society on liberalism’s terms is an
accommodating endeavor that renders Christianity irrelevant and incoherent. That
rendering is advanced by a third aspect in both liberalism’s hegemony and liberal
theology’s accommodation. Political liberalism’s pressure to translate Christianity’s
language into secular idioms further establishes Christianity’s invisibility. When that
translation is accommodated by liberal theology, it becomes “functionally atheistic.”150
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What expresses and ensures liberalism’s limited public morality is a “neutral,”
public language, or “third language.”151 It stands over any public discussion between two
other particularities such as the languages of particular communities or traditions. The
third language, then, is what the ‘bias’ of Christian language must be translated in order
to receive a public hearing. However, for Hauerwas the third language and the public
square are “anything but neutral” or objective, no matter whether translation is described
positively or negatively.152 Positively, Christian faith translated into a rational morality of
rules and choice reformulates the historical story of God’s work and human response into
a set of ahistorical propositions that assume a religious essence and that distill it into
moral beliefs. Negatively, the third language divests faith of the particular language that
constitutes its meaning. Any acceptable public talk of God is subject to autonomous
reason and abstract universals that reduces God to the void of an abstract ‘god.’
Privatization demands that any public utterance of faith not be identified as religious.
According to liberal reason, then, speech must be translated into a third language, the
abstract idiom of morality that is safe for the ‘neutral’ (autonomous) public square.
Whatever private ‘beliefs’ the liberal order allows in public must be transformed first to
align with public procedural morality. So not only does the abstract, universal category of
religion “domesticate” Christianity through privatization, but also translation further
domesticates Christianity by supplanting its particularity in public with the liberal moral
order.153
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Liberal theologians and ethicists like Dorrien find parallels between Christianity
and the liberal order in categories like equality, human dignity, and justice for the
oppressed. But for Hauerwas, the liberal version of those categories is “a universal
that…tempts us to substitute…some moral ideal” or “external standard” like human
rights “for our faithfulness to God” and God’s kingdom that realizes true freedom,
justice, equality, and peace.154 The consequences of substitution through translation are
catastrophic. As Hauerwas fatally asked of Walter Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many
other liberal theologians, if translation indicates that rhetoric, not substance, is the true
difference between Christian language and secular idioms, “then why bother saying it
theologically at all?”155 But Hauerwas’s socratic point has an even more incisive edge.
When liberal theology bows to liberalism’s hegemonic demand to translate Christian
language, liberal theology becomes a co-participant in supplanting Christian identity with
the procedural morality of the liberal order. Through the likes of Rauschenbusch and
Niebuhr, liberal theology translated Christian faith into “an ethic for ‘anyone’” in order to
be a universal, democratic morality for co-operative participation in the “civilizing
project” of liberalism.156 To justify this project, liberal theology asserted that
Christianity’s mission to universally “make things right” can avoid the political chaos
feared by liberal theology and political liberalism.157 But ironically, when the liberal
standard is normative and Christianity is privatized, “what Christians believe or do not
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believe about God” is made “irrelevant” while justice through violence is accepted as
necessary and “responsible.”158 Christianity in the US, accordingly, took on the role of
justifying the nation-state as Christian ethics became a branch of US society for US
interests. So Christian ethics became unmoored from Jesus and hitched to liberal
procedure, privatization, and translation. The incoherencies of liberal theology and the
supplanting of Christianity, Hauerwas judges, are the source of liberal theology greatest
unfaithfulness.159
Hauerwas Against the Third Layer
The second layer’s shockwaves reverberate in the third layer. On Hauerwas’s
view, liberal theology’s embrace of the first layer and liberal theology’s subsequent
incoherence create its unfaithfulness. Liberal theology becomes unfaithful by embracing
the pernicious hegemony of the liberal order that supplants Christian loyalty to the nonviolent particularity of Jesus with the moral-political order of liberalism as the
mechanism for peace. Hauerwas’s most repeated concern is that liberal theology, as part
of liberalism’s civilizing project, is “Constantinian.”160
In short, Constantinianism is “making the faith credible to the powers-that-be so
that Christians might now have a share in those powers.”161 The Constantinian project is
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possible for liberal theology because the Constantinian presupposition that “God
is…available to anyone, without moral transformation and spiritual guidance” parallels
the liberal assumption that knowledge is an abstract universal which construes
“Christianity as a truth separable from truthful witness.”162 So for both Constantinianism
and liberal theology, one can be a “Christian without training.”163 Christianity as such
mimics political liberalism’s assertion that justice can be attained by procedure rather
than by God’s justice, which for Hauerwas is Jesus and his reconciling work embodied
by the church. Further coherence between the Constantinian project and political
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liberalism undergirds the justification of Constantinianism as being “politically
responsible.”164 Such legitimacy is based on a Christianized version of political
liberalism, which fears that political chaos will erupt and that human freedom will be
undercut without Christian involvement.165
The allure of responsibility and justification of chaos are difficult to abandon if
one holds to similar assumptions typified by R. Niebuhr’s realist project. Parallel to
liberal desacralization, he started with original sin as the “universal condition” of
humanity and the one “empirically verifiable” doctrine of Christianity.166 Beginning as
such furthered desacralization in two ways. First, he circumvented the biblical and
Christian fact that one cannot know that one is a sinner apart from Jesus’s work. Second,
Niebuhr’s empirical original sin eventually led to his claim that Jesus’s love ethic is
impossible in the public sphere, to Niebuhr’s argument for democracy as the means for
peace, to his critical support for national interests. So he fulfills liberal theology’s
presupposition that its “fundamental task [is] to make America work.”167 Both Dorrien
and Hauerwas note that despite Niebuhr’s sharp criticisms of liberal theology, his
assumptions placed him in fundamental continuity with it. Like the social gospel,
Niebuhr’s anthropology beginning with sin reflects liberal assumptions about death’s
importance. In response, also similar to the social gospel, Niebuhr understood that the
mission of Christianity is to transform society through social justice. Rather than Jesus,
then, the liberal order serves as the peacemaker, either as an international community
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(e.g., Kant, the social gospelers, and Dorrien) or the nation-state (e.g., Hegel and
Niebuhr). Since liberal theology is more amenable to non-theological liberalism, the
liberal order can use an accommodated version of Christianity to secure peace.168
Hauerwas calls Constantinianism liberal theology’s apologetic and socially
transformative project, because liberal theology yokes Christianity with state power in
order to “make history come out right.”169 However, as Hauerwas is quick to note, liberal
unity and progress have not led to more peace. Instead, liberal theology has historically
been guilty of significant participation in US colonialism.170 For a long time liberal
theology has mistakenly conflated redemption with “progressive process” and US
violence.171 Even Niebuhr, despite his deep criticism of naive progressivism, argued for a
progressive realist project that critically supported the state through translating Christian
categories into liberal categories. But in doing so he inadvertently made the US his
church, which blinded him so that he ultimately capitulated to US interests.
Constantinianism, then, is tantamount to taming Christianity with what Dietrich
Bonhoeffer called “cheap grace.”172
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Hauerwas’s rejection of Constantinianism is predicated on his hierarchical and
relational account of truth. For him, living in God’s reign is about “truth and illusion”
rather than, as the social gospelers emphasized, about whether or not God’s kingdom is
“realized and unrealized.”173 The same pattern of contrast goes for Niebuhr and
Hauerwas. The former was framed by what could be realized, even though he despised
idealist kingdom language. But for Hauerwas, Niebuhr mistakenly confused sin and
relevance for what truly creates and shapes humanity, thereby undercutting the church’s
witness to the world. Contrary to Niebuhr, Hauerwas maintains that one cannot know that
one is a sinner until it is revealed by Jesus. Since the church knows Jesus, the world only
knows it is in sin if the church lives as a faithful witness to the truth.174
Hauerwas’s ecclesial politics accordingly diverges from Niebuhr’s. The church’s
embodiment of the truth, Hauerwas argues, challenges the US’s racial imagination, its
capitalist mindset, and its foreign policy. Without embodying the distinctiveness and
challenges of Christianity, US Christians become sentimental and cooperative US
citizens in the pursuit of individual and national self-interests. The church, therefore,
should not side with illusion by taking on the role of a “helpful, if sometimes
complaining, prop for the state” as liberal theology does under the guise of gaining
credibility, being effective, and/or achieving relevance.175 Instead, the church’s “first
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task” is to live truthfully together so that it can fulfill the “correlate,” confessional task of
telling the world about its sin and the better hope of Jesus.176
III. Dorrien’s Response to Hauerwas and Shift to Liberal Theology
Dorrien is nothing if not dialectical. This method produces a liberal theology that
is simultaneously continuous and discontinuous with contemporary liberal theology. His
dialectical position, therefore, makes possible a different engagement with Hauerwas and
liberal theology than is the norm. I will begin by situating Dorrien’s work as a response
to Hauerwas’s insights in both his constructive project and his critiques of liberal
theology. In doing so, I complicate not only Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology
insofar as it concerns Dorrien, but also complicate Dorrien’s dated critique of Hauerwas.
These complications will initially show that Dorrien’s concern for faithfulness and
Hauerwas’s concern for justice differ because of their rival evaluations of liberalism.177
In the complications are, however, more important agreements and disagreements
that illuminate Dorrien’s concern for and understanding of truth. Hauerwas once
applauded Dorrien for seeing that translation to achieve relevance “is no longer tenable
and the issue finally is one of truth.”178 Nevertheless, as Dorrien notes, he and Hauerwas
offer “alternative” trajectories for post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity in the US.179
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Countermanding with equal vigor Hauerwas’s proclamation that liberal theology is
incoherent, Dorrien declares that “the original idea of liberal theology is as relevant and
coherent today as it was a hundred years ago.”180 Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s disagreement
ultimately concerns their differences over truth. In contrast to Hauerwas’s hierarchy of
truth, Dorrien maintains a plurality of truths in a mutually informing pattern. In order to
do so, Dorrien recovers underdeveloped and lost aspects of liberal theology, and he
creatively incorporates non-liberal sources into his liberal theology.
This creative recovery means that Dorrien is not at the center of Hauerwas’s
critique of liberal theology. Yet Dorrien’s shift to contemporary liberal theology does not
entirely elude Hauerwas’s critiques either. In contrast to Hauerwas’s argument that liberal
theology has demythologized itself into irrelevance, Dorrien provides a re-mythologized
vision through a mutual interplay of multiple truths. But between what Hauerwas
critiques and what Dorrien supplies, there is enough agreement and difference that the
calcified outer layers of normal discussion are cracked open. Through the crack, at the
end of this chapter, we can move into deeper depths crucial to reach the heart of
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different accounts of relational truth are
rival understandings of reality, not simply differences over liberal re-mythologization or
the church-world relation.
Dorrien’s Agreement with and Critique of Hauerwas, and Complications Therein
Dorrien’s dialectical method roots both his appreciation and his critique of
Hauerwas’s project. Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberal theology have not gone unheeded.
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Dorrien dethrones and replaces liberal theology’s longstanding impulse to pursue success
and to prioritize integration with the powers that be.
In a critical mode he effectively avoids some hallmarks of Constantinianism. He
eschews the endeavor to control history as he maintains that the contemporary church is a
“partial manifestation” of the eschatological kingdom.181 Like Hauerwas, Dorrien
proclaims that “‘success’ is not a theological category,” and he critiques the concern for
credibility that underwrites success.182 For the same reasons and with words very similar
to Hauerwas, Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr’s project of translating Christianity into the
idioms of secular society. “If the meaning of Christian faith can be translated into secular
terms, why bother with Christianity? Niebuhr’s strategy left progressive Christianity
without enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own
reasons.”183 Like Hauerwas, Dorrien observes that Protestant US Christianity’s mainline
withered dramatically as it was ordered by loyalties to nationalism and to relevance
concerns as the assumed cultural Christendom declined. So Dorrien shares Hauerwas’s
worry about US Christianity conflating itself with “liberal political arrangements.”184 For
them, political relevance or social credibility ought not drive Christianity, lest it become
unfaithful. The question is, how is one to be faithful?185
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Dorrien’s constructive answer first parallels and then breaks from Hauerwas.
Instead of success and credibility, Dorrien argues that liberal theology should not only be
“prophetic,” but also be “counter-cultural.”186 But rather than give up on liberal theology
as Hauerwas advocates, Dorrien asserts that liberal theology must uphold counter-cultural
values because the mission of “progressive Christianity” today “is to hold out for the
possibility of a divine good that is too religious for our secular friends and even more
alien to many American Christians.”187 This pattern of Dorrien paralleling and breaking
from Hauerwas continues into issues on which the typical social justice versus
faithfulness narrative dwells. However, the pattern also shows the poverty of that
narrative insofar as it relates to Dorrien. On the basis of the social gospel’s kingdom
theology, he has granted that, “as Hauerwas remarks, the church in the biblical
understanding is a social ethic.”188 Dorrien then challenges Hauerwas to be more faithful
based on the theological commonality Dorrien identifies. To proclaim that the church is a
social ethic “cannot mean that the biblical command to create a just social order is
relativized, since the ethic of the kingdom requires action that struggles for justice for the
poor. In Scripture, the crucial sign of the presence of the kingdom is that justice is
brought to the poor and oppressed.”189 Dorrien argues further for obedient witness to “the
biblical imperative to pour yourself out for the hungry and satisfy the desires of the
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afflicted.”190 These statements indicate Dorrien’s understanding of how to be faithful
even as they serve his critique of Hauerwas.191
The issue of social justice is Dorrien’s first of three critiques directed at Hauerwas
published in 1995 and 1997. Dorrien argued that Hauerwas’s “polemic against social
justice politics [is] unbiblical and ethically unacceptable, and…he [has] wrongly
disparaged the social ethical concern for the ‘right ordering of the world.’”192 The deeper,
second criticism is that Hauerwas’s work creates “isolation” from “a moral responsibility
to work with non-Christians to create a just social order in a pagan world.”193 The third
critique underlies Dorrien’s charge of isolation. “Hauerwas’s version of a kingdom ethic”
maintains a “sharp dichotomy” between church and world that unbiblically “strips
Christianity of much of its social meaning.”194
These critiques reflect Dorrien’s continuing concerns. But his 1995 critique was
overstated even then. Hauerwas affirmed that “the church must pursue societal justice”;
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his concern was that social justice as abstraction would circumvent discipleship.195 For
Hauerwas back then the issue of social justice was about priority. All proper calls to the
world for justice are predicated on first a faithful community embodying God’s justice,
which is a polity faithful to the politics of God’s kingdom. This framework Hauerwas has
since solidified and developed by arguing that Jesus is God’s justice, that justice is
righteousness-reconciliation, and that the church is the embodiment of Jesus’s reconciling
work. Because of God’s reconciling Word to human beings, the latter can become friends
of one another and of God. Thereby reconciliation serves the proleptic, partial
embodiment of transfiguring theosis in contrast to a sinful world.196
There are still significant differences between Dorrien and Hauerwas here, in
particular regarding the use of the prophets for supporting liberal justice. But Hauerwas’s
biblical account of justice is not only relational, it is also solidaristic in the best way
possible. Friendship is the increasing sharing with one another, and reconciliation for
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friendship includes “living with” and “suffering with” the handicapped, the elderly, the
infirm, and the poor.197 This much Dorrien could appreciate considering that his emphasis
on solidarity informs and shifts his understanding of liberal justice. So the difference
between Dorrien and Hauerwas is not the pursuit of justice. Even their disagreement over
what justice is and how it is achieved is not so simple.198
Rather, on the level of social justice, the issue is their different evaluation of
Christianity’s participation in political liberalism. For Hauerwas, forgiveness and
friendship require love, truth, mutual vulnerability, time, remembrance, patience,
constancy, and obedience. They make possible the difficult, confrontational work of
reconciliation necessary to truly be friends in God’s peace; the alternative is to risk
succumbing to the false appearance of friendship and to peace secured by violence and
oppression. Hauerwas notes that the requirements and vision of reconciliation are
similarly found in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. However,
he concludes that such work appears “far too demanding,” and that remembrance is “a
deeply illiberal idea.”199 Reconciliation exists for the common good and “resist[s]
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injustice” only through a true healing work rather than through the procedures of liberal
justice.200 Hauerwas’s development here, as well as his more recent work that I will
address later, meets Dorrien’s 1997 comment. He grants that Hauerwas’s work contains
“considerable promise” for openness to “working with non-Christians to create a more
just social order.”201 Thus there is warrant for Hauerwas’s gentle rejection of Dorrien’s
critique of isolation.202
But as they both noted, “the question is…how” Christianity, Hauerwas
emphasizing its “distinctiveness” and Dorrien stressing the connection to society,
contributes to a just social order.203 Dorrien affirms the importance of love,
remembrance, community, and stubbornness––the latter implying patience and time––to
achieve justice. However, his project for politically realizing justice through liberalism
co-inheres with liberal theology’s legacy. The social gospelers’ articulated Christian
language in terms of morality and democracy in order to bridge the gap between
Christian language and secular idioms. R. Niebuhr crossed the bridge and then destroyed
it when he led a generation to reject the social gospelers’ idealistic moralizing. Dorrien
wants to carefully reconstruct the bridge. He does not want to ignore Niebuhr’s insights
about human sin, democracy, and equality. However, Dorrien also relativizes Niebuhr’s
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thin theology and nationalist politics with the social gospelers’ thicker, idealist
understanding of Christianity’s moral presence in the local society and the international
community for the common good. Accordingly, Dorrien’s affinity for the social
gospelers’ understanding of morality maintains some translating of Christian ideals into
public morality (“enough common moral ground to make an intelligible appeal to those
who are not already converted”) as part of creating a just social order.204
So Dorrien is vulnerable to Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology presuming the
importance of morality. But remember Dorrien’s dialectical method. He is still attentive
to the problems of invisibility, of functional atheism, and of capitulation to the status quo
created by translation. The reason for his attention is not answerable in the bare fact that
he and Hauerwas agree over the importance of the question about how Christianity
should contribute to a just social order. Rather, they both notice that the question as a
speech-act raises the deeper issue of truth.
Hauerwas argues that theological accommodation to modernist epistemology and
progressive politics is dangerous even concerning those, like Dorrien, who emphasize
society, the prophetic, economic justice, and equality. For Hauerwas, even critical
accommodation “avoid[s] questions of truth” in order to achieve autonomy and political
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expediency.205 He argues that truth was pushed aside in the pursuit of justice by
theological movements from the social gospel to liberation theologies. The neglect of
truth goes hand in hand with theological reduction or narrowness. The social gospel
reduces Christianity to morality while liberation theology narrows Christianity to the
oppressor-oppressed dynamic.206
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Hauerwas appreciates the connection between theology and politics by Gustavo Gutiérrez, José Segundo, and Jon Sobrino.
Hauerwas is simply concerned with how to connect theology and politics, worrying for instance, about the potential conflation of
Gutiérrez’s three types of liberation (liberation from oppression in politics/economics, in the individual’s psyche, and in relation,
which is liberation from sin for relation with God and humanity) capitulating to political liberalism. That capitulation, which I will
briefly note later, is linked for Hauerwas to his equally central and less qualified critique of liberation theology, that it is too narrow
(which by the way, he also once leveled at political theology). However, there are of course qualifications concerning liberation
theologies. Some of his criticisms of them, beginning with the issue of narrowness in terms of truth, have not always been on the
mark, or were at least quickly proven wrong. Emilie Townes’s defense of liberation theology over truth in “Ethics in Our Time” also
defends implicitly against Hauerwas’s claims in “The Ethicist as Theologian.” In the latter Hauerwas wrote: “The rhetoric of
‘liberation theology’ often makes it appear that the goal of the Christian life is to free us of all limits. That theology’s proponents fail
to discern that the gospel does not free us of all limits but rather provides us with the skills to embody our limits in nondestructive
ways. ‘Liberation theology’ tends to become a theology without the cross. This kind of point is hard to make, of course, without
appearing to be in bad faith, since the church has become the church of the strong” (412). That was in 1975, the very year that James
Cone published God of the Oppressed, in which linking not homoousia but black experience to the cross was crucial to Cone’s
arguments. But for the sake of argument, even if Dorrien was long ago correct, both in his interpretation of Cone as countermanding
redemptive suffering in the cross and, in turn, Dorrien’s use of Juan Luis Segundo to correctively critique Cone, Dorrien would be the
first in line now to note Cone’s recent The Cross and the Lynching Tree. Similarly, besides even Hauerwas’s acknowledgement of
Gutiérrez’s development, some of Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberation theology are now quite dated concerning Gutiérrez. This much
David Kamitsuka notes too as he defends Gutiérrez’s more mature work from Hauerwas’s earlier criticisms, and as Kamitsuka draws
parallels between Gutiérrez’s and Hauerwas’s work on faithfulness and truth in their respective contexts. Arthur McGovern also
clarifies the issue of truth concerning Gutiérrez in terms of praxis. Taking that a step further, Bretherton shows the similarity of
Hauerwas’s emphasis on practical reasoning with Gutiérrez’s construal of orthopraxy, as well as those respective positions connected
to orthodoxy. Given the importance of practical reasoning in an oppressive context, Hauerwas’s critique on the limitation of the
liberation metaphor should be significantly qualified. But he does have a point for Kamitsuka, who agrees with Hauerwas’s concern
about liberation as the only or primary metaphor. There are of course developments by those like Mary Grey who recognizes the
limitation of liberation alone, and accordingly there has been more recent expansions or additions. So in terms of theology, the very
best liberation theologians are not adequately described by many of Hauerwas’s dated critiques that may have been true at one point.
However, Hauerwas and Dorrien’s largely old critiques still ring true concerning the theological milieu. For instance, Joerg Rieger
admits that he and his co-authors lacked attention to churches in Beyond the Spirit of Empire.
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Gutiérrez, The God of Life, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); David G. Kamitsuka, Theology and
Contemporary Culture: Liberation, Postliberal, and Revisionary Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chp. 5,
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Hauerwas’s contention concerning truth may seem to contradict Dorrien’s deep
sympathy for the social gospelers’ thick morality and liberation theologies’ concerns.
(The latter will be developed below.) But Dorrien also agrees that for a century liberal
and liberation theologies, in general, have almost entirely pushed aside truth in favor of
pursuing justice. He observes that “since the generation of Rauschenbusch and Mathews”
liberal theology “has often downplayed the question of religious truth” in order to
democratize and translate religious experience for the wholesale pursuit of justice.207 This
shift has led liberal theology to lose its spiritual ground––the “confessional center” of its
“transcendental, biblical voice”––and the “spiritual power” of its “spiritual conviction
about God’s holy and gracious presence, the way of Christ, and the transformative
mission of Christianity.”208 Liberal theology was already long on moral idealism and
short on spiritual conviction before the waning of evangelical liberalism and personalism,
and the waxing of process and liberation theologies in the 1960s and 70s. To make
matters worse, the new theological configuration’s moral ideals did not, on the whole,
sufficiently develop sacred myth’s truth as truth and its spiritual conviction in a way that
would preach well in the US churches, on the whole. Rather, the neglect of truth and
spiritual conviction had a concomitant narrowness that “reduce[d] Christian ethics to
political or ideological causes.”209 As a result “progressive Christianity has not had

Theology Forty Years after Medellín, ed. Patrick Claffey and Joe Egan (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 159; Joerg Rieger, Series
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), xi; Nestor Miguez, Joerg Reiger, and Jung Mo Sung, Beyond the Spirit of Empire: Theology and Politics
in a New Key (London: SCM Press, 2009).
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Reinventing Liberal Christianity, by Theo Hobson, Commonweal, Oct. 11, 2013, 27.
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Liberalism to Liberationism,” Christian Century, Jun. 16-23, 1999, 653-654.
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enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own reasons.”210
Dorrien concludes, then, that the century-long project has been detrimental to liberal
theology, especially in contemporary society where belief in Jesus is no longer assumed.
In other words, progressive Christianity has ironically isolated itself from the church and
from society.211
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Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27. See also Dorrien, SS, 366-367, 373.
Dorrien, MALT, 3:p. 8 and chp. 9; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology”; Dorrien, MALT, 3:2, 8, 523, 529, 538; Dorrien, SS, 361;
Dorrien, WTM, 191-199; Dorrien, SS, 247; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 472-473; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of
Liberal Theology,” 13, 17, 20-21; Dorrien, MALT, 2:551; Dorrien, SS, 373; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 478. The
concluding sentence of the paragraph is an extension of Hauerwas’s reversal of the isolationist critique, which can also be seen in
Dorrien’s own work. Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Dorrien, SS, 360-367.
Dorrien does give a qualification that explicitly recognizes the first generation and implicitly later developments: “With the
partial exception of feminist theology, none of [the liberationist and postmodernist] movements gave much attention at first to the
problems of interpreting myth and the sacred” (Dorrien, WTM, 197). Prior to that claim and partly in contradiction to it, Dorrien not
only summarizes a chapter on Gutiérrez as him “ultimately preoccupied with the recollection of Christ in the spiritual struggles of the
exploited” (RCG, 126). Dorrien also spends time on the importance of scripture for James Cone as he emerged from his Barthianism
(SS, 243-245), which Dorrien prefaces briefly with Cone’s The Spirituals and the Blues (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991). Dorrien then
concludes that chapter with a pitch for liberative liberal theology by way of the same first-wave feminists of liberal theology that he
pointed to in the quote above, and by way of a quote of Gutiérrez that parallels Dorrien’s summary of him in the quote above (SS, 263281).
There are a few points to note here. First, Dorrien’s argument would have been enriched if he had reckoned with Gustavo
Gutiérrez’s The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990); however, I
have not been able to find Dorrien ever mentioning it, much less engaging it. Dorrien’s Reconstructing the Common Good may be
excused since it was published in the same year by Orbis as Gutiérrez’s English translation was published by Orbis. But Dorrien’s
Soul in Society, that notes the languishing of truth and takes a cue from Gutiérrez on reviving the social gospel in US Christianity
(360), does not quite follow through on Gutiérrez’s account of truth.
Second, as I will show later, Dorrien’s perspectivism is too broad for the contextual-communal confines of Cone’s work on
scripture and economics, even after he shrugged off sympathy for Barthian revelation (SS, 244, 248; KRHS, 402-409; RCG, 161-164;
EDE, 308-309). On the issue of black theology and liberation here, I suspect that Dorrien falls much in line with J. Deotis Roberts
since Dorrien’s account of Robert’s own position and of his agreement with Cone hits so many of Dorrien’s hallmarks that will be
addressed in this chapter and the next (MALT, 2:166-172). That account may qualify the quote from Dorrien above about no “attention
at first…to…myth and the sacred.” However, to what extent Roberts is formally a liberationist is not quite clear, and in fact perhaps
not quite the case, since “Roberts identified with theological liberalism” whereas “the black theology movement of the 1970s and
beyond mostly did not” (ibid., 173). So in some respect on the issue of true sacred myth, Dorrien seems to be judging black liberation
theologies on his own terms rather than theirs. While in The Spirituals and the Blues Cone accepts the historical separation of the
spirituals and the blues in terms of pre- and post-civil war consciousness respectively without quite bringing the spirituals to the
present, and while he differentiates the spirituals and the blues in terms of sacred and “secular spiritual[s]” respectively, they are
theologically linked by what is functionally a kind of embodied personalism (100). That is, in the face of oppression, both “affirm the
somebodiness of black people, and they preserve the worth of black humanity through ritual and drama” (ibid., 105). That
“experience” is not only “the Truth” (ibid., 106); the experience is an experience of the truth, of its sustaining and transforming power,
even if the latter is delayed. Such experience is not simply similar to how Dorrien understands myth, it is how Dorrien understands
humanity’s encounter with God’s Spirit moving mysteriously––not always seen or even strictly in reference to scripture, although the
latter is normative for Dorrien (WTM, 238-239). So in Dorrien’s terms that I will define and use later, the spirituals and the blues
correlate respectively with the evangelical (gospel faith) and modernist (Enlightenment rationality) heritages of liberal theology. But
whereas Dorrien already had the benefit of the social gospelers’ fusing the two heritages, Cone had to construct his Martin-Malcom
duality after he cleared the ground for black resources, like the spirituals and the blues, from the incursion of white sources. In effect,
on Dorrien’s terms, Cone continued his work on the basis of living the sacred myth.
Third, more recently, work such as Bryan N. Massinagle’s Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis,
2010) is not only marked by Gutiérrez’s and Cone’s influence, but also stresses the importance of both the black experiential truth and
theological––including even liturgical and doctrinal––truth (chps. 2-3). However, at the same time, the fact that Massingale’s book
was ground-breaking for US Catholicism does indicate how little an affect liberation theology has had in many US churches. So as I
noted earlier in terms of both Hauerwas and Dorrien, they may have once been and may still be more correct than not about the
theological milieu. But there are individuals who break the mold at the very least, and there has been some important development.
Dorrien may even contribute further to the latter with his forthcoming second volume on the black social gospel, since it will give a
211
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How can Dorrien assume the importance of a thick morality and deeply critique it
at the same time? Again the answer is a dialectic. Vital for Dorrien “is whether or not
progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional spirit. The question cuts two
ways, in terms of spiritual conviction and the ethical imperative of struggling for social
justice, but they go together, each being indispensable to the other.”212 The issue for
Dorrien is to recover liberal theology’s “spiritual conviction,” its spiritual ground in
truth.213 Here his agreement with Hauerwas concerning the importance of truth turns into
a complicated disagreement over the ancient question, what is the truth?
Truth in Perspectivism and Plurality
Dorrien once described his understanding of truth as “perspectivist and pluralist”
rather than either “absolutist” or “relativist.”214 The latter two are opposing extremes.
Absolutism maintains that “universal truths” can be perceived and have purchase on the
perceiver apart from any “historical or cultural context.”215 Relativism rejects
absolutism’s universal truths, and it holds that truths are limited to “the particular
assumptions and contexts from which they derive.”216 Perspectivism drives in-between
absolutism and relativism. Positively, perspectivism affirms the importance of both
universal truth socio-historical contexts. Negatively, perspectivism qualifies the
absolutists’ anthropological hubris and “relativizes the relativizers” ironic universal claim
about relativity.217
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Dorrien has not revisited perspectivism as a term since 1995, but his successive
work employs a perspectivist framework that can be described as a relational nonfoundationalism. So like Hauerwas, Dorrien gives a relational account of truth. In fact,
Dorrien claims that Hauerwas holds to perspectivism, or as Hauerwas calls it, a “softperspectivism.”218 But there are two complications in terms of their relation to one
another over perspectivism/non-foundationalism.219
First, Dorrien’s perspectivism/non-foundationalism places him partly out of the
realm of Hauerwas’s critiques of liberal theology and philosophical liberalism, which
have been directed largely at foundationalism. Part of Dorrien’s perspectivism/nonfoundationalism, I show below, is informed by Hegel and Karl Barth. But despite my
occasional injection of Hegel above, Hauerwas largely avoids explicit engagement with
the post-Kantians, rarely mentions Hegel in particular, and attributes as much
significance to Kant as possible. Dorrien acknowledges that Kant is vital. Dorrien also
admits that “of the five main traditions of German liberal theology...Hegel has been the
smallest, by far, in the United States.”220 So Hauerwas’s critiques are not necessarily
misguided considering his US audience. Nevertheless, Dorrien contends that Hegel
provided the philosophical ground, directly or indirectly, for the greatest developments in
the following centuries. Dorrien further argues that Hegel not only fulfills and supersedes
Kant, but also that Hegel is more promising for liberalism than Schleiermacher because
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Hegel reclaimed speculative reasoning to develop accounts of reason, social subjectivity,
and a dynamic, panentheist Geist.221
Hauerwas misses Dorrien’s argument because, from Dorrien’s position, Hauerwas
commits Karl Barth’s mistake of focusing on Schleiermacher but not taking seriously
enough the Hegelian vein of liberal theology. Accordingly, Hauerwas critically accepts
George Lindbeck’s characterization of theological liberalism as “experientialexpressivist,” while Dorrien rejects that formulation as too narrow.222 So, from Dorrien’s
position, Hauerwas does not fully appreciate social subjectivity within liberalism.
Liberalism and liberal theology is not always individualist. But since the post-Kantians
are both indebted to Kant and break from Kant, some critiques of Kant can be viable
critiques of the post-Kantians. To that critical end and to put Hauerwas and Dorrien in
more interactive conversation, below I will on occasion extend lines of critique from
Hauerwas’s criticisms noted above without belaboring the point.223
Second, Dorrien claimed that his and Hauerwas’s perspectivist positions differed
since Dorrien is “open-ended,” vulnerable to “outside criticism,” whereas Hauerwas is
not.224 I will address Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas later. Here Dorrien’s openness is the
concern. Dorrien uses the term “spiritual center” to describe a cluster of convictions that
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“provide…whatever sense of meaning, coherence, or direction one possesses.”225 His
spiritual center is “a gospel-centered theology of personal spirit” that is attentive to
liberation.226 This center is built on a plurality of truths. Both are framed by Dorrien’s
account of liberal theology as a relational dialectic, so I begin with the dialectic. It
establishes that, for Dorrien, the relations between multiple truths are much more mutual
and therefore flatter than Hauerwas’s hierarchy of truth.227
The Two Heritages of Liberal Theology, and Dorrien’s Relational Dialectic
Recall that liberal theology mediates between the two poles of over-belief and
disbelief by internalizing sacred and the secular resources in a mutually informing
interplay. Somewhat following convention, Dorrien categorizes these two resources as
“two heritages.”228 Broadly construed the first heritage is “evangelical,” focusing on
transcendence, and the second is “modernist,” focusing on immanence.229 The
evangelical heritage’s role is to keep liberal theology Christian. Evangelical “affirm[s] a
personal transcendent God, the authority of Christian experience, the divinity of Christ,
the need of personal redemption, and the importance of Christian missions.”230 The
modernist heritage corresponds to the secular worldview that began in the middle
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enlightenment. Modernist “emphasize[s] the authority of modern knowledge, affirm[s]
the continuity between reason and revelation, champion[s] the values of humanistic
individualism and democracy, and usually distrust[s] metaphysical reason.”231
For Dorrien, the two heritages allows liberal theology to retain Christian belief
and reconfigure it according to “a modern philosophical and/or scientific worldview that
satisfies modern tests of credible belief.”232 That way, Dorrien argues, the best of liberal
theology answers “challenges to belief and deal[s] with them as creatively and faithfully
as possible.”233 But recall Hauerwas’s contention that liberal theology and Dorrien in
particular are trapped in a “double mind.”234 Dorrien admits that there is a dialectical
tension between the evangelical concern for “essential continuity with the historic
Christian tradition” and modernist “discontinuit[y].”235 So if one is to be faithful to both
seemingly contradictory heritages, how should they be related? Dorrien argues that
historically both “broad theological tendencies” (heritages) in liberal theology were built
on the union of faith with human freedom (human reason and experience).236 And both
heritages articulated the fusion in both secular and sacred terms that mixed both
heritages. Dorrien’s own work follows suit. He resolves the tension between the two
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heritages by situating them in mutual interrelation rather than in opposition. As much as
liberal theology pulls from divergent worldviews, it does so through its own
consciousness––the second layer axiom in the definition of liberal theology––that takes
ownership of the gospel, reason, and experience for its own vision.237
That is Dorrien displaying the historical and theological acumen for which he is
rightly, deeply respected. Yet since Dorrien has been received as an historian, his own
constructive interrelation of the heritages goes largely unnoticed. Accordingly, the
significant value and originality of his work has been missed. Dorrien’s dialectical
proclivity united with his historical bent has indeed produced very good historical works.
But they are also the ground for his constructive theological contribution that goes
beyond the limits of historiography. Dorrien’s historical narratives of liberal theology’s
relational dialectic are for guiding the present. He critically evaluates and recovers the
promising aspects of the two heritages that sometime go unseen today.238
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Dorrien’s mediation, then, has a somewhat different shape than mediation in
contemporary liberal theology on the whole. On the one hand, the root of the tension
between the evangelical and modernist heritages concerns Christian intelligibility.
Dorrien’s dialectical mediation between the heritages is precisely about being intelligible
in the modern society at least partly on its terms. On the other hand, Dorrien is attempting
to be faithful to the Christian truth of liberal theology in a context where contemporary
liberal theology has languished precisely because crucial aspects of its past have been
proportionally underplayed and forgotten, in particular Hegel and the evangelical heritage
respectively.239
Within the frame of the two heritages united by a relational dialectic, I argue next,
can be found what truths that Dorrien holds to, how each heritage supplies truth that are
mutually informing for him, and what truths he incorporates that are outside the
conventional bounds of liberal theology. The idealist concepts of spiritual truth,
apophatic truth, re-mythologized truth, and relational truth from the modernist heritage
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contribute to both the evangelical heritage’s and Dorrien’s spiritual and social idealism.
Much of those truths can be attributed to the post-Kantians, but Dorrien also incorporates
Barth. The evangelical heritage maintains not only the truth of God’s kingdom, but also
the heritage is the site where liberal theology historically and Dorrien presently fuse the
two heritages. That truth and fusion Dorrien attributes to the social gospel, which is very
dear to him. Yet he also incorporates liberation theology in such a manner that I argue is
initially a hierarchy of truth. Ultimately, however, his perspectivism leads him to situate
liberative truth in mutuality with the social gospel.
The Modernist Heritage, Apophatic Monism, and Relational Truth
Kant’s transcendental, subjective idealism with objective and realist elements laid
the ground for the post-Kantians’ objective, absolute, social, and transcendental religious
idealisms that creatively configured religious experience, reason, and the divine. This
post-Kantian version of the modernist heritage helped reconfigure the evangelical
heritage into an idealist and social spirituality.240
Historically, liberal theology incorporated the modernist focus on reason and
experience to the degree that eventually reason and experience were at least raised up to
the level of scriptural authority and external authority was largely rejected. Doing so gave
liberal theology not only more credibility in the eyes of liberalism, but also flexibility not
allowed within the bounds of Christian tradition. The post-Kantians were crucial to the
project, and for Dorrien, Hegel played a central role. Hegel’s rationalist method
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recovered truth in a way that both valued and went beyond the theological limitations of
“picture thinking,” the facade of sensuous particularity that cannot sufficiently grasp
universal truth.241 “Spiritual reality,” instead, “is the land of true explanation”; it is where
humanity as spirit comes to know that Spirit (God) is love.242 In that framework are four
truths vital to Dorrien which are worth explicitly noting now. Spiritual reality, or the
category of spirit, is itself true because it describes three other truths: the (1) relation
between God and humanity illuminates that (2) God is Spirit, and that (3) humanity is
spirit. These truths of S/spirit are summed up in the term monism, the category of spirit is
“a single underlying reality” to everything.243 Chapter two will focus on Spirit, spirit, and
the character of their relation. Here the question, how Hegel could employ speculative
reason to construct a monist account, requires some explanation considering Kant’s
legacy and Dorrien’s critical sympathy for them. Out of the latter stems two of Dorrien’s
truths and then a broader, relational account of truth.244
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Hegel’s formula of Spirit relating to spirit is predicated on a form of reasoning
called intellectual intuition, “a source of metaphysical knowledge about eternal forms.”245
Dorrien grants that Kant was an enemy to both intellectual intuition and monism because
he rejected that one can know the noumena and he privileged that “sensible intuition” can
still access the phenomena.246 But Dorrien also argues that Kant, in the second and third
critiques, still “appeared to authorize an understanding of appearances, sensibility, thingsin-themselves, understanding, nature, and freedom as aspects of a single underlying
reality.”247 This “opened the door” to “a Kantian basis for apophatic monism.”248 In this
framework of granting and sublating Kant for an apophatic monism are two truths, first a
negation and second a construction.
The first truth for Dorrien is what I will call an “apophatic reserve”: human views
of the world and human knowledge of God are relativized and even negated on the basis
of God’s ineffable mystery.249 This reserve cuts between Kant and Hegel. Like any
apophatic theology, for Dorrien, human finitude cannot fully apprehend, much less
comprehend, the infinite expanse of God. That truth of humanity’s incapacity in
Dorrien’s apophaticism is the product of his liberal starting point, the axiomatic
conviction that privileges human reason and experience over-against a thick and positive
account of revelation. This assumption may appear Kantian, but Dorrien also wants to
avoid the foundationalism of Kant’s rationality and the metaphysical limitations of his
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two-worlds framework. So Dorrien expresses his apophaticism in line with the early
Hegel’s emphasis on negation in his dialectic. But rather than adopting a conventional
left-wing or right-wing Hegelianism, Dorrien argues for theology’s importance as he
mines the “critical principle that subverts its own pretensions to systemic completion.”250
For Dorrien’s normative position “the negation of the negation” does not produce a fullorbed, positive account of Spirit, as in God.251 Otherwise Dorrien would succumb to a
number of problems found in Hegel, chief among them being the later Hegel’s overrealization of mystery that is absolute Spirit. In other words, a violation of divine mystery
is “idolatry” for Dorrien.252
To avoid idolatry Dorrien takes his perspectivism seriously, incorporating a
source that is outside the conventional bounds of liberal theology. Barth’s nonfoundationalist, evangelical, and apophatic position––which Dorrien argues is more
Hegelian than Barth admitted––Dorrien joins with his development of Hegel’s legacy in
an apophatic reserve. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien appreciates Barth precisely for what
Dorrien would call postmodern anti-foundationalism: Barth’s rejection of any method
and any epistemology that over determines the truth. But whereas Hauerwas argues that
Barth holds together both the apophatic and cataphatic in Jesus’s particularity, Dorrien
merges his apophatic reserve with Barth’s rejection of method born from their resistance
to “reduc[ing] God to an element of a system.”253 What can be said is that “revelation”––
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using the word as lightly as a liberal informed by Barthian would––is a “negation for a
negation.”254 The presence of God’s Word reveals the Word’s hiddenness that disabuses
humanity’s idolatrous presumptions: that humanity can definitively associate the Word
with any single, fleshy point, and that humanity can definitively speak in any way about
divine mystery other than that it is ultimately ineffable mystery known only “in and
through the movement of Spirit.”255 Or in another frame, Dorrien accepts Hegel’s account
of “relational Spirit” because it maintains the relation between God and humanity without
tying God’s self to the framework of being.256 So Dorrien creatively employs Barth in
order to avoid idolatry. But in order to secure the ineffability of divine mystery, Dorrien
holds to an apophatic reserve that pre-empts, and thereby relativizes or sometimes
negates, cataphatic claims about God.257
Can Dorrien then say anything constructively positive about God? Yes, in the
second, constructive truth. Within Dorrien’s apophatic reserve, he affirms the importance
of “metaphysical audacity” since “faith is a form of daring.”258 Even though Dorrien is
for “radical immanence,” his understanding of it is not without spiritual and divine
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transcendent remainders that desacralization denies.259 To this end, Dorrien, like Paul
Tillich and R. Niebuhr, argues for the value of myth in contrast to many of their liberal
forbears. Dorrien’s book on reason, truth, and myth, The Word as True Myth, culminated
with him arguing for truth transcendent (or abstract in Hauerwas’s terms) made known in
mythic imagination through intellectual intuition, immanence, and the Word as Spirit. In
that frame Dorrien incorporates into his spiritual center a personalist-Hegelian version of
a long-held staple in liberal theology, the evangelical heritage’s constructed account of
personal Spirit. Rather than the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien emphasizes the Word in
order to attribute a personally relational character to Spirit that humanity knows in the
mode of spirit. Instead of affirming the hypostatic union, Dorrien reformulates Barthian
Logos Christology into a Spirit Christology of true myth that fits with modern experience
and reason. Jesus was “divine” insomuch as he was directed and empowered by the
Spirit, while Jesus himself was not the incarnation as understood in the creeds.260 Hence,
Dorrien uses the missional title “Christ,” rather than the name Jesus, for referring to the
Word qua Spirit––the ideal of “the kingdom bringing Spirit”––active in human history.261
Chapter two will address further the issue of personal Spirit, which has been
largely ignored by contemporary liberal theology. But for now, two initial conclusions
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can be drawn from Dorrien’s dialectic of apophatic reserve and metaphysical audacity.
First, with his reserve wiping clear the theological slate and his metaphysical audacity
supplying the new content of monism, Dorrien’s thought fits within the narrative of the
modernist heritage liberating the evangelical heritage from over-belief. In some respects,
then, Dorrien appears to parallel demythologization. Second, however, Dorrien offers a
re-mythologization. Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s desacralizing trend is
warranted as a critique of the liberal legacy. But his critique does not extend quite so
easily to Dorrien’s recovery of myth and sacred transcendence. So their difference here is
actually about what kind of sacralization Hauerwas and Dorrien affirm in response to
desacralization.
Dorrien’s privileging of myth attempts to fill the gap between abstract truth and
concrete particularity, between “meaning” and “event” in a way that is both historical and
unique to faith.262 But his use of “Christ” rather than Jesus is a telling substitution.263
Hauerwas opposes approaching Jesus through an abstraction often called Christology,
much less a universalism of “some univocal Being” or “generalized spirit” that reflects a
generalized religious or moral sensibility as with Kant and Hegel.264 To extend another
critique Hauerwas has made of others, that generalized sensibility is produced by the
private “meaning we give it,” which Hauerwas pejoratively calls spirituality.265 However,
Dorrien is not dismayed about spirituality on his terms because it describes the truth of
not only monist Spirit, but also Spirit in a panentheist frame. Crucial to that spirituality is
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an account of speculative reason grounded in relational truth. That account is F. W. J.
Schelling and Hegel’s socialized development of intellectual intuition.266
“Schelling and Hegel…threw the door” that Kant cracked “wide open” to
“apophatic monism,” Dorrien argues, by socializing intellectual intuition for speculative
reason and absolute idealism.267 Schelling and Hegel turned intellectual intuition into a
method of reflecting on one in relations to others (subject-object) as part of “one see[ing]
all of nature acting through one’s self” and “knowing one’s identity with[in] the universe
as a whole.”268 This method and the two quotes are vital to Dorrien’s spiritual center and
truth about Spirit. The emphasis on interrelation in “nature acting through one’s self”
corresponds with Dorrien’s claim that “anything that I think or do is ultimately God
thinking and acting through me.”269 Then through that interrelated permeation one
apprehends one’s self “within the whole.”270 The “whole” here is two-fold: the whole that
is everything in relation and ultimately that whole in Spirit (Whole), the noumenal
content of “revealed religion and speculative reason.”271 In this acceptance of
contingency, not only does “one grasp…the unity of universal and particular, the ideal
and the real.”272 One ultimately comes to recognize her or his “absolute dependence” on
Spirit, who is “the dynamic inter-subjective in itself.”273 So through relation Dorrien’s
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theology moves from “I know myself” to the truth of “God transcendent,” who is “the
eternally self-identical, the absolute ‘I AM.’”274
Here Dorrien has given an account of truth about Spirit that is apprehended
relationally. With Hegel, for Dorrien the Spirit is panentheist, “irreducibly dynamic and
relational.”275 But to hold onto his apophatic reserve in accordance with intellectual
intuition, Dorrien maintains an “intuition of God as the holy unknowable mystery of the
world.”276 This allusion to consciousness, however, might appear to give merely private
meaning, as Hauerwas points out in terms of spirituality. That may be the case, yet
Dorrien’s dialectic mode escapes at least some aspects of private meaning. His apophatic
reserve is also based on the Spirit’s dynamism and relation that both makes known and is
made known in the truth of the Word’s hiddenness. This relational turn, even in the
negative, still mirrors Hegel’s privileging of intellectual intuition and speculative reason
that moved from thinking in picture to apprehending Spirit in relation to human spirit. So
through a framework of relational truth Dorrien comes to a vision of monist Spirit in a
panentheist frame but without what he sees as Hegel’s baggage.277
There is one more advance by the modernist heritage vital to Dorrien’s merging
of the two heritages. Schelling’s and Hegel’s idealist theory of social subjectivity also
created a social awareness that helped establish the ground for social idealism. The fruit
of their social awareness was later combined with gospel ideals by the evangelical
heritage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The social gospelers’ fusion

274

Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49. In that article, Dorrien is appropriating without explicitly naming Samuel
Taylor Coleridge (which Dorrien argues was a British version of Schelling) and William Temple (Dorrien, KRHS, 136, 436).
275
Dorrien, KRHS, 12. See also ibid., 160.
276
Ibid., 12-13. Emphasis is mine.
277
Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, KRHS, 191, 194-195, 217, 220-221, 347, 387-390, 418; Dorrien, MALT, 2:18; Dorrien, KRHS, 12-13,
160. Chapter two will address how human freedom figures into this relational framework, in terms of both Spirit relating to spirit and
spirit relating to spirit.

90

created the ground-breaking insight of social salvation realized in their social mission to
transform society. Social structures had recently been ‘discovered,’ but many, especially
predatory capitalism, were in need of redemption since they were neither just nor
peaceable. The social gospelers reasoned that “if evil is socialized,” then “salvation must
be socialized” as well.278 One’s socialization towards God and the kingdom, which is a
“commonwealth of co-operative service,” orients one towards humanity with a
structurally transformative vision of the common good where all are equal and free.279
The social gospelers, then, sought to actualize idealist, social truth in human relations.280
So the spiritual and social contributions of the modernist heritage reflect
Dorrien’s summation of the Kantian and post-Kantian work as “mapping the
epistemological and spiritual ground of freedom and imagining a cosmopolitan
commonwealth of freedom.”281
The Evangelical Heritage, Fusing the Two Heritages, and Liberation
Although the spiritual idealism of Hegel’s Spirit is important for Dorrien, it is not
sufficient to account for liberal theology’s spirituality. The evangelical heritage is crucial
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to liberal theology, and to Dorrien in particular, even with experience and reason
relativizing biblical authority and negating Christian tradition’s authority.
Theologically, liberal theology needs its evangelical heritage in order to be
faithful to Christian truth. Soon after Dorrien delineates his perspectivist understanding of
truth, he writes that his “religious perspective is founded upon the way of Christ and the
reality of Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.”282 For him, “social gospel is ultimately
precious…because it recovers the fullness of the spiritual reality and ethic of the kingdom
of Christ” that has and will come.283 Without evangelical truth such as this, liberal
theology has become unmoored from what grounds and animates it.284
Methodologically, liberal theology’s second layer is only possible with both
heritages. But simply construing the evangelical heritage as one of two poles cuts short
the importance of the evangelical heritage and the social gospel. Historically, the
evangelical heritage “sustain[ed] the original merger” of the two heritages “that gave rise
to liberal theology” and “made liberal Christianity compelling to millions.”285 In more
recent terms, the social gospel is Dorrien’s exemplar for unifying the modernist and
evangelical heritages. The social gospelers “fused” modernist and evangelical heritages
in the “spiritual power” of “spiritual conviction” to create the largest movement in the
history of US liberal theology.286 The social gospelers articulation of social salvation was
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derived from the modernist insight about social structures and from a sense of mission
given by the “transcendental, biblical voice.”287
The social gospelers could sustain the merger because they were as much pastoral
and activist as they were intellectual. The social gospelers’ massive theological
movement arose in parallel to the development of sociology and socialist communes, but
the movement itself was birthed from the pulpit’s response to social turmoil. The white
social gospel addressed primarily the ongoing class warfare, instigated by the then rising
global capitalism, and to a much lesser extent racism and patriarchy than did the black
social gospel and first-wave feminism. The trajectory from biblical-ethical preaching to
movement exemplifies Dorrien’s claim that “whenever liberal theology finds a large
audience, it speaks a gospel of personal faith in biblical terms.”288 With that spiritual
ground the social gospelers’ pastoral community organizing achieved significant political
advances and a lasting legacy to match.289
Just such kinds of spiritual ground and pastoral activity are crucial, Dorrien
argues, for “liberal Christianity...to regain its public voice.”290 He can see that the
evangelical heritage has long been overlooked because faithfulness guides his normative
understanding of liberal theology. His “normative” definition of liberal theology requires
a critical emphasis to keep liberal theology from losing its theological content.291
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However, as opposed to Dorrien’s historical definition of liberal theology, he has not
fully articulated his own normative definition of liberal theology. If he were to, it would
look something like this. Liberal theology “unit[es]... the sacred and the secular” in a
“relational” dialectic, such that the sacred and secular mutually shape each other,
positively and critically, for a progressive and “critically constructive” transformation of
society.292 Liberal theology as such is faith continually evolving by and for two ends: to
take into account the contemporary world-view and to work for the transformation of
society in some measure. In order to evolve and transform, liberal theology integrates
itself into liberal philosophy and politics.293
But such integration is dialectical for Dorrien. He refuses to allow liberalism to
overrun theology and ethics. His resistance occurs in two ways other than his insistence
on the evangelical heritage vis-à-vis the social gospel. The first is his apophatic reserve.
Dorrien grants that mediation is how liberal theology is “friendly to something called ‘the
modern world-view.’”294 However, with “Barth’s voice in [Dorrien’s] head,” Dorrien’s
apophatic reserve qualifies the extent to which he holds to a world-view.295 The second is
ethics. Liberalism is critiqued on ethical grounds in order to arrive at social
transformation in line with theological ideals. The social gospelers’ ideas of social
salvation and political activity to achieve it took root. Dorrien’s own politically inclined
spiritual center is a “gospel-centered” personalist faith found in the progressive liberal
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theologies of both the social gospel that worked for economic equality and the Civil
Rights movement of the 1960s that fought for political liberation.296
Political liberation raises another truth. Despite Dorrien’s broad critique of
liberation theology noted above, he proclaims a truthful insight about God because of
liberation theology. “God is the partisan, liberating power of the oppressed in their
struggle for justice.”297 This truth decisively constitutes Dorrien’s spiritual center. But
how does liberative truth fit in his project?298
Born from his attention to outside criticism, his privileging of liberation theology
creates an initial hierarchy of truth. He argues that liberal theology should become a
subset of liberation theology. His normative position on liberalism and liberal theology
shift accordingly. While he opts for justice as “right order,” he also questions the veracity
of a “universal theory of justice” since “oppression is multifaceted, concrete, and
particular.”299 His insistence on liberation and justice in concrete particularity configures
the church’s mission. It “is called in the Spirit to prefigure a new society and emancipate
the poor and oppressed.”300 In these ways the truth of liberation theology keeps Dorrien
plumbing the theological and political depths of what it means to be attentive to the
flourishing of all.301
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The shift to a hierarchy of liberationist truth has a significant implication for
liberal theology’s method of mediation. On the one hand, liberal theology’s method of
meditation has led, and arguably still could lead, to an insufficiently critical embrace of
the status quo. On the other hand, the mediating method can also move in the other
direction by placing liberal theology under liberative truth. Liberal theology must stay
true to the truth of liberation experience precisely because experiences of oppression are
“not what liberal theology has been about” on the whole.302 In this latter framework, for
Dorrien, contemporary social gospelers move in the direction of the antebellum
abolitionists who were too fiery about slavery to be socially acceptable by the status quo.
This shift forms some of Dorrien’s deepest political ideals, which lie somewhere between
progressive and radical.303
Part of the reason why Dorrien lies in between progressive and radical is because
the liberation hierarchy of truth is only initially a hierarchy. Like Dorrien’s merging of
the modernist and evangelical heritages, his method to join liberation and liberal
theologies is also deeply dialectical. As far back as 1990, Dorrien argued that liberation
theology lacks the social gospelers’ necessary, broad “moral discourse” of economic
democracy (sometimes called democratic socialism), which is “larger and more inclusive
than the discourses of countercultural vanguards.”304 So Dorrien once proclaimed:
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“liberation theology needs to be shaped, informed, and limited by the theology of the
Social Gospel”; “liberation theology needs a praxis of democratic socialism.”305 Recently
Dorrien has reiterated that same line of argument in terms of “Christian socialism,”
particularly “guild socialism,” with the implication of the social gospel and its economic
democracy.306 What Dorrien is doing here can be reconciled by his “open-ended”
perspectivism, blurring the boundaries between liberal and liberationist.307 He opts for
hybridity, a liberative liberal, that comports with how Dorrien understands one of his
heroes, Martin Luther King, Jr. King was in many ways both the culmination of
American Protestant liberalism and a representative of liberative work. He was a black
church pastor, a social activist, and a liberal, personalist theologian who incorporated the
social gospel, pacifism, and to a degree R. Niebuhr. Dorrien’s own constructive project is

already “identify themselves with the socialist tradition,” and thereby “they transform this tradition through their commitment and
criticism” (ibid., 171-72).
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largely in direct continuity with King. The social gospel and liberation are not only
related, they are fused together.308
The embrace of diverse, marginalized voices and the emphasis of liberation are
“the new sine qua non of progressive theology.”309 However, Dorrien’s concern for truth
makes him unusual in contemporary liberal theology. Dorrien fuses the modernist and
evangelical heritages partly through his complex definition of liberal theology that
recovers under-recognized theological work from the past, and partly through his
perspectivism open to figures and traditions that have been historically outside of
conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s work, then, moves him somewhat out of
Hauerwas’s critical spotlight set on liberal theology. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien holds to
truth known in relation. But they differ over what those truths are and how they are
related. Where Hauerwas has an account of truth that is hierarchical and relational
stemming from the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien places truth mutually related in Spirit
qualified by an apophatic reserve rooted in human finitude. Even when Dorrien has a
kind of hierarchy of truth, it is ultimately part of his perspectivism rather than an
abrogation of it.310
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IV. Complications: From Liberation and World to Truth and Reality
There are issues to address which are more complicated than Dorrien indicates in
his 1995 claim that his “open-ended” perspectivism to “outside criticism,” specifically
liberation theology, differs from Hauerwas’s closed off perspectivism.311 Dorrien’s
critique of Hauerwas goes hand in hand with Dorrien’s proclamation that “the insistence
on dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans marks the essential difference
in spirit between Hauerwas’s theology and [Dorrien’s] progressive social Christianity.”312
Their alternatives for a US, post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity, in Dorrien’s
account, differ because his position on God’s kingdom “takes more from [Walter]
Rauschenbusch than Hauerwas” and is “inspired and shaped by liberationists movements
that Hauerwas spurns.”313 For Dorrien, “to believe in the reality of the indwelling
kingdom of Christ does not require that one regard the rest of the world as unregenerate
or deprived of grace.”314 But to that position Hauerwas “gives short shrift to those who
press him,” calling it “‘a liberal question…. You’re worried about non-Christians because
you’re a liberal.”315
While I do not doubt Dorrien’s summary of their conversation in the last quote,
Hauerwas at his best has a more interesting relationship with liberation theology and a
more complex account of the world. I will address those complications to initially show
that the liberation-world connection is not exactly what Dorrien made of it in 1995. He
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overstated his case when he declared that “Hauerwas spurns” liberation theology.316 And
by using that mistake as proof of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing between Christian and
pagans,” Dorrien reversed the fact that Hauerwas’s appreciation of liberation theology is
complicated when liberation is joined to the world.317 These interpretive problems are
also partly the result of Hauerwas’s polemical rhetoric and silence. As a consequence of
Dorrien’s reversal and Hauerwas’s language, in 1995 Dorrien was at best correct by half
concerning Hauerwas’s account of the church-world distinction.
Those initial problems obscure a more significant issue. Hauerwas’s account of
truth not only underwrites his church-world distinction, but also his account of truth is his
account of reality. That pattern is the same for Dorrien as well, but they disagree over
truth in either a hierarchical arrangement or a mutual arrangement. Their differing
accounts of truth indicate rival positions over the nature of reality because Hauerwas and
Dorrien differ over what is truly significant.
Liberation, Church, and World
Hauerwas’s lop-sided engagement with liberation theology is exemplified by his
critical article on Gutiérrez in 1986 and by his appreciative endnote on Jon Sobrino in
1981. Although that lop-sidedness is problematic, it is not a dismissal of liberation
theology as Dorrien claimed in 1995. Rather, Hauerwas’s appreciation for liberation
theology is not often easily accessible. One could have the wrong impression that he has
largely nothing to say on a slew of social issues based on Dorrien’s summaries of
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Hauerwas, the selections of The Hauerwas Reader, and even some of Hauerwas’s books
by his own admittance. Hauerwas’s habit of “silence through presence,” and therein
participatory listening, contributes to the possibility of misimpression.318 The endeavor to
listen there is not only consistent with his emphasis on relational reconciliation, but also
there is wisdom since, for instance, “gender is tricky for Hauerwas––and at his best,
Stanley knows that.”319 However, his attempt at silence, thankfully, has not been entirely
successful prior to and even more so after 1995.320
There is consistent and specific evidence in Hauerwas’s own work for his
sympathy with liberation theology––“that [they] share far more in common than [they]
differ”––besides his stated general appreciation for it on the whole and for specific
liberation theologians in particular.321 From subtly to explicitly, he has consistently
shown that integral to his work is the common good and solidarity. In one of his two
recent chapters on poverty, he connects the common good and solidarity with the poor
through Pope Francis’s call for the church to “the option for the poor” and to become
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poor with the poor.322 That ecclesial account is not only prefigured by Hauerwas’s work
in 1983, but also correlates with his more recent accounts of his normative politics. He
advocates for a deliberative “democracy…that refuses to silence the voice of the poor”
and for “justice” that “imitates the divine partisanship on behalf of the poor, the widow,
and the orphan.”323 That affirmation of the preferential option for the poor in all but name
includes “God’s unrelenting desire to liberate us from sin.”324 Hauerwas is also attentive
to, and at times parallels, other liberation theologies. Although Hauerwas’s work is not
visibly marked by eco-feminism or queer theology, he has written one chapter on ecology
against “anthropocentrism,” another on liturgical formation provoked by a group of nuns,
and two chapters on homosexual people––one of which showed the immense value of
friendship with them.325 He has provided one popular article in favor of the black power
movement, two chapters about racial reconciliation, and two chapters about a martyred
“saint of the church,” Martin Luther King, Jr.326 Hauerwas has also described Cesar
Chavez as a “hero.”327 Against European colonialism and the US liberal extension of it,
he has affirmed communal self-determination by oppressed communities (African
Americans, Native Americans, and women), which is probably surprising to many
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considering he repeated rejects notions of autonomy as self-determination. He not only
has no “objection to feminine imagery for God,” but also has made occasional remarks
that uphold women’s ordination.328 Further but still occasionally, Hauerwas has made
remarks that reject the domination of women, that question his white privilege because of
Malcolm X, that critically highlight the sin of racism, that pay attention to the racism of
racial categorization itself, that advocate pacifist involvement in countermanding African
American enslavement and its legacy, and that lambaste Native American genocide by
US empire.329
Although those chapters and remarks are proportionally few for a long academic
career, they are not off-hand. Dorrien once recalled in class a conversation he had with
Hauerwas. Hauerwas made a sympathetic observation about the plight of African
Americans in the US, and Dorrien replied that Hauerwas needed to actually publish it. I
do not know if Dorrien’s urging was the cause for Hauerwas to put it in writing, but
Hauerwas did publish his point. “I marvel at the miracle that African Americans do not
each day have to refrain from killing a white person. …[which is] a testimony of the
depth of God’s love that has and continues to sustain them.”330 God’s sustaining love,
Hauerwas continues, is the hope of reconciliation without violence between “children of
slaves” and “children of slaveholders.”331
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So perhaps even with Dorrien’s input, his point of conflict with Hauerwas over
liberation theology has a lot less to do with liberation than Dorrien presupposed in 1995.
Instead, their disagreement has a lot more to do with Hauerwas’s suspicion of
liberalism’s impact on liberation theology. Hauerwas finds that liberation as a category is
too abstract, that liberation in some forms is too similar to Kantian autonomy, and that
liberation is too often articulated in the Constantinian terms of liberal justice. Indeed,
when marginalized voices are connected to the world as liberal society, Hauerwas’s
relation to liberation theology is overridden and Dorrien’s critical account of Hauerwas’s
position is incomplete.332
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have taken seriously the critique of Constantinianism. So has Cornel West. I expect that Hauerwas would find interesting parallels
with and would be quite critical of Leonard Boff's recent book on virtues. There is another interesting tension. If Hauerwas’s students
represent development of Hauerwas’s work, as he claims, then it is worth noting not only Daniel Bell, Jr., whose account is suffering
unto death for some liberationists such as Ivan Petrella, but also worth raising is D. Stephen Long. The latter, although Petrella
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some ways, what I am pointing towards is not unlike, and actually would be helpful in meeting, Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman’s call
to Hauerwas for a more explicit engagement with race and racism for radical democracy. In fact, meeting Woodard-Lehman’s call
would still be helpful, even though Hauerwas has not only since again addressed racial reconciliation and King but also much earlier
affirmed black power as Michael S. Northcott reminds us. Despite Johnathan Tran’s defense of Hauerwas’s silence from Woodard-
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For instance, Linda Woodhead argues that Hauerwas misses much of sociology
and feminism in particular because his theology frustratingly looks at the church and the
world each within their own “homogenizing discourse.”333 Yet even then it was not true
that Hauerwas wholly neglected sociology or feminism. In 1981, he maintained that “the
influence of some of the work in sociology of religion and knowledge is beginning to
have a fruitful effect on the kind of work that is done in New Testament ethics.”334
Despite Hauerwas’s concern about the metaphor of liberation, in 1988 he wrote that
“most of the charges made against male-dominated culture are both fair and just.”335 But
he could be weak on the issue of gender. So in response to Woodhead, Hauerwas
confessed his earlier failures to understand feminism and affirmed her critique that his
work should pay more attention to women in the church. This confession and affirmation
suggests that the hermeneutic-of-mostly-silence for participatory listening may be a more
significant factor in his engagement with gender than the issue of homogeneity.336

Lehman’s call, the latter’s challenge is pre-dated by similar enough critiques made towards Hauerwas by Michael Eric Dyson and
James Logan.
Hauerwas, AC, 9-10, 172 n. 10; Hauerwas, CC, 233 n. 4, 237 n. 48; Jon Sobrino, No Salvation Outside the Poor:
Prophetic-Utopian Essays, trans. Paul Burns, Joseph Owens, and Margaret Wilde (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, Orbis Books, 2008);
Dorrien, RCG, 119-120, 124; Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism (New York: Penguin Books,
2004), chp. 5; Leonardo Boff, Virtues: For Another Possible World, trans. Alexandre Guilherme (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011);
Hauerwas, BH, 228 n. 44; Hauerwas, WAD, 99; Daniel Bell, Jr., Liberation Theology After the End of History: The Refusal to Cease
Suffering (New York: Routledge, 2001); Ivan Petrella, The Future of Liberation Theology (London: SCM Press, 2006), 39-40, 128132, 140 n. 27; D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (New York: Routledge, 2000), chps. 7-10, 15; Ivan
Petrella, Beyond Liberation Theology: A Polemic (London: SCM Press, 2008), 148-150; Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman, “Body
Politics and the Politics of Bodies: Racism and Hauerwasian Theopolitics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 2 (2008); Hauerwas,
CDRO, chp. 4; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 7; Michael S. Northcott, “Reading Hauerwas in the Cornbelt: The Demise of the American
Dream and the Return of Liturgical Politics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 40, no. 2 (2012): 265; Johnathan Tran, “Time for
Hauerwas’s Racism,” in Unsettling Arguments, chp. 13; Michael Dyson, Reflecting Black, chp. 20; James Logan, “Liberalism, Race,
and Stanley Hauerwas,” Cross Currents, Winter 2006, 524-525.
333
Woodhead, “Can Women Love Stanley Hauerwas?,” 183. For similar feminist critiques of Hauerwas, see Albrecht’s The
Character of Our Communities, “Myself and Other Characters,” and review of In Good Company; Elizabeth M. Bounds, Coming
Together/Coming Apart: Religion, Community, and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 1997), 63-64. For defense of Hauerwas from
the critiques of Albrecht and Woodhead but also, in light of those criticisms, a sometimes friendly critique and development of him on
the issue of feminism, see Murphy, “Community, Character, and Gender: Women and the Work of Stanley Hauerwas.”
334
Hauerwas, CC, 237 n. 44. See also ibid., 110; Hauerwas, CET, 12.
335
Hauerwas, CET, 28-29.
336
Hauerwas, “Where would I be without Friends?,” 327-329; Hauerwas, WW, 195.

105

However, the link between homogenization and liberal society is more complex.
On the one hand, what Woodhead calls homogenization is in fact Hauerwas’s hierarchy
of truth ordering historical, social, and political work. Within that hierarchical frame,
Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead and in his work elsewhere show his openness to the
contributions that the world can bring to the church. So there is a complex relation
between the world and the church. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead
uses the phrase “world of liars” to emphasize the importance of truth telling and
nonviolence.337 That “sharp dichotomy” between the church and the world seems to
confirm, from a perspective like Dorrien’s, Woodhead’s critique of homogeneity in
Hauerwas’s church-world distinction.338 Hauerwas has further contributed to such
readings when, from time to time he has privileged provocative polemics. Even after
Dorrien made his 1995 critique, Hauerwas claimed that “Christianity is unintelligible
without enemies.”339 Lines like that only reinforce an overly simple understanding of his
church-world construction. But it does not represent Hauerwas at his theological best.340
So what is Hauerwas’s nuanced account of the world? It is inseparable from his
accounts of creation, privation, and ecclesiology. The world and the church describe
creatures in “God’s creation” differentiated by “loyalty” and agency: whether human
creatures are turned toward either sin or holiness.341 The world is those creatures who
“reject Christ” by a disobedient perversion, refusing to love God by turning God’s given
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“creative gifts” to humanity against God.342 And “the result of sin” is “the violence that
grips” the world.343 The church is those creatures who confess Jesus, and in seeking to
imitate him, those creatures become heirs and heiresses of his kingdom. Accordingly, to
live faithfully is to live non-violently in peace, which is “what the world can be.”344
Hauerwas has summarized this world-church distinction as “not an ontological
difference, but rather a difference of agency,” a “duality without dualism.”345 But here
Hauerwas’s articulation of that framework becomes complicated, forking into two but
connected lines of argument that become two accounts of the church-world relation. One
avoids an ontological dualism while the other appears to raise a different kind of dualism.
In 1995 Dorrien missed the former and feared the latter like so many other famous
critiques of Hauerwas.346
From Dorrien’s 1995 position, Hauerwas’s world-church framework appeared to
create a dualism in terms of the world as totally depraved today and doomed to perdition,
the church as unique today since it is perfected eschatologically, and Hauerwas’s
ecclesial isolation as a flippant concern for the world. However, in 1995 and 2009
Dorrien overlooked Hauerwas’s 1983 normative rejection of the world as totally
depraved, of the church as perfected, and of the “enmity” between them wherein the
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church retreats from or overtakes the world.347 But Hauerwas not only continues that line
of thought when he shows an openness to non-Christians in 1998. Before his account of
all creation as “sinsick” in 2000 that was hinted at in 1992, 1993, and 1998, in the early
80s he complicated the very idea of the world as separable from any human creature.348
Buried in a 1981 endnote, Hauerwas writes that “Christian judgment of the world is
always self-referential, as we can never forget that the world is not ‘out there’ but in
us.”349 Or in other words, as he writes upfront in 1983, “the world is those aspects of our
individual and social lives where we live untruthfully by continuing to rely on violence to
bring order.”350 Christians can be disobedient just like other creatures. So the difference
of agency seems to be framed by covenant. The disobedient creatures who confess Jesus
are being unfaithful.351
But in order to confess and be faithful to Jesus, Hauerwas’s account can slide into
a kind of solidified duality “between Christians and pagans.”352 Rather than ontological
dualism, the duality is a dichotomy between traditioned communities that culminates in
the disparate politics of Christians and pagans. At the beginning of the 1980s Hauerwas’s
account of the church began with emphasizing the uniting of story and character for the
church to form a disciple in the “narrative traditions” of a particular community, an
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“institutional space,” distinct from but still in the world.353 As that church peaceably
embodies its distinctively traditioned space, the church illuminates that the world is
“divided” and displays that Christianity is true to the world.354 Over the course of the
1980s and 1990s, Hauerwas closed the respective gaps between story and particular
community and between virtue and particular tradition. In the 80s Hauerwas argued that
the church, in a relational account of embodied truth, is the truthful story of salvation
history found in Israel, in Jesus, and in the new creation. In doing so Hauerwas further
solidified the separation of the church and the nations. He preached that, from Jesus and
Pentecost, the church’s witness of peaceable alterity to the violent nations is a proleptic
reversal of disobedient Babel and of the successive fragmentation. The church thereby
continues the particular mission of the Abrahamic covenant to be “a light to the
nations.”355 In the 90s Hauerwas emphasized all the more the importance of particular
“traditions” for virtue in order to undo the weaponizing of virtue serving the nationstate’s violence.356 But similar to Hauerwas’s separation of the church and the nations,
his stress on particular traditions has the consequence of splitting pagan and Christian
virtues. Pagan courage, as articulated by Aristotle, “faces death with indifference” in
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battle since one “sees no other good.”357 Christian courage, as articulated by Aquinas, “is
martyrdom.”358 Pagan and Christian accounts of courage differ––in fact, “the world of the
courageous Christian is different from the world of the courageous pagan”––since they
maintain “differing visions of the good that exceeds the good of life itself.”359 Over the
course of the 90s and 2000s, Hauerwas suggests that the pattern of different visions and
their different virtues extends to two traditions: the church’s life in concrete
particularities and political liberalism’s abstracting, warping, and supplanting of the
virtues of “concrete traditions.”360 So for Hauerwas the question is to whom is one
“loyal”?361 Is one’s loyalty to God’s peaceable kingdom and the community that
embodies it, or is one loyal to “people and institutions” (“the world”) that assert the
necessity of self-securing violence?362 For Hauerwas, “of course,” the answer is “the
church…that community that rightly commands our loyalty in a manner that relativizes
all other loyalties.”363 So one can see that Hauerwas is susceptible to Dorrien’s 1995
critique of “dichotomizing…between Christians and pagans.”364
However, Dorrien’s focus on the church-world distinction missed two important
issues. The first is a basic tension in service of asking how the world might understand
the truth rather than be bound by illusion. Hauerwas proclaims that the world should
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“place [itself] under the discipline of Christians who are trying to learn how to live
peaceably.”365 But that seems to conflict with Hauerwas’s breaking down the worldchurch separation. Resources in Hauerwas’s work might resolve the tension, such as his
consistent concern of the world/violence within Christians, or his position of “ultimate
realism” which I note below, or his account of creation which I address more in the next
chapter.366 The final conclusion to this project returns to the church-world relation
because my constructive critique differs from Dorrien’s in light of what will be covered
in chapters two through four.
Yet, to focus here on the church-world framework or on resolving directly the
tension misses a second, fundamental issue indicated by Hauerwas and Charles Pinches’s
claim that “the world of the courageous Christian is different from the world of the
courageous pagan” in relation to violence.367 The hierarchy of truth that Hauerwas
maintains is either obediently received and then orders lives according to God’s peaceful
“aeon” or is disobediently rejected and then rises the world’s violent “aeon.”368 Yet for
Hauerwas “there is only one true history…God’s peaceable kingdom. Christians can
admit no ultimate dualism between God’s history and the world’s history.”369 This
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assertion of one history and rejection of dualism expresses what Hauerwas calls “ultimate
realism.”370 Rather than the church living in a “fantasy or illusion,” instead he asserts that
“the so-called world-as-it-really-is is itself fantastic” since the world asserts its autonomy
from “the resurrection of Jesus [that] is the absolute center of history.”371 Dorrien
recognized this framework all too briefly in 2009, minus an explicit note about a
hierarchy of truth. He mentioned that Hauerwas’s pacifism rooted in God’s peaceable
kingdom is quite different than “the social order of ubiquitous violence described by [R.]
Niebuhr and other social ethicists that liberalism sought to manage.”372 That difference is
less about a church-world distinction and more about two very different views of reality,
or as Dorrien notes for Hauerwas, which account describes “the real world.”373 Similarly,
Dorrien and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the church and world is predicated on their
different understandings of the nature of reality because they differ about what is truly
significant. What is truly significant for them depends on what they argue is truly
determinative of humanity, what ultimately creates and shapes humanity’s relational
existence. So in other words, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differing positions on relational
truth are actually rival accounts of reality.374
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True Reality
For Hauerwas, what is truly determinative of humanity is that Jesus as
autobasileia is the truth, and that humanity’s new agency emerges from within God’s
kingdom. Liberalism is significant only insofar as the church in the US is more beholden
to the liberal assumption of violence than to practices that embody Jesus’s nonviolence.
However, this hierarchy of truth has been misinterpreted in light of contemporary forces
in human existence. Some have argued that Hauerwas’s stress on the church’s alterity
indicates that he is over determined by his rejection of liberalism. Hauerwas’s account of
the church as an “alternative” to political liberalism is indeed about setting the church in
continuity with God’s “cosmic” kingdom and against political liberalism.375 But it is
somewhat misleading to say, even though Hauerwas often does, that he portrays Jesus
and the church as alternatives to liberalism. The converse is the case.376
For Hauerwas, the Christian confession that “God, not humanity, is the ultimate
determiner of human history” is a universal, “metaphysical claim about the way things
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are.”377 Jesus, in his particularity, is of utmost significance because he is the truth that is
“more determinative” than any other truth.378 The actual alternative has always been sin,
the perverting of humanity through the fearful lie of human autonomy as an alternative to
God’s sovereignty. In Hauerwas’s words: “grace is a more profound word than sin.”379
This complicates Dorrien’s 1995 critique that, contrary to Hauerwas, one need not
“regard the rest of the world as unregenerate or deprived of grace.”380 For Hauerwas,
because Jesus determines and works “with the grain of the universe,” “our sins cannot
determine God’s will for our lives,” “justice is deeper than injustice,” and “forgiveness is
a more determinative reality than punishment.”381 The church can, therefore, proleptically
live in the nonviolent, eschatological peace of God rather than live determined by
liberalism’s political order and its violence. In the face of illusion the church reveals the
truth that the world is still God’s and that it remains “bounded by God’s goodness”
despite sin.382
So Hauerwas’s position is that “the ultimate sign [of] our salvation comes only
when we cease trying to interpret Jesus’s story in the light of our history, and instead we
interpret ourselves in light of his.”383 But what then of Dorrien’s 1995 critique that
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Hauerwas’s perspectivism is “quasi-sectarian” rather than “open-ended”?384 Hauerwas’s
account of hierarchical truth is complex and open, not monolithic.385 He argues that
theology as the “‘queen’ of the sciences” requires an openness and humility, including
that “theology has to learn from other disciplines.”386 He allows for “antecedent
moralities,” meaning moralities that one’s cultural context holds.387 Even before 1995 he
affirmed an account of “the self…constituted by many different roles and stories.”388 So
rather than Jesus extracting the church from society, the question is how Jesus orders the
church’s navigation of a complex milieu. The answer for Hauerwas is, of course, the
faithful witness of embodying Jesus makes Jesus known in everyday relations.
Hauerwas’s account of truth in hierarchy and relations is, then, his account of
reality. In contrast, Dorrien dethrones a hierarchy of truth. What determines human
existence is a multiplicity of forces that are mutually related. Although they are qualified
by an apophatic reserve, the reserve actually re-institutes the mutuality.
Dorrien assumes two basic truths found in line with his perspectivism that shape
his understanding of reality. The first is that in the “world…everything is relative because
everything is related.”389 I contended above that Dorrien’s mediating dialectic places
truths in a mutually determinative relationship to one another. This “relational” dialectic
rejects “Kant’s dichotomy between pure and practical reason,” but assumes that Christian
truth and society are generally on the same plane when it comes to shaping one’s
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subjectivity.390 Theology asserts the importance of gospel truth. But theology must also
be open to and engage modern knowledge in order to reflect on what is known and
imaginable. Through the gospel and open reflection one can more readily participate in
the movement of personal and panentheist Spirit within which all humanity relates to
itself.391
This account of reality as mutual relationality frames and propels Dorrien into a
host of different kinds of human interrelations such as ecology, economics, interfaith
dialogue, and discussions between science and religion. Dorrien supports, for instance,
John Cobb Jr.’s “mutual transformation” as a model for holding together process
theology’s sense of cosmological and ecological interrelatedness within an emphasis on
liberation theologies and interfaith dialogue.392 But for Dorrien, social justice largely
guides the forms of human interrelation. He asserts that the “best sign” of living in the
mystery of universal, personal Spirit’s love is “a passion for social justice and the
flourishing of life.”393 His progressive theology of justice works against oppressive
injustice in order to work towards what people and their relations should become.394
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Dorrien might then reflect Hauerwas’s summation of “Christian Realism” as
stated by Robin Lovin: “in the end truth about God must be consistent with every other
kind of truth we can know.”395 However, this consistency is not the case for Dorrien. For
him, “worldviews are relative, limited, fallible, passing, and thus not really the point.”396
Rather, “the incomprehensible Spirit of the Whole” will eschatologically transfigure “our
[incomplete] strivings to live into the truth and advance the flourishing of life.”397 This
eschatological variation on Dorrien’s apophatic reserve keeps him from “tak[ing] any of
[his] worldviewing or activism too seriously, especially the battle of isms.”398 Thus, his
apophatic reserve’s relativizing of the relativist perspective qualifies his mutual relation
between Christianity and society.
Such a qualification might indicate a truth that orders all others, a kind of
hierarchy in the negative. But there is more to what the reserve does. Remember that the
specific basis for his reserve is both the limitations of human experience and reason and
the relational apprehension of the Word’s hiddenness. These mean that Dorrien’s reserve
is itself perspectival. The reserve is about the relativity of his position, that his
perspective is absolutely relative and that it is inherently relational. So he must be open to
others in order to broaden his perspective. The apophatic reserve, therefore, reinforces the
importance of mutual relationality. Thereby it serves implicitly as a description of reality
“where everything is relative because everything is related.”399
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But what about Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity, his re-mythologizing of Christ’s
kingdom in Spirit? Although an account of Spirit inherently stresses relationality, does
not simply the idea of Spirit undercut the claim that “everything is relative” in respect to
objective, absolute, and universal truth?400 The answer depends on which relation that
one is referencing.401
Dorrien’s normative theological position, by his own admission, is one position
within liberal theology. Right after he calls for recovering a theology of personal Spirit
and outlines his own spiritual center, he then writes, “more important than any particular
proposal is whether or not progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional
spirit.”402 Relativizing his own theological position comports with not only his definition
of liberal theology united by method rather than doctrine, but also his perspectivism in an
apophatic reserve. “Only a healthy pluralism in philosophy and rhetorical forms can free
theology to do the work of locating the correspondence between human word and divine
truth.”403
So might Dorrien’s relativizing of his own position “make relativism a new
monism”?404 Hauerwas rejects just such a postmodern enterprise. But Dorrien is not that
postmodern. Paralleling Hauerwas’s concern about liberalism in the university, Dorrien
argues that “trying to convince deconstructionists that theology is a legitimate academic
enterprise” has distracted, if not cut off, liberal theology from its evangelical heritage.405
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That critique is about what conviction liberal theology should have. His normative
theological position for liberal theology is that “it…should be a clear and convicting
word about following Jesus and worshipping God as the divine Spirit of love without
having to believe any particular thing on the basis of external authority.”406 This quote
exemplifies Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity.407
Dorrien may then appear in a dialectical bind between his position and his
conviction. At worst, as essential as Dorrien’s described conviction is to his position, his
conviction is not simply filtered through but perhaps always subject to his apophatic
reserve. Yet there is more if we are to take Dorrien’s conviction seriously. In the quote
about his conviction is a small but crucial hint that, to use Rowan Williams’s words,
Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree not only over “reality as it is” but also, more
fundamentally, “the truth which encompasses it.”408 That is, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s
different understandings about the nature of reality are shaped by rival understandings of
some-‘thing’ besides the human forces that determine human existence. As a speech-act,
Dorrien’s account of Jesus and loving Spirit above subtly implies that Spirit shapes
human relations. Divine creating, the other half of determination, can be identified in
terms of the source of life that for Dorrien, I explicitly but briefly showed above, links
divine transcendence and divine determination. Hauerwas’s account of God’s particular
grace, that is Jesus, is explicit about determining humanity. So the issue is how Dorrien
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and Hauerwas account for the fact that “human reality exists…within God’s reality”: that
“we are contingent beings whose meaning and significance is determined by something,
something other than ourselves.”409 The next chapter will focus on their difference over
the divine determination of humanity and the differences that stem from it.
V. Conclusion
I have shown that Hauerwas and Dorrien aim to be faithful to their relational
accounts of truth. Yet their differences over truth create differences over how to be
faithful to it. Hauerwas rejects liberal theology’s three layers because he privileges Jesus
in his particularity as the truth who is known in particular relations. This relational
account of hierarchical truth contrasts sharply with Dorrien’s account of multiple truths in
mutual relation. These differences explain their differing evaluations of and responses to
liberalism and liberal theology. However, what truth(s) Hauerwas and Dorrien focus on
are often overlooked in terms of truth, while their differences over faithfulness are
discussed in terms of liberation theology and the church-world relation. I addressed the
latter issues to show not only that are they more complicated in Hauerwas’s work, but
also that such considerations are insufficient for understanding the difference between
Hauerwas and Dorrien. Instead, undergirding Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s differences over
the church-world relation are their differing accounts of truth that imply rival
understandings of reality.
However, even their difference over reality only begins to introduce but does not
quite reach the heart their disagreements or theologies. Chapter two will show that at the
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heart of their theologies and their disagreements are the issues of divine sovereignty,
human subjectivity, and human agency. There I show how divine sovereignty creates and
shapes human subjectivity, and in turn, how that shapes human agency in intra-human
relations. Dorrien focuses on Spirit, human spirit, and love. Hauerwas emphasizes Jesus,
the triune creator, human creaturehood, and God’s particular grace. From Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s differences on those points, chapter three will argue, issue forth rival
accounts of political sovereignty and participation with it.410
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CHAPTER 2
The Heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s Disagreement:
Divine Sovereignty and Human Subjectivity and Agency
Chapter one concluded that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the
church-world distinction presupposes a more basic difference: the relational nature of
reality informed by a hierarchy of truth for Hauerwas or a democratized plurality of truths
for Dorrien. I briefly noted then that these differences over reality and truth are created
and shaped by an even deeper difference. Dorrien emphasizes love and Hauerwas stresses
gift within their respective frameworks of the Spirit’s universality and Jesus’s trinitarian
particularity. These different emphases, I will argue, characterize their rival accounts of
divine sovereignty creating and shaping human subjectivity and agency, and in turn,
intra-human relations. Their different positions here mark the heart of both their
theologies and their disagreements with one another.
I. Divine Sovereignty
Divine sovereignty is theology’s term for God’s supreme authority understood in
two vectors. First, God determines––created and continues to shape––humanity. Second,
humanity does not, at least fundamentally, create and shape God. This vector is
undergirded by the recognition of partly human finitude but ultimately divine freedom.
God is not a being or created, nor is anything necessary other than God for God to ‘be’
God. I endeavor in the first half of this chapter is to show that crucial to Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s projects is how they construe the relation between God’s supreme authority
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and human agency. To show this importance and to narrow the scope of inquiry, it is
worth stipulating five ways of understanding divine sovereignty.411
The first issue of divine sovereignty is Dorrien and Hauerwas’s affirmation of
divine freedom. Yet Dorrien may not succeed where Hauerwas does on divine freedom, I
will argue, precisely because of their respective construals of love and gift. However,
divine freedom will be more integrated into my argument below rather than be the
primary focus. This is because divine freedom is less prominent in their thought than
divine sovereignty in terms of God’s sovereign agency in relation to humanity. So I will
focus most on the latter.
The second understanding of divine sovereignty is divine lordship. Dorrien and
Hauerwas’s kingdom theologies hold that God is the Lord over the cosmos. Despite
lordship being the conventional description of divine sovereignty, lordship qua lordship is
not the focus here. Instead, I follow Dorrien and Hauerwas. My focus is their re-
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description of lordship, to varying degrees, in trajectories other than as God ‘lording
over’ creation.412
Their re-descriptions occur in points three and four, which are, respectively,
God’s creative work and divine providence. In the former, God is sovereign as the one
who is the source of creation and who brought creation into existence. In the latter,
providence, God continues to sustain creation and to oversee creation’s development.
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a transcendent and immanent, creative and redemptive
understanding of divine sovereignty. They refuse to make God subject to ontology while
they emphasize God’s sovereign work as undergirding the existence of the cosmos and
overseeing the transformative growth of humanity. But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ
about the details. Although Dorrien and Hauerwas will make appeals to grace and love
respectively, for the most part Dorrien stresses Spirit and love, while Hauerwas
emphasizes Jesus and particular grace. Those differences are the focus of what follows
about Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s understanding of divine sovereignty.
Fifth, divine sovereignty determines both human subjectivity, in terms of
ontology (e.g., nature and creaturehood), and human agency. Both Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s accounts of human subjectivity revolve around relations among human
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beings because God’s sovereign relating to humanity in turn shapes human relations.
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas understand the divine relation to humanity in terms of love
and grace. But, again, Dorrien focuses on love and Hauerwas on particular grace.
In the next few sections, I will explicate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s latent
understandings of divine sovereignty framed in terms of God’s creating and shaping
relation to humanity. I show how those understandings are characterized by Dorrien’s
and Hauerwas’s respective emphases on love and particular grace. But first, the
distinctiveness of Dorrien’s position cannot be sufficiently appreciated without noting the
middle to late twentieth-century shift in liberal theology. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s life
and assassination marked respectively the climax and collapse of two of liberal
theology’s three wings: the social gospel, which carried on evangelical liberalism, and
personalism, which provided the metaphysical backing for the social gospel. Process
theology, the third wing and heiress to the Chicago school, was all that was left. That puts
into relief Dorrien’s critique of Whiteheadian process theology ultimately construing God
as the highest and most exemplary being or “creative process,” but still as “subject” to
process nonetheless.413 So when faced with a choice of giving up God’s goodness (love),
omniscience, omnipotence, or immutability/impassibility, process theology often gives
up the latter implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, despite the distinction between “God’s
primordial nature” as immutable and “God’s consequent nature” as mutable.414 While
Dorrien does not directly address impassibility or omniscience in his constructive work
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directly and nor will I do below either, he nevertheless breaks from process because of
divine freedom. It is crucial, then, to establish the importance of divine sovereignty in
Dorrien’s position and to show how he develops it with his account of loving Spirit. The
development of his position provides the ground for the subsequent, more direct
engagement between him and Hauerwas on God’s sovereignty and creation. I explicate
Hauerwas on divine sovereignty partly because his reliance on it needs to be supported,
but also partly because divine sovereignty’s character of gift has been under-recognized.
Gift is a significant golden thread in Hauerwas’s unsystematic web. The triune God is the
one who gives particular gifts; human existence starts with gift; human creatures exist
through gift-giving; and gift runs accordingly to the end of Hauerwas’s ethics. Only then
can I proceed to a more thorough account of their understandings about human
subjectivity and agency in terms of intra-human relations as they are framed by
humanity’s relation to divine sovereignty.415
II. Dorrien on Divine Sovereignty
Dorrien’s account of gospel-centered personal Spirit (God) relating to spirit
(humanity) is predicated on the sovereignty of love, the universality of Spirit, and the
universal category of spirit. Most of these issues were raised in chapter one, but they
were only briefly noted. They were not explicitly brought together, nor were they framed
by sovereignty. I argue here that Dorrien’s articulation of panentheist, personal Spirit as
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love is the source of existence and shapes it. The following is a brief stipulative overview
of Dorrien’s framework before I develop it.
The Spirit is not a being nor is it subject to process. Spirit is the source of
existence, and Spirit works within historical process because underneath all existence is
the category of spirit. With the Spirit as source of and its activity in human spirit, there
are three aspects to ontology: being, nonbeing, and becoming. The Spirit’s oversight of
these aspects is part of how the Spirit is sovereign. Spirit is the creative source of being,
Spirit is greater than the void of nonbeing, and Spirit guides human becoming through the
dialectic of being and nonbeing. This ontological typology and account of the Spirit’s
sovereignty are not possible without an account of love. Being is made possible by love.
Here love is the Spirit’s openness to difference from itself, that is human beings and their
autonomy. Love has no exact corollary to nonbeing itself; however, love is in the Spirit’s
creative work between being and nonbeing to guide human becoming. Love is the Spirit’s
caring endeavor undergirding humanity’s development. Spirit calls humanity to love on
the one hand, and on the other hand Spirit affirms human autonomy rather than violates
it. In light of human autonomy, loving Spirit begins by laboring impersonally within the
consciousness of humanity. Impersonally here means a non-personal presence. The
Spirit’s impersonal work in human consciousness is how human beings apprehend that,
nonetheless, their autonomous nature involves existing in mutual relations. Humanity can
then realize that its development towards freedom is achieved through relations
transformed by living in love’s openness and care. This pattern is typified by the Spirit’s
personal, spiritual work in Jesus. Finally, then, humanity can begin to see its absolute
dependence on personal Spirit. So love is essential to the Spirit’s sovereignty and
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humanity’s developing existence. Love is openness both to others and to their autonomy.
Love is also caring work for them to achieve free flourishing through the development of
autonomy-in-relation to others.
Now to support my claim about the sovereignty of Spirit-love in Dorrien’s
theology and to show the details of Dorrien’s framework. I begin with his understanding
of divine freedom in terms of creative, universal Spirit. This places God above process
while still the source of being. Dorrien can hold such a position because he understands
the Spirit in both personal and impersonal terms: as love (personal) and universal
(impersonal). This is also the ground for God working in process to transform it.
However, Dorrien’s understanding of nature and grace ultimately places love before
grace in order to make room for human autonomy, a point which will contrast sharply
with Hauerwas. I then note that a spiritual perichoresis between divine Spirit and human
spirit undergirds Dorrien’s understanding of transformation. Divine Spirit is sovereign,
for Dorrien, because its universality and its creative love are the source of humanity and
its means of transformation. In light of all this, then I can return to the issue of divine
freedom.
Divine Freedom, Creativity, and the Apophatic Turn
Dorrien combines gospel, process, and personal Spirit for a kind of panentheist
God who ‘exists’ in an “immanent transcendence,” always related to the world, but with a
mysterious transcendent “more.”416 That framework is an account of divine sovereignty
because, informed by two divergent schools of thought, Dorrien joins immanence and
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transcendence with divine creativity and freedom. On the one hand, Whiteheadian
process theology’s emphasis on the creativity of God and the development of matter
affects Dorrien’s view of immanence. On the other hand, Barth’s rejection of human
attempts to control God affects transcendence. Dorrien’s dialecticism is not evenly
weighted here. Although process theology has outlived all other schools in liberal
theology, Dorrien is not a fully-fledged process theologian because he ultimately leans
toward Barth’s stress on transcendence (divine freedom) over process theology’s
reductionary emphasis on immanence. God is transcendent “power” over “being,” that is
life or existence, and over “nonbeing,” that is both death/nihil and potential.417 Yet,
Dorrien’s affirmation of divine transcendent power and his rejection of God “subjected to
process” are why Dorrien can maintain divine immanence active in process.418 God is the
creative source of being and is creatively at work in-between being and nonbeing for
humanity’s “becoming.”419
This account of God’s sovereign transcendence undergirds issues raised in chapter
one. Dorrien’s critique of God’s participation in process being subject to ontology or
process is the ground upon which Dorrien simultaneously embraces and relativizes the
modern world view. Chapter one also noted that Dorrien attributes his apophatic reserve
to Barth’s influence. But Dorrien can still incorporate process because his monism
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describes God as “the ultimate ground of all categories, not merely all that is excellent or
surpassing.”420 This indicates that ultimately undergirding Dorrien’s apophaticism is a
complex fusion. He combines Barth’s understanding of divine freedom and the early
Hegel’s construal of Geist that privileges negation. However, there is also tension in that
Barth-Hegel fusion. Although Dorrien asserts divine freedom, his normative accounts
have not addressed an implicit necessity of divine relation to humanity in accounts of
panentheist monism. But the issue of necessity can only be addressed in light of answers
to other questions. How exactly is Spirit creatively the source of and involved in process
but not subject to it? And how is human subjectivity understood and incorporated?421
Love and Spirit; Personal and Impersonal
Dorrien has yet to give his own robust and detailed account of Spirit. But he has
indirectly through his historical work on and his normative appeals to Nels F. S. Ferré.
Dorrien’s descriptions of both his normative position and Ferré’s work track not only
theme for theme, but often even word for word. So here I delineate their position often
through Ferré but still connected to Dorrien. However, there is some difficulty in
delineating what is to come. Dorrien rightly describes that “Ferré's academic works were
long on spinning concepts out of concepts.”422 Dorrien’s historical interpretation of Ferré
is clearer but it and Dorrien’s brief, normative appeals to Ferré still follow the conceptual
pattern. That propensity combined with––and in fact due to––their apophatic reserve can
lead to some rather abstractly vague accounts. What “metaphysical audacity” that can be
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articulated is limited by “apprehending…indirectly,” by seeing “through a glass
darkly.”423 So the following must be faithful to their idealist language of S/spirit. For
them loving Spirit, personal and impersonal, is how God is universally and creatively
sovereign over and through process. I begin with love and then address S/spirit, personal
Spirit, and impersonal Spirit. These connected issues together form an account of the
Spirit’s sovereignty and the ground for its relation to humanity.424
In Ferré’s parlance, “God is sovereign love.”425 “Love is ultimate” because, as
agape, divine “love is a self-existing and self-directed form of energy” that is both the
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source of other’s distinction and the unconditional orientation toward the other.426 This
initial understanding of love is about God in se and pro nobis. For Ferré, “God is love”
because God is known in God’s “personal,” “creative,” and transformative love.427 This
outgoing love begins with divine love as “the ‘category of categories.’”428 Divine love
unifies the category of personality, which is “purpose or meaning,” with the category of
spirit, which undergirds “being and nonbeing.”429 Love’s injection of purpose into the
relation of being-nonbeing creates a directed form of becoming, a new existence. So the
sovereignty of divine love is twofold. First, love is about openness for and to the other.
That is, love recognizes the distinction between subject and object, and love is the subject
open to the object. From this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s openness to being, the
difference of being itself. Second, love is caring work for the other’s flourishing. From
this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s care for being, the development of being
(becoming).430
Throughout the different variations of personalism, personality is “centered on the
metaphysical primacy of consciousness.”431 However, Dorrien opts for Ferré’s minority
position within personalism that rejects the primacy of personality. Ferré does so partly
because “two personalities can[not] occupy the same place at the same time either in
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physical or in psychic space.”432 But this issue implies a further problem. When he asserts
that “God is not even a thinking and acting substance,” Ferré is rejecting “a ‘separate
Personality’ concept of God modeled on the supreme being of classical theism.”433 So for
Ferré, the primacy of personality is still bound by the limits of “substantialist
metaphysics,” despite claims to the contrary––some correct and some not––by the Boston
school personalists.434 To avoid these problems of personality, Ferré construes love in
terms of personal, which is “self-conscious, nonspatial purpose.”435 The immediate
difference between personal and personality is “adjectiv[e]” and noun, respectively.436 If
personal was not “qualitative” but instead quantitative, it would still be bound to some of
the same substantive baggage of personality that would limit the extent to which
panentheist Spirit permeates being.437 So what “quantitati[ve]” non-spatial, non-thing is
personal modifying?438 Ferré and Dorrien need something else to make love a
thoroughgoing universal, to stress the interrelatedness within the Whole, to strengthen
their account of process, and to avoid anthropomorphizing or limiting God to radical
immanence.439
For Ferré and Dorrien the answer is monism: God is Spirit and the general
category of spirit. The Spirit is the most basic form of divine reality, Spirit is the source
of existence, and the category of spirit encapsulates the whole of reality. There are three,
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related implications in this framework. First, Spirit is universal as “the ultimately
inclusive ultimate.”440 Second, the ultimate ground of each human being is ultimately
spirit, not material being. Third, Spirit relates to humanity in spirit. Ferré rejects
idealism’s conventional “subject-object relation.”441 He argues instead for “Subjectsubjectobject and Subject-subjectobject relations” that are “in one dimension identical” as
S/spirit, “and in the other distinct” as Spirit and spirit.442
Divine Spirit and human spirit as such is effectively what I will call the
“similarity of spirit.” By similarity of spirit I mean that, on the level of spirit not being,
God and humanity are equalized in terms of type, spirit, but are distinguished in terms of
capacity or ‘existence’ (infinite Spirit-finite spirit), origination (Spirit the source of
spirit), and “nonsubstantial personal awareness.”443 This framework shares affinities with
both analogy and univocity of being without being wholly either because the category of
spirit is not being but rather the ineffable, monistic ground of everything. One can see the
similarity and dissimilarity of analogy within the differentiation of capacity/existence and
origination. In fact, I presume that Dorrien would want to argue for greater dissimilarity
since he “take[s] for granted that [his] concepts do not correspond univocally to divine
reality or any reality.”444 Dorrien appears to take that reserve a step further as he does
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with his readings of Barth rejecting analogy of being and opting for “dialectical
reasoning” to the end of his life.445 Framed by the latter, recall that Dorrien’s apophatic
reserve qualifies but does not keep him from re-mythologization. He gives of an account
of God and humanity as divine Spirit and human spirit in those terms precisely because
they are incomplete concerning the fullness that is God and humanity. Can something
then be said? There is a correlation between God and humanity that is, for the same
reason, not adequately described by the univocity of being. The level of spirit is supposed
to be about the relationship between God and humanity that is rooted in a panentheist
monism, that is partially realized now in human consciousness, and that will be fully
actualized non-spatially in the eschaton on the level of spirit. But that account of
relational “coinherence” between divine Spirit and human spirit situates both as a
fundamentally similar type (or in Hegelian terms, “essence,” and in Ferré’s “the essence
of sameness”) on the level of spirit in order to delineate a “contrapletal” panentheism in
monist Spirit.446 I will return soon to the issue of Spirit-spirit’s coinherence and human
development therein.447
For now Ferré and Dorrien join the two ultimates, love and Spirit. Ferré claims
that “God…is Spirit. The form of Spirit is personal; the content of Spirit is Love.”448 To
say that “God is Spirit” is a claim that everything is included in the Spirit’s infinite
expanse.449 “Personal” emphasizes the distinctive relational nature of Spirit and avoids
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some vague notion of Spirit.450 “Love” makes distinctions on the levels of spirit and
being.451 There is human spirit and human being because love recognizes the difference
between divine Spirit and humans as spirit and being. But also, implicitly, love is a sense
of caring for difference as different and for its development.452
When it comes to universal and personal Spirit relating to spirit, love as caring
recognizes a crucial fact. There can be interpenetrative unity between Spirit and spirit on
the level of spirit, but not on the levels of personality or substance because, again,
multiple personalities or substances cannot exist in the same space. To avoid Spirit
overriding the psychic space of human spirit, Ferré’s solution is not only Spirit as
personal. Divine Spirit is also “present impersonally or semi-personally in man’s moral
urges and the workings of conscience” (e.g., intellectual intuition) in order to protect
spirit’s distinctive difference and its autonomy from overbearing Spirit.453 So God is
present personally to humanity as loving Spirit and present impersonally in humanity as
impersonal Spirit directed by love. This “contrapletal” framework is how love, even
though it is personal, can be universally present.454
Dorrien’s normative accounts emphasize personal Spirit because it is the heart of
Spirit. But even though Dorrien himself never explicitly employs the framework of
impersonal Spirit, it is still necessary to his normative position for a number of reasons.
Here it is worth noting that Dorrien matches Ferré’s construal of impersonal Spirit and
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the autonomy of spirit’s difference. On the one hand, Dorrien describes the ground of
intellectual intuition as “anything that I think or do is ultimately God thinking and acting
through me.”455 On the other hand, Dorrien seeks to maintain humanity’s autonomous
subjectivity in a dialectical relation with humanity’s absolute dependence on panentheist,
loving Spirit who is over being and nonbeing.456
Humanity’s Dependence and Autonomy;
the Spirit’s Apophatic Grace and Cataphatic Love
Dorrien has long held to an epistemology of God’s universal accessibility to
humanity through spirit’s experience of love and its rational reflection on it. Dorrien does
so to keep divine sovereignty from overriding human autonomy. This has led him to
ultimately emphasize love over grace to the point that grace, gift, or any other synonym
rarely makes an appearance in Dorrien’s constructive theology. He privileges love and
down plays grace for three reasons.457
First, Dorrien’s opting for universal accessibility to God leads to rejecting
cataphatic revelation in Barth. Dorrien notes Barth’s understanding that “truth is grace”
means that truth is only known through grace.458 Dorrien also recognizes the problem
Barth saw in idealism: “If theology is to remain grounded in God’s revelation, then the
idealist is going to have to dampen his ardor for a generally accessible truth, and to join
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forces with the realist.”459 But Dorrien’s answer is to emphasize idealism’s universalism
and reasoning rather than to accept a full-blown realism or Barth’s cataphatic articulation
of grace. Humanity perceives its “absolute dependence” on God through socialized
intellectual intuition and speculative reason, not so much through receiving cataphatic
grace from an external authority.460 So in Dorrien’s constructive theology, humanity’s
intellectual intuition and speculative reason apprehend that the nature of God is personal
Spirit and love. Dorrien appears, then, to do away with grace. Yet, there is still room for
Barth’s emphasis on grace in an apophatic frame.
Second, Spirit’s universality and humanity’s finitude makes grace largely a
spiritual and ontological reality that proceeds from an epistemology about the spiritual
reality of divine love. Years before his publications on Ferré, in 1997 Dorrien used
Barth’s apophaticism and theology of the Word to construct a Spirit Christology. The
Spirit is both hidden and universally known through its gracious work of spiritual selfrevelation and transformative love in one’s mind and the concrete world. This
constructive account emphasized many of Dorrien’s later hallmarks. The 1997 difference
is that Dorrien actually wrestled with the issue of grace.461
Grace appeared to ground his constructive theology because of his debt to Barth’s
apophaticism. However, like Ferré, Dorrien also had reservations about Barthian grace.
Barth’s truth-grace relation led to “a rather contrived and reductionist definition of myth”
as “biblical ‘saga,’” in contrast with “monist mythologies of other religions and
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philosophies.”462 Instead, similar to Ferré, for Dorrien grace is necessary because of
human finitude and God’s transcendence. But grace as such is largely an apophatic
‘revelation’ about the mystery of God’s hiddenness. Dorrien recently expressed his
apophatic reserve in terms of grace: “Even if one begins with the given reality of God,
the truth about God’s reality is not given.”463 Rather, grace illuminates in human
consciousness the hiddenness of God, the transcendent ineffability of Spirit. But recall
that Dorrien’s apophatic reserve does not negate “metaphysical audacity.”464 In 1997 he
stresses that God is Spirit truly known only on the level of spirit. Dorrien characterizes
that Spirit later in terms of personal, loving Spirit. So in love the Spirit is open to human
spirit. Therefore, the net effect of an apophatic grace and cataphatic love makes grace a
product of love.465
This production of grace by love can be seen even in Dorrien’s explicit
articulation of grace in the positive. Love is “life-giving.”466 Grace as such is one
component of the Spirit’s universal love, which grounds Dorrien’s fight for justice and
human flourishing. Such love and grace are also the reason why Dorrien proclaims that
“we are not in control. It is not up to us to fulfill God’s will for the world. In drawing
closer to God we are thrown into work that allows others to share in the harvest, and that
is enough.”467 So in love the Spirit cares for human spirit by nurturing humanity’s
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development in love. Grace, therefore, issues forth from love, the Spirit’s universal
openness and care.
Third, for Dorrien, if love is to be “life-giving” for human development, then
grace is shaped by human autonomy. Dorrien seeks to protect human autonomy from
overbearing divine sovereignty in a way that overlaps with Ferré’s contention that Spirit
relates impersonally to spirit. Dorrien contends that R. Niebuhr undercuts the liberation
brought by autonomy because his stress on divine grace and sovereignty over determines
humanity. In contrast, Dorrien’s understanding that “God is the lure of love divine”
parallels his summary of Alfred North Whitehead: “God lures us to make creative, lifeenhancing choices, but God does not negate our freedom to make choices.”468 Emphasis
on the “lure of love” and “choices” might not seem consistent with an account of grace,
but the space for the freedom to choose is Ferré’s account of grace. Ferré construes divine
grace as “God withdraws” God’s personal presence to be present only impersonally in
humanity so that humanity can use its “God-given capacity” to make choices.469 If Spirit
were personally present in spirit, that would compete for the psychic space in human
consciousness.470
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Spirit Christology as Spiritual Perichoresis,
and a Return to Divine Freedom
How then do Spirit and spirit relate? On the basis of the universality of both Spirit
and the category of spirit, Ferré supercharged the relation between loving Spirit and spirit
into a relation of interpenetration transforming spirit. The Spirit as personal and
impersonal works on all levels of love––agape, eros, and altruism––and unites them
together. This unity initially brings the human spirit’s erotic and altruistic love in line
with Spirit’s agape, but the result exceeds the initial conclusion. A “Spirit-coinherence,”
the “interpenetration of Spirit and spirit,” makes a new existence in human spirit: “cosubjects” with Spirit as modeled by the adoptionist “picture” of Christ.471 The
“coinherence,” the “perichoresis” of Spirit and spirit in spirit, is a theology of spiritual
transformation in continuity with intellectual intuition about Spirit.472 In other words, this
perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is a “spiritual” perichoresis because the perichoresis of
Spirit and spirit is at the heart of Ferré’s description of Christian spirituality.473 The
perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is Ferré’s understanding of the incarnation in contrast to
what he judges are Chalcedon’s idolatrous problems of substance and Hegel’s
overbearing Spirit.474
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Dorrien’s Spirit Christology is in fundamental agreement with Ferré’s framework
above. The ultimacy of Spirit and its love of all is the “universal Word,” which is
“normative truth” for Ferré and Dorrien; indeed, the universal Word is at the heart of
Dorrien’s Spirit Christology.475 In particular, Dorrien affirms Ferré’s account of spiritual
coinherence and his apophatic concern about Chalcedonian ‘idolatry’ obscuring the truth
of Spirit, when Dorrien writes “Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in
him.”476 That is the heart of Dorrien’s Spirit Christology. What can be said about “the
triune mystery who has power over the void,” is that “the presence of Christ’s Spirit calls
for ongoing transformation in the form of life-giving works of love. The Word becomes
true myth in order to redeem all history through ongoing transformations of the human
spirit.”477 So both Ferré and Dorrien develop a similar pneumatology of sovereign love
that creatively relates Spirit and human spirit. Ferré and Dorrien’s goal is also similar: the
transformation of humanity into a new existence like Christ, despite how incomplete
humanity’s faithful work may be. “God is the lure of love divine for creative
transformation and the flourishing of life.”478 Specifically, since Dorrien’s theology seeks
to be faithful to the truth and since that is about living in the Spirit as Christ did, “a
passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine
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light” of sovereign love.479 But that raises the issue of intra-human relations in love to be
taken up later.480
With spiritual perichoresis as a capstone to the whole framework of S/spirit and
love, an issue concerning divine freedom can be raised in full. For the latter, trouble
occurs in his cataphatic account of S/spirits’ interrelationality and love. To construe God
as Spirit and humanity as spirit assumes an inherent connection between Spirit and spirit
and between spirit and spirit from the beginning. Without that connectivity, God is not
Spirit or the Whole, humanity is not spirit in the whole and Whole, and so the category of
spirit is not itself. Love is crucial here since it makes the distinction between Spirit and
spirit, and in turn, love establishes a panentheism rather than a pantheism. But even in
that distinction, love is an internal distinction on the level of spirit. Love cannot achieve
an articulation of what grace in its negative inflection does: divine freedom. “If God is
not free from us in some way that makes God’s power transcend the world, God cannot
be free from us in our suffering and mortality. God cannot sustain life beyond death if
God’s transcendence does not include power over nonbeing.”481 But in that apophatic
framework is also an implicit characterization of divine freedom, here specifically
election, analogous to what political liberalism calls negative freedom. While such a
claim may seem tenuous in light of only the quote, my claim is one specific way of
developing Dorrien’s deep sympathy for the larger apophatic vision of Meister Eckhart,
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who “refused to apply the names of the Father, Son, and Spirit to the ‘God above
God.’”482 For instance, Dorrien still holds to thrust of those two quotes above, even
though the first was in 1997 and the second was in 2009; however, other points
surrounding Dorrien’s position seems to have changed. Whereas in 1997 he held to
“triune mystery who has power over the void,” by 2014 he asserted that “all thinking
about God is inadequate, a mere pointer to transcendent mystery. …Even if one begins
with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”483 The latter
quote explains why, in 2009, Dorrien overlooked Karl Rahner’s dictum that the economic
Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa in order to include Rahner in the list of
“apophatic mystics” crowned by Eckhart. 484 Yet it is one thing to maintain an apophatic
emphasis. It something else entirely to privilege apophaticism in such a manner that
undoes an account of the Trinity and to employ a metaphysical audacity that over time
replaces the Trinity with “creative and personal Spirit, the transcendent holy mystery of
love divine.” 485 In other words, Dorrien’s construal of grace in the negative sets forth an
apophatic account of divine freedom. Such ineffable mystery he supplements then with a
cataphatic account of experiencing loving Spirit. The latter account he affirms
unabashedly in terms of agency pro nobis but more tentatively in terms of in se because
of divine freedom in the negative––the mystery of “I AM.” 486
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Response from Hauerwas’s Position
Hauerwas has not explicitly addressed Spirit Christologies, has rarely addressed
personalism, and has only once mentioned Ferré. But a response can be derived from
what he has written about love. Hauerwas emphasizes love’s priority in the sense that
God is love, that God commands humanity to love, and that humanity is oriented to God
by love characterizing friendship and ordering the virtues. But Hauerwas rejects most
approaches to the primacy of love. They produce a vague, if not sentimentalized, notion
of love without truth because they often abstract love from its particular triune and
“cruciform” definition in order to maintain the human individual’s autonomous
agency.487 There is persuasive evidence that Dorrien’s emphasis on truth seeks to avoid
sentimentalizing love, but there is warrant for a potentially devastating response by
Hauerwas on his terms. As chapter one showed, abstraction creates Christological
problems. Hauerwas argues that “love, justice, or some other monistic principle as alldetermining for ethical rationality and judgment” reductively replaces particularity with
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generic universality.488 That replacing is a “spirituality” which ultimately supplants Jesus
with self-creation for self-interests under the guise of human experience.489 Dorrien’s
Spirit Christology would then be a problematically “weak Christology” in Hauerwas’s
view.490 But for Hauerwas, “Jesus is not the teacher of love; rather, he is the the herald of
the Kingdom whose life makes possible a new way of existence.”491
That allusion to Jesus as the autobasileia is not the same as spiritual coinherence.
Yet the new life that he gives is one of love since, for Hauerwas, “Jesus’s Lordship is
exercised as a rule of love that prohibits the killing of the neighbor.”492 That “love is
deeper and more profound than the evil we find in the world.”493 Then how might
Hauerwas’s position be better distinguished from Dorrien’s account of love? One might
continue to try in terms of abstraction and particularity since Hauerwas articulates love as
friendship and stresses the “concrete fleshy” particularity of Jesus as constitutive of
Christian love.494 But the details make differentiating Dorrien and Hauerwas more
complex. For Hauerwas, Jesus’s love is a self-“dispossessed,” “nonviolent apprehension”
in openness to all that shows the truth of God’s gracious openness to and care for the
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other.495 That description of love simultaneously shares with Dorrien a similar
characterization of love and indicates another difference alongside the issue of
particularity. Hauerwas argues that love should not only be intimately connected with
truth, but also with gift. Love requires the concepts of truth and gift in order to be
intelligible. For the relation between love and gift: “love is a gift.”496 Accordingly, I will
contend that love proceeds from gift for Hauerwas, in contrast to Dorrien’s account of
gift proceeding from love.497
III. Hauerwas on Divine Sovereignty
Hauerwas claims that he has not “abandoned the central Christian contention of
the priority of God’s grace.”498 Hauerwas also “ha[s] no intention of qualifying the
necessity of God’s grace for the beginning, living, and end of the Christian life.”499 Those
quotes raise this chapter’s thesis, that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s respective
positions and their differences is divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency.
So it is instructive to show their differences in light of their similarity over the
relationship between God’s sovereignty and human existence. In Dorrien’s position
above, God’s determination of humanity occurs in two relational forms. God as the
source of being asserts in less traditional terms that ultimately God is the creator of
human subjects. God also determines humanity by God’s impersonal relation indirectly
shaping humanity towards the goals of transforming humanity and of humanity
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perceiving personal Spirit. A similar point about the relationship of God’s sovereignty
and humanity is at the heart of Hauerwas’s work. Hauerwas’s claim, that “the triune God
is the origin and ultimate goal of all things,” is much like Dorrien’s way of framing the
broadest relationship of God and humanity.500 But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ over
significant details. Dorrien’s non-Chalcedonian Spirit Christology is grounded in the
universality of spirit and sovereignty of love. For Hauerwas, Jesus-autobasileia reveals
that the triune Creator, through the divine economy of particular grace, creatively
determines the cosmos as creation and redemptively transforms human creatures together
into friends of God. In turn, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different characterizations of
divine sovereignty, I show later, shape different understandings of intra-human relations.
These differences, linked together, issue forth dramatically divergent responses to
political sovereignty in the next chapter.501
Here I will begin by contrasting Dorrien’s ultimates of Spirit and love with the
heart of Hauerwas’s portrayal of divine sovereignty in Jesus and in gift. Then I will
demonstrate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences on how Jesus reveals God, how Jesus
relates to creation, how God is free, how Hauerwas rejects the nature and grace
distinction, how God’s relationship to humanity shows God’s sovereignty, and how
Hauerwas understands the goal of God’s relating to humanity. By addressing those
issues, I conclude, the heart of Hauerwas’s work is a theology of the trinitarian God who,
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as gracious creator, positively determines humans to be creatures that are redemptively
shaped in the particularity of God’s gracious work past, present, and future.502
The Particularity of Jesus, Gift Preceding Love
Whereas Dorrien personalizes the generalized universality of Spirit, for
Hauerwas, Jesus in the particularity of his life, death, and resurrection fully reveals the
distinctiveness of God’s sovereignty. God rules and redeems in Jesus on a “cosmic”
scale.503 For Hauerwas, Jesus’s life and work as the autobasileia is God’s distinctively
particular but still universal invitation for humanity to participate in God’s kingdom.
Because Jesus the autobasileia is the truth, the living God incarnate, he reveals “to us
how God would be sovereign.”504 Humanity comes to understand in Jesus that humanity
is determined by gift instead of death, since “our existence and the existence of the
universe itself is a gift” from the “Lord of the universe” upon whom all creation
depends.505 Further, the cosmic character of Jesus’s lordship “totally reconfigured” what
kingship means in contrast to and over-against sovereignty predicated on the fear of
chaos and death.506 Divine kingship is sovereign not by coercion or violence, but through
the gift of Jesus’s self-dispossessed openness to those considered outsiders or enemies
“because God has valued ... all life.”507 The cosmic character of Christ’s revelation makes
the rule universal and it redefines sovereignty.
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Dorrien’s understandings of the creative, universal Spirit and the sovereign love
are no less than cosmic. But how he gives that account is based on the correlation
between the primacy of love as openness and an epistemology of God’s universal
accessibility to humanity. This ground leads Dorrien to construe gift predicated on love.
Hauerwas, however, makes love a function of gift because Jesus’s kenotic openness is a
gift, because love is the Holy Spirit’s gift, and because humanity’s learning how to love
is accordingly dependent on having been given it and reciprocating it in a particular
community. The difference on the relation of love and grace may seem to be nothing
more than a chicken versus egg dichotomy. But this disagreement undergirds other
differences to follow.508
The Sovereignty of God’s Particular Grace Framing Creation and Divine Freedom
Contrary to Dorrien, Hauerwas has consistently rejected any natural theology not
beginning with the particularity of Jesus. Hauerwas does so because he argues from the
primacy of Jesus’s lordship over creation to a trinitarian basis of creation. Against
abstraction, Hauerwas refuses to “separate” both creation and human knowledge of it
from “Christ’s lordship”: “the cross determines the meaning of history”; “Jesus is the
resurrected Lord of all creation”; “in Christ’s bodily resurrection nature and history are
made forever inseparable.”509 With Jesus as Hauerwas’s focus, he maintains that Jesus is
indicative of the Christian confession that there is no creation apart from the triune
creator. The alternative, which results from abstracting God as creator from Jesus, is a
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theistic or deistic divinity that causes the natural world. God as such is then used to
“underwrite an autonomous realm of morality separate from Christ’s lordship.”510 In that
case, nature names what can exist independently of God. But Hauerwas’s understanding
of particular grace resists this for two reasons.511
First, Hauerwas’s theology of God’s cosmic politics is a graced creational
theology rather than Dorrien’s more natural-spiritual theology of love. Hauerwas rejects
the nature-grace distinction insomuch as he understands the sovereignty of Jesus as lordcreator in terms of gift-giving. Simply put, “life” both “belongs to God” and is “God’s
free gift.”512 Grace is, therefore, clearly determinative of ‘nature’ for Hauerwas; the
issues are why and how. He rejects the modern bifurcation of “human knowledge of
God” as either “from ‘the bottom up’ ... [or from] ‘the top down’” because that created an
“ahistorical” split between ‘nature’ and grace.513 Instead the two can only be understood
in “mutual interpenetration,” based on the “analogical and historical ordered uses of
language by which God’s relation to God’s creation is articulated.”514 So Hauerwas and
Dorrien both have an account of “mutual interpenetration” or perichoresis respectively.
But whereas Dorrien frames the elevation of being (nature) into spirit (‘supernatural’)
through love, for Hauerwas both ‘nature’ and revealed grace are “set within the purview
of God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.”515 That is, Jesus reveals that God’s sovereign work of
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creating a world with a God-given eschatological telos is just as much a gift as God’s
sovereign redeeming of creation. So instead of the ‘nature and grace’ distinction,
Hauerwas writes in terms of creation and God’s cosmic kingdom, for God generated
creation in grace and continues to relate to it in grace.516
Second, Hauerwas’s understanding of divine freedom is found in the gracious
character of God’s determinative reign. Hauerwas argues that creation is dependent on
the triune God by siding with a Thomistic-Barthian account of divine freedom and
rejection of method on a cataphatic basis, rather than an apophatic basis as in Dorrien’s
apophatic reserve. Hauerwas’s cataphatic basis is the link between God acting out of
divine freedom and that act as fundamentally gift. God freely gives God’s self, and
thereby gives creation, because kenotic giving open to difference is a given extension of
the triune life. Through God’s self-gift, God freely gives and determines “time and
space” (e.g., “creatio ex nihilo”), which includes humanity and “human history.”517 God
cannot be “judged by an external standard to God” (e.g., method).518 Instead, “life is
God’s” gift, and life is redeemed in the gift of God’s kingdom-time, not in attempts of
human self-creation like at Babel that refuse God’s gifts.519 For Hauerwas, then, divine
sovereignty is God’s free and gracious rule that determines and redeems creation,
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revealed in a cosmic politics of particular grace. This gift established creation, saved the
world in Jesus, and continues to work salvation in human history. Hauerwas’s
understanding of the God-human relation relies on this account of particular grace.
Accordingly, his configuration of the God-human relation contrasts sharply with Dorrien
and Ferré’s account of the interpenetration of Spirit and spirit.520
Human Creatures and Agency, Divine Sovereignty
as Gardener, and the Trinitarian Economy
Dorrien and Hauerwas both configure divine sovereignty over creation in terms
other than lordship, but their configurations differ from each other. Hauerwas
understands lordship in terms of divine creating and a particular kind of “providential
care” that embraces the difference in substance by maintaining the creator-creature
dynamic.521 Since “God is Creator, eternal Lord of all,” human existence and contingency
are a result of being creatures––dependent subjects––growing within the gift of God’s
story and time.522 That emphasis on God as creator is one way of situating the creatorcreature relation in divine sovereignty. But both the relation and sovereignty cannot be
separated from particular grace. Human beings are “contingently constituted” as God’s
creatures because Jesus’s lordship is realized as gift.523 The importance of particular
grace is seen in the relativization of human aspirations. Creaturehood extends to all
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humans; anything less is “bondage.”524 Or said another way: “any account of agency that
excludes the givens of our life, which often come in the forms of gifts, is insufficient.”525
Hauerwas’s description of humanity’s creaturehood presupposes an account of
greater distinction than similarity between God and humanity. Hauerwas describes as true
“the…profound inequality” between God’s “infinite” sovereignty and “God’s flawed,
finite creatures.”526 So on the one hand, Hauerwas’s rejection of the univocity of being
can be understood as similar to Dorrien’s contention that God is over both being and
nonbeing. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s account of human creaturehood subordinates
humanity to God more fully than Dorrien’s dialectic in the similarity of spirit. Yet the
inequality and subordination of creature to creator does not disparage or undermine
creation’s difference. Creaturehood is a good for it is God’s way of accepting humanity’s
God-given “otherness.”527
Hauerwas’s emphasis on God’s gift of otherness in terms of creaturehood
indicates God’s creative grace. Creative grace is just as much a gift as God’s redemptive
grace because both kinds of grace are fused in Jesus, in whom God draws close to
humanity as self-gift. Gift in the form of particular intimacy marks a major difference
from Dorrien position on divine gifts as God’s personal withdrawal in order to give space
for human choice and as God’s work as luring humanity to make choices for flourishing.
This difference of relation is reflected accordingly in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s
understandings of divine sovereignty. Dorrien eschews any account of divine sovereignty
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that overwhelms human autonomy. But for Hauerwas, such conceptions of autonomy
result in “serving any powers but the true one” and rejecting “loyalty to the truth”
inherent in creaturehood.528 Even God’s disrupting of Babel was a gift so that humanity
could realize its creaturehood. Might that example of gift look like God ‘lording’ over
humanity? Perhaps from Dorrien’s position. Yet for Hauerwas, divine intervention is
God’s gift for cultivating humanity.529
Hauerwas holds that “Jesus has totally reconfigured kingship” by inverting the
established power structures and that he has reconfigured politics by establishing his
alternative.530 Since Jesus’s reconfiguration was achieved through the gift of his kenotic
“care” for humanity, Hauerwas maintains that lordship is not the only metaphor for God
as sovereign creator.531 In fact, an “almost exclusive concentration on kingship and rule”
is problematically narrow.532 In order that “images of God’s care of and love for
creation” will reshape the images of “‘kingship’ and ‘rule,’” Hauerwas suggests
“horticultural images and descriptions as gardening and vine dressing,” as well as “ the
profoundly central pastoral image of shepherding.”533 Admittedly he rarely writes
explicitly about God as a gardener or shepherd. But easily complementing themes like
gardener or shepherd, Hauerwas consistently emphasizes human development under
divinely directed friendship. God’s given direction and time makes possible friendship
among human creatures, and humanity’s obedient friendships fulfill its God-given telos
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to become friends of God. Thus, for human creatures to be is to be under the gift that is
God’s caring rule.534
For Hauerwas, the doctrine of creation is one way that Christianity describes God
as “pure act, an eternally performing God” who created creation and continues to relate to
creation.535 But describing God as such is inseparable from an account of the Trinity.
That emphasis on the Trinity provides a crucial contrast not just to Dorrien’s account of
Spirit since, for Hauerwas, Trinity means that God is not “generalized spirit,” even as
personal Spirit.536 Dorrien’s emphasis on the sovereignty of love before grace is reversed
by Hauerwas, for love is defined in terms of “self-giving.”537 In other words, the fact that
friendship with God is the Good depends on the fact that God’s gifts stem from the
Trinity.538
Recall how Dorrien creatively appropriates Barth in order to assert that “even if
one begins with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”539
Hauerwas takes note of Barth’s apophatic inclination, but within that there is for
Hauerwas a cataphatic basis by way of seeing speech-acts in the traditional ordo
cognoscendi. The gift of Jesus, pointed to and supported by the gift of the Holy Spirit,
reveals the triune giver. The truth of the incarnation and of the Holy Spirit (missio) is an
invitation to friendship that reveals the triune God whose internal life is “self-giving”
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(processio).540 That is, the different trinitarian persons embrace and maintain distinctionin-unity through loving self-gift and reciprocating in kind.541
The Trinity’s difference-in-relational unity is, in turn, the source of God’s
establishing and accepting creaturely difference. Since the triune economy is one of
eternal “overacceptance” and “reincorporation,” the economy is one of “overflowing
plenitude” without end.542 Proceeding from that abundance is the gift of creation’s
difference. God then extends further gifts to creation as an invitation for a positive
response from creation to participate in the triune life. Jesus’s resurrection overcoming
death showed “God’s refusal to accept the loss of any difference” both in se and pro
nobis.543 So the triune economy of difference and unity in gracious relation is, for
Hauerwas, the way God establishes, sustains, and redeems creation.544
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The issue of particularity notwithstanding, Dorrien could affirm much about such
trinitarian difference since love establishes difference. In fact, Trinity is the image of
love-difference in unity for Ferré. The disagreement between them and Hauerwas arises
out of their differing accounts on the God-human relation in terms of love or gift
respectively. When this difference is set within how God accounts for humanity’s
subjectivity and agency, the flashpoint is the concern about God overriding human
autonomy in Ferré’s and Dorrien’s terms, or coercively consuming humanity in
Hauerwas’s terms.545
Remember that for Ferré and Dorrien, Spirit is personal but it graciously
withdraws its personal aspect and relates impersonally to spirit in order to affirm the
autonomy of spirit (difference). This construal of grace as negative freedom is ordered by
the Spirit’s love of the openness and care for humanity. The Spirit’s openness and care is
manifest in its personal work with and impersonal work in human consciousness and
relations so as to transform human communities into images of God’s love.
On those terms, Hauerwas’s understanding that the Trinity joins ‘personal’ and
universal in a way that affirms differences such as human freedom without the need to
construe God impersonally. For Hauerwas, the triune distinction between the persons in
relation is both the source of difference and the reason why difference is peaceably
present rather than coercively consumed in God. Accordingly, Hauerwas has emphasized
triune difference because the positive relationality between triune persons reveals how
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God acts in unity. But mostly Hauerwas emphasizes the triune economy in relation to
human agency.546
God hospitably makes room for human participation through the church, a
community of recipients of grace who reciprocate it with one another in friendship. Gift
for intimacy, then, is the life blood of God’s economy. But also consider the ways that
God’s invitation to “shar[e]…God’s very life as Trinity” makes humans creatures free in
the process of transforming them into friends of God.547 Humanity is free when it is
“constituted by more determinative practices of” God’s “peace,” love, and truth, rather
than the world’s violence and lies.548 From the gift of divine forgiveness, humanity learns
to forgive and live peaceably within God’s forgiving work. In that work “wrongs” and
“resentments” cease to determine the identities of individual humans, communities, and
all of human history.549 Such forgiveness and human agency is under the gift of not only
God’s direction but also God’s time, which I will take up soon.550
A Response from Dorrien’s Position
Dorrien’s deep sympathy for process and ecofeminism could affirm Hauerwas’s
horticultural understanding of divine sovereignty. There is also warrant for some overlap
between Hauerwas and Dorrien on participation in the triune life. For Dorrien, both
intellectual intuition and the pursuit of justice participate with the Spirit; and he has
called God “triune mystery” on a rare occasion, even though he may have since left
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Trinity behind.551 Yet there still remains a sharp contrast between Hauerwas on the Holy
Spirit and Dorrien on the Spirit. Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity not only
shapes a pneumatology that “point[s] to Jesus.”552 The Holy Spirit is also present today
“so that Jesus might continue to be present with us.”553 In contradistinction to that
Christological pneumatology, Dorrien’s prioritization of the Spirit construes “the way of
Christ” in terms of “Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.”554 Dorrien further maintains that
it is the Spirit present today, ordered by sovereign love, that works for transformation.
The framework of Spirit relating to spirit has an inherent, positive openness to both
autonomous spirit and the Spirit’s work in the world. This framework thereby opens
attention to the interrelatedness of humanity and to its the transformation. So from
Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity is an exclusive claim that
drives a church-world distinction and that, in turn, eschews a constructive relationship
between church and world.555
IV. From Divine Sovereignty to Intra-Human Relations
In order to complete my argument about divine sovereignty and human
subjectivity and agency in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions and disagreement, I will
show how they understand that God’s determining of humanity is realized within intrahuman relations. Dorrien and Hauerwas have a deep sense of humanity’s interrelatedness
that creates and shapes human subjectivity and agency. But they differ on the character of
human interrelatedness because of its dependence on and relation to divine sovereignty. I
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will argue that Dorrien sees a dialectic in human subjectivity, which I call “autonomy-inrelation.” Human spirit is autonomous, but also a human spirit is interrelated with other
human spirits within the Whole. I delineate the dialectic as a metaphysical account at
work in humanity’s material existence. I then argue that Hauerwas’s account of human
subjectivity and agency is determined by the gifts of God’s time and tempo. In order for
human creatures to be representative witnesses of God, God gives time and direction that
requires humanity’s patience and obedience. That divine determination and human
contingency are necessary for human creatures to develop their interrelated mutuality into
friendship.
The immediate material differences in their understandings of human subjectivity
and agency are as follows. Dorrien’s democratic political economy is a framework of
interrelation that serves the liberative equality necessary for flourishing in freedom. For
Hauerwas, human freedom occurs in and serves friendship. These differences in their
political arrangements fit their differing accounts of divine sovereignty. Dorrien’s love,
his openness and care, for the mutual and free flourishing of human spirits matches his
understanding of loving Spirit uniting all while ensuring spirit’s autonomy. For
Hauerwas, the triune God’s gracious, cosmic politics orders and develops friendship in
human creatures so that they may become friends of one another and of God.
V. Dorrien on Human Subjectivity and Agency as Autonomy-in-Relation
The beginning of this chapter established that Dorrien understands human
subjectivity as autonomous spirit in relation to personal Spirit. The complexities of that
personalist-Hegelian position, focused this time on human subjectivity and agency, are
worth a short exploration in order to frame in terms of spirit and love the subsequent
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account of Dorrien’s position on intra-human relations informed by sovereign love. What
can be derived from the Spirit’s relation to spirit is a framework of human subjectivity
and agency where autonomy and relation are not only connected, they are essential to one
another.
The Spirit’s life-giving love is the source of, and respect for, human autonomy.
The latter humanity apprehends and achieves on the basis of loving relationships attentive
to autonomy. But even if human autonomy is its own end in one way, it is not originally
self-generating. Here Dorrien’s apophaticism employs two forms of reason. The first, in
the terms of Paul Tillich and Ferré, is “‘ecstatic reason,’ the eschatological, mystical
experience of being grasped by the unconditional.”556 This sense of human finitude in
relation to ineffable mystery is why Dorrien, like Ferré, frames “the personal and moral
in terms of spiritual aliveness.”557 The concept of personality would over-define human
consciousness and Spirit as well as control their relation. But the human as personal spirit
acknowledges a ‘space’ for the spiritual presence of transcendence “immersed in world
process” and the creative possibilities therein.558 Therein, on the one hand, “[hu]man as
spirit is basically the capacity for freedom.”559 That is, “freedom is self-determination,
the power to become a self through finite choices” in both “concrete realities” and
“imagined realities.”560 But on the other hand, one’s “openness to Spirit becomes
sensitivity to the world.”561 Accordingly, the personalist variation of Hegelian spirit is
related to human development in light of a second form of reason, the framework of
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Hegel’s socialized intellectual intuition. Through one’s own free choices in relation to
another, a person develops from an isolated self-consciousness (“spiritual personality”) to
a distinctive person in loving relation (“personal spirit”) toward the whole.562 The latter,
“personal spirit,” is both “the image of God” and the telos of humanity.563
That conclusion raises two issues. First, the conclusion is what Ferré called
“unimunity.” 564 He merged “unity” and “community” to describe “the richest possible
variety of difference” “perfectly coinhering” within the multidimensionality of Spirit;
Spirit, in turn, “penetrates and partakes of all personal entities.”565 This unimunity is love,
“where the self is always fully included but never at the expense of the other.”566
Unimunity as such is just as much about the common good and a new community as
unimunity is about the image of God and the telos of humanity. Second, unimunity
confirms the importance of divine sovereignty. The process of realizing freedom through
relation allows one to ultimately perceive that one’s autonomy is in absolute dependence
on the Spirit’s life-giving love.567
Dorrien does not give a metaphysical account of human as spirit, as spirit relating
to spirit, nor such a metaphysics connected to material existence. However, essential to
Dorrien’s account of intra-human agency is not only self-determination and choice, as I
will show below. But also in parallel to Ferré’s account of unimunity, Dorrien’s employs
John Cobb’s work on “mutual transformation” for the common good in racial, national,
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imperial, economic, environmental, and interfaith issues. 568 To address these emphases
of both autonomy and relation, I will develop what I call a framework of autonomy-inrelation: both the recognition of the inherent autonomy in each person and the work to
achieve their autonomy depend on relations attentive to human autonomy and to
communities within the Whole. When it comes to Dorrien’s work, autonomy-in-relation
is present in humanity’s concrete reality shaped by the Spirit’s love. Thereby Dorrien’s
political economy for the common good charges through the door opened by Ferré and
their forbearers: Kant, Hegel, and the social gospelers.569
The Common Good: Free, Equal Self-Determination in Free, Equal Choice
Dorrien holds to human autonomy and agency in terms of freedom as equal selfdetermination through the free and equal capacity to choose. Freedom as such is a
common good, and to achieve it, individual rights are “foundational.”570 That is the
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political fruit of Kantian autonomy which Dorrien assumes within his social gospeler call
for “a democratic transformation” to economic democracy.571
For him, “democracy has to do with the character of relationships constructed on
the principles of freedom and equality.”572 Yet rampant economic and social inequality
makes impossible equal self-determination through free and equal choices. So Dorrien
argues for his liberal interpretation of the common good, stating that “the principle of
equality is central, and [that] there is no equality of individual opportunity without
approximate equality of condition.”573 Key to achieving the latter is Dorrien’s vision of
economic democracy. It “is about giving substance to the principle of self-determination
for all people. It extends this principle across all sectors of social existence, including
racial and sexual justice, and refuses wars of empire and aggression, forging a common
ground for social justice movements.”574 That makes economic democracy, Dorrien
proclaims, “the system most compatible with human freedom.”575 Freedom gives
economic democracy the logical ground to be about self-determination and therefore
choice.576
The point of economic democracy is to pragmatically realize choices that are
broader and more substantive than offered by banal capitalism. Economic democracy
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itself is an alternative choice to “neoclassical theory [that] promises but does not deliver”
on “choices for workers.”577 Critically, both kinds of choice together apply “a brake on
human greed and domination” by resisting the exploitation of the worker.578 Positively,
both choices together not only make possible, but are also themselves the kind of
“creative, life-enhancing choices” which “God lures us to make.”579 The principle of
equal self-determination through free and equal choices is a common good; selfdetermination and choices in equality are necessary for each individual to freely
flourish.580
The Common Good: Together
But as the issue of democracy indicates, the principle of choice is “co-constitutive
of the self’s being.”581 Drawing from Gregory Baum, Dorrien maintains that “each person
needs others to become oneself; every person comes to be through dialogue and
communion with others.”582 The same can be said for the common good, it “emerges
through discussion and struggle.”583 When both choice and relation are transposed into
the frame of democracy, “robust democracies”––which are themselves relational––“seek
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to maximize freedom and equality for all people.”584 Dorrien’s vision of economic
democracy follows accordingly. As if to fulfill Ferré’s emphasis on concrete and
imagined realities, Dorrien maintains that economic democracy’s “imagining [of] new
forms of social and economic organization…is fundamentally about creating concrete
and viable new democratic choices.”585 So freedom is gained by autonomous persons
(spirit) in and through mutual, “deliberative” relation with other, immediate autonomous
persons (spirit) and the broader, social whole.586 That is autonomy-in-relation, a version
of Hegel’s socialized intellectual intuition where the focus is human subjectivity and
agency in community and for freedom. But Ferré’s frame helps better illuminate two
important points about spirit relating to spirit within Dorrien’s work.587
First, recall that unimunity is about love as the recognizing of and caring for
distinction within the whole. In accordance with autonomy, Dorrien’s attention to love
means recognizing (openness) and securing (care) the human dignity of free selfdetermination and choice for all. Dignity as such must accordingly be secured politically
and economically, even though dignity is a position about what is natural to human
consciousness. But love’s emphasis on the individual also has a social dimension.
Dorrien situates self-determination for the liberation of the marginalized within the larger
whole of the common good. He argues that a “decentralized,” economic democracy puts
into practice the liberal principle of equality, which he correlates with proleptically
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realizing the biblical vision of the eschatological banquet.588 Dorrien fights for liberative
common good because he, like other social gospelers and personalists, sees other
individual persons and communities within the Whole. That fight and recognition is
socialized intellectual intuition in response to the Spirit’s agape at work. Like
Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many other liberal theologians and ethicists, Dorrien
understands love as the force that calls humanity to recognize the dignity of all persons,
to fight for their recognition, and to sustain those in that struggle. So the Spirit’s love in
openness and care shapes Dorrien’s understanding of human relations in mutual
recognition.589
Second, aspects of this autonomy-in-relation framework are directly related to
economic democracy. Dorrien’s economic politics of inter-connective subsidiarity is, I
claim, effectively spirit relating to spirit. In terms of intellectual intuition as an
interrelated whole of reality, economic democracy collectively situates individuals within
the whole. Or this framework stated in economic terms, economic democracy unites
collectivism and freedom for the common good. That re-statement is precisely how Ferré
frames economics in terms of unimunity for the common good. How does this break from
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Hegel? Rather than Hegel’s account of the greater good depending on a slaughter“altar,” Dorrien holds to the common good.590 There is no self-determination and
liberation without mutual interrelation creating an “approximate equality of condition.”591
Economic democracy is autonomy-in-relation that achieves the common good of
liberative equality for freedom. Economic democracy privileges the principle of equality
by fusing co-working and co-owning in cooperatives. What is necessary, Dorrien argues,
is democratic transformation achieved through democratization and localization of
investment and power in the community, in the workplace, and in the banking structure.
He maintains a special focus on unionization and production since community enterprises
and worker ownership usually take the shape of local cooperatives, union movements,
and economic rights. As for the “mutual fund or public bank enterprises” of social
ownership and investment, Dorrien has always put forward Sweden’s Meidner Plan.592
But he also includes cooperative firms or networks, like Mondragon, and state owned
banks, like North Dakota’s state bank.593
Multiple Levels: Local and Global
The emphasis on communities such as local cooperatives, unions, and workerowned corporations also assumes relations among communities in their local, societal,
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and global contexts. So autonomy-in-relation must accordingly expand, or scale up, to
include communities and their relations. Or as stipulated earlier, human communities are
within the Whole (everything-in-relation within Spirit). Otherwise, the autonomy-inrelation framework would parallel “a religion that lacks…a sense of the Spirit of the
whole,” which “does not interest” Dorrien.594 And going hand in hand with a vision of
the Whole is the pursuit of social and economic justice. So justice endeavors for the
common good expand accordingly. How Dorrien does so is in the link between economy
and ecology.
Dorrien’s vision of economic democracy, focused on the community for the
common good, cannot be separated from economic democracy’s service to ecotheology.
His work for democratic transformation is partly to resist the “turbo capitalism” that
consumes people and natural resources as if they are in infinite supply.595 The ecological
turn is key to understanding Dorrien’s concept of subjectivity. Ecology maintains Kant’s
international scope by expanding and further characterizes Hegel’s horizon of
interconnectivity between spirit and spirit. This multivalent horizon of humanity’s global
reality develops autonomy-in-relation. To transpose it into an ecological frame, the
common good of equal relations qualifies free choice when private ownership is placed
over against equal self-determination.596
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Eschewing the anthropocentrism of the self-determined subject, ecotheology
begins with the principle that to value life means recognizing the finitude and
interconnectedness of reality. In unchecked global capitalism, most of humanity loses
finite, natural resources for the unsustainable benefit of a select “few” who act as if “the
destructive aspects of its activity [are] somebody else’s problem.”597 This greed is
economically driven. But that structural evil is “at war not only with the world’s natural
ecology.”598 It also fragments the global and local “social ecology.”599 In the effort to
commodify cheap labor on a global scale, international and local relationships are subject
to capitalist colonialism rather than the common good.600
To address global capitalism, Christianity “must offer a new myth of healing,
relationality and embodiment that counters the bad myth of sovereignty and domination
sustained by the perpetrators of the worldwide ecological crisis––ourselves.”601
Generally, in liberalism’s terms, oppressive determination is an external force that
violates the autonomy of human subjectivity. But the turn to ecology illuminates that
oppression countermands a larger, social vision of the common good that the gospel
Spirit calls Christians to work toward. The common good requires all voices, but
oppression undercuts the common good by silencing people and communities with an
externally determining framework. Although some aspects of the common good builds on
Kant’s anthropology, for Dorrien, self-determination is part of achieving liberation for
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the common good. This implies that the common good is communal and, in turn,
relational. How can that be since self-determination is often construed as an individual’s
act? Self-determination is also dependent on relationships between individuals who
positively and negatively determine one another in their local environment. Selfdetermination, then, is best understood not only as attending to an individual, but also to
liberating a community’s collective voice. The latter is the necessary first step towards a
“cooperative commonwealth.”602 Or in Ferré’s terms, unimunity liberates marginalized
communities. The freedom and distinctiveness of the other in loving relation to another
are realized through and bounded by the Spirit’s love.603
VI. Hauerwas on Human Subjectivity as Interrelated Agency
Like Dorrien, Hauerwas holds that human subjectivity is found in relations. They
both further stress mutual recognition for human flourishing in the common good, in
history, and in God’s kingdom. Those affinities are partly due to Hauerwas sharing some
common interests with Hegel’s emphases on history, teleology, and social subjectivity as
mutual relations in-and-for freedom. At the same time, Hauerwas sharply diverges from
this common ground because of his emphases on creaturehood, God-given time, and
friendship. Within these similarities and differences, I will argue that Hauerwas
emphasizes intra-human friendship framed by his account of God’s sovereignty. I begin
by briefly establishing that human creatures are to be, for Hauerwas, representative
witnesses of the creator through intra-human friendship. To this end, Hauerwas argues,
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God gives time necessary for human creatures to learn how to be friends through
obedience and patience to God’s timing. These themes, I show, mark a significant
divergence from Hegel and Dorrien. That disagreement also exposes another, significant
difference. For Hauerwas, friendship, not freedom, is the point of humanity. So Hauerwas
situates human freedom as a necessary component of friendship, but freedom is
reconfigured by friendship. Freedom is not the end result of friendship.
Human Subjectivity as Creatures and Human Agency as Friends in God’s Time
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s alternative conceptions of the relation of divine and
human agency follow from variant ideas of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity.
Dorrien’s Spirit relates to and transforms spirit in love. For Hauerwas, Jesus the
autobasileia reveals that God’s particular grace determines the world’s being as creation
and redemptively transforms the world as creatures through participation in God’s
economy. In that account of humanity’s subjectivity as creatures, the general framework
for Hauerwas’s understanding of human agency is friendship. Describing that framework
as such emphasizes the often implicit themes of creaturehood and friendship in
Hauerwas’s emphasis on the necessity of faithful embodiment in the church’s
representative witness. There is, however, one more vital subtext that over time has
occasionally become more visible in the sprawl of Hauerwas’s work: the triune economy
of gift. Since I developed it earlier, here the issue is how, for Hauerwas, the triune God’s
gifts determine human creatures for intra-human friendship. The triune God gives the
human creatures the time for obedience and patience in accordance with God’s timing.
After delineating the difference between Hauerwas, Hegel, and Dorrien on time, I show
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how Hauerwas understands human freedom within friendship cultivated by obedience
and patience. Such friendship is representative witness.604
Human Subjectivity as Human Agency in the Gift of God’s
Apocalyptic and Eschatological Time
To develop how human representation in friendship is dependent on receiving
God’s gifts, Hauerwas connects witness and friendship to human participation within the
triune economy. He does so by emphasizing the economy in time rather than in a
“timeless model.”605 Time is a particularly important issue for Hauerwas because “sheer
contingency” without a telos “has rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less
unintelligible.”606 To recover God’s rule in terms of time, Hauerwas employs Rowan
Williams’s characterization of God’s gracious work as a performance that takes time like
any music or theatrical play.607
Human performance in God’s play frames human participation in the triune
economy, which in turn determines humanity’s interrelated subjectivity. Human creatures
as representative performers move to the “gift” of God’s tempo.608 Specifically, human
agents act through virtues in accordance with the time-filled, community told story of
God’s work. This framework is how human creatures have room to actively participate in
the triune economy, and thereby have agency in becoming friends of one another and of
God. But the virtues must be learned; discipleship is process. So God gives the time
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necessary for people to learn the virtue-filled, skilled craft of embodying peace by
practicing under a master’s instruction. The virtues of obedience and patience are
especially vital since human creatures participate in God’s play by moving to God’s
tempo that “takes time” rather than by human creatures creating their own performance
or timing.609 Thereby obedience and patience are virtues by which humanity receives and
responds to God’s gifts of forgiveness and peace.610
Hauerwas’s account above offends not one but two aspects of both liberalism and
liberal theology. First, just as Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr, Dorrien would presumably
worry that Hauerwas’s account of divine sovereignty and human “submission” to it
overruns human autonomy.611 I will return soon to Hauerwas’s account of obedience
because not only is it more complex than it may seem, but also because what contributes
to its intricacy is another complex difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas.612
Second, obedience to the triune God also offends liberalism’s abstract universals
that dismiss ‘picture thinking’ for generalized ideals to be progressively achieved. Yet,
crucial to Hegel and Dorrien are accounts of teleology and progress that initially seem to
operate like Hauerwas’s sense of human agency within God’s time. But for Hauerwas not
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only is the perfecting of humanity framed as ecclesial friends on a “journey” of character
development towards a particular theological end.613 Such maturation also occurs in
God’s apocalyptic-eschatological time, rather than Hegel’s progressive-teleological
vision or Dorrien’s progressive-eschatological orientation.
Hegel’s progressive Spirit makes time thoroughly teleological, but also, in
Dorrien’s estimation, dangerously all-encompassing. Hauerwas’s critique of
“metanarrative” is probably the closest he comes to paralleling Dorrien’s critique of
Hegel.614 But unlike Dorrien, Hauerwas explicitly rejects Hegelian “presumptions that
each tradition must share with all other traditions some final rational state.”615 Hauerwas
also seems to reject Hegel’s teleology since it replaces eschatology with “continuous, or
even progressive, process.”616 In contrast, Hauerwas’s appreciation of telos is more or
less Thomistic.617 The God-given telos of all people in relation to God is to be “friends
with God,” which is achieved by the God-given telos of intra-human relations, to be
“friends with one another.”618 Those teloi are revealed in the incarnate and resurrected
Jesus who “embodied” “God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.”619 The church as human creatures
“serving one another” in turn “serve[s]” the more immediate end of witness to “the
kingdom of God.”620
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Dorrien is, however, more theologically complicated. Particularly important for
Dorrien is the social gospelers’ hope for the eschatological kingdom progressively
realized in their time, to one degree or another, through human cooperation with God.
But Dorrien also breaks with their, for the most part, politically naive postmillennialism.
Their overreaching moral rhetoric overemphasized the realization of the kingdom, and
overestimated their work in realizing it. More careful social gospelers, like
Rauschenbusch, recognized an apocalyptic aspect to the kingdom but also saw that “the
perfection of the kingdom was reserved for a future epoch.”621 Dorrien similarly holds
that human work is superseded by the Spirit’s work of completely actualizing the
eschatological banquet in some sort of eschaton. One might construe such a vision in
Hegelian terms of Absolute Spirit. Even if that is correct, the theological source is not
directly Hegel. Dorrien’s embrace of Barthian apophaticism and his resistance to
“control” history make room for some measure of transformative revelation in the new
creation.622 But Barth is only one element within Dorrien’s much larger framework. His
definition of liberal theology, his sympathies for transcendence in immanence, and his
normative account of Spirit eschew a cataphatic, apocalyptic in-breaking in the
present.623
Hauerwas agrees with Dorrien that God’s kingdom is already present but not yet
fully realized. Hauerwas also argues for a transcendent “eschatological orientation” over
an immanent yet “incomplete telos” in order to oppose liberal theology “assuming the
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responsibility (which is clearly not theirs but God’s) of ensuring that the story comes out
right.”624 But unlike Dorrien, for Hauerwas redemption from “self-deception…must
come to us externally.”625 In other words, Hauerwas’s frequent argument against human
agents attempting to control history arises from his emphasis on apocalypse in the
present. Apocalypse reveals, Hauerwas proclaims, both “the way the world is meant to
be” and “a time that makes all things new” in history rather than a “point outside history
where we can secure a place to anchor our moral convictions.”626 The cross shows that
God’s loving patience endures “our frightened and prideful refusal to worship a crucified
savior,” while through the resurrection “the very destiny of the cosmos is determined.”627
The conclusion of the cross and resurrection together is that Jesus’s apocalyptic
(re)ordering of (disobedient) creation historicizes it within the story of divine history. So
not only does Hauerwas emphasize that creation is irreducibly material and thereby
social, as opposed to the position in which “our ability to be spirit––that is, to be more
than our physical or biological nature––is exactly what is necessary for us to historic.”628
Hauerwas also argues against human history reduced to a “seamless web of casual
relations” that cannot truly change since God’s material creation has “an end” in being
created anew that is “inaugurated” by Jesus and that is proleptically realized “at
Pentecost.”629 Apocalypse, therefore, is the salvific revelation of and embodiment of
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God’s kingdom, predicated on God as the redeeming creator revealed in Jesus’s patient
work.630
Freedom and Interrelated Mutuality within Friendship
So for Hauerwas, God orders human existence by putting it in step with God’s
particular work and timing. How does that ordering extend to intra-human relations? A
helpful entrance to answering that question is addressing part of the next question. How
does Hauerwas’s answer differ from Dorrien’s Hegelian informed position that
emphasizes humanity’s free agency achieved through choice and mutual relations? An
answer to the latter question may seem initially obvious since obedience to the triune
God’s time countermands human autonomy and abstract universals. But the issues are
more complex because Hauerwas holds to an account of mutual recognition between
human beings.
Throughout Hauerwas’s work he appears to sympathize with what would be
Hegel’s account of mutual recognition. The whole section of The Peaceable Kingdom
titled “Freedom as the Presence of the Other” more or less relies on mutual recognition
and a kind of double negation between subject and object (“other”) within community for
character development.631 With that framework, Hauerwas’s description of love, “the
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nonviolent apprehension of the other as other,” is similar in some respects to Rowan
Williams’s embrace of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian account of mutual recognition.632 Once
Hauerwas even employed Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in order to delineate
Christianity’s political position as the “peasant” (non-Constantinian) rather than the
“master” (Constantinian).633 Mutual recognition also appears in Hauerwas’s more recent
work. He appropriates Williams’s argument that justice requires recognizing the other
and listening to their voice as the triune “God sees us.”634 In continuity with accounts in
The Peaceable Kingdom (1983) and After Christendom? (1991), Hauerwas even
characterizes human agency as mutual recognition within the frame of God’s time
(2004). Constitutive to the patience of obedient performance is the dispossessive opening
of one’s self to another through attentive listening. This “repentant attention” is
constituted by “reverence toward one another and receptivity to God.”635 Repentant
attention––which is Hauerwas quoting Williams––appears awfully similar to mutual
recognition and potentially absolute dependence.636
But there are major differences between Hauerwas’s view and an Hegelian view
of recognition that significantly qualify their similar affinities, even if Hauerwas was or is
an unacknowledged Hegelian in any strict sense. In “Freedom as the Presence of the
Other” and the following section, Hauerwas emphasizes calling into question the
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idolatrous self-deception of autonomy (sin) by the truth-telling church under God’s
sovereign gifts.637 This indicates a break from Hegel. Hauerwas’s understanding of
mutual recognition, in terms of repentant attention, is not about the turn towards
interiority for achieving autonomy, as in Hegel’s development of consciousness. Rather,
for Hauerwas, “mutual recognition” is between the particularities of bodies.638
Accordingly, Hauerwas frames repentant attention in a public language of virtues in order
to avoid “self-invention.”639 Obedience requires the skills of listening to and receiving
from others; patience coheres with the play’s tempo and the other actors rather than
violate them by attempting to satisfy one’s impatience. Obedience and patience, then, are
active rather than passive, and they are ordered towards one another outwardly instead of
inwardly. Obedience, patience, and openness to the other are not only markers of God’s
time; they are vital to the gift of God’s pedagogy that forms a community into a “longhaul” “apocalyptic people” living God’s peace.640
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That obedience is, for Hauerwas, nothing short of freeing. But even then he is not
so easily distinguished from Hegel and Dorrien, since in Dorrien’s accounts, they
maintain in their own way an emphasis on obedience as the source of freedom. Dorrien
stresses that Hegel’s politics was one of duty. In Dorrien’s own project, he calls for
“stubborn types” who, as briefly characterized in chapter one and showed above, are
being obedient witnesses in their proclamation of and work for the Spirit’s liberative
vision.641 So how might then Hauerwas’s understanding of human subjectivity be further
distinguished from Hegel’s and Dorrien’s?642
The answer is Hauerwas’s account of freedom and mutuality in friendship. For
Hegel and Dorrien, freedom is achieved through autonomy-in-mutuality. But for
Hauerwas, freedom is realized in the contingent mutuality of human friendships and in
the cultivating determination of God’s invitation for friendship with humanity. Hauerwas
not only rejects construing human freedom as self-grounded autonomy because of
humanity’s contingency and creaturehood. He also countermands freedom as the right to
choose since he opposes freedom “an end in itself.”643 That is, “the language of choice
[is] facile” for Christianity because “Christian freedom” is about being given the “power”
to act within a specific, already given narrative and under “direction from a master.”644
So freedom is a “gift,” and it is for much more than equality necessary for all to pursue

help myself and others rediscover what it might mean if the church constituted our primary loyalty” (DT, 184). That loyalty is of
course not an end in itself but a means to loyalty to God and thereby friendship with God.
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their self-interests.645 In sharp contrast to an account of autonomy-in-mutuality, the
humility of creaturehood and of relational dispossession are gifts of friendship that are
truly freeing. Thereby interrelated mutuality comes by friendship, and interrelated
subjectivity makes freedom for friendship.646
Dorrien might respond that solidarity and equality are still deeply similar to
dispossession. He would be correct to a significant degree since friendship shares life
with others, a “living with” that includes “suffering with.”647 But this politics of
friendship is countermanded by racial “classification,” an inherently racist division that
separates human friends in God’s “new creation.”648 The interrelatedness of friendship
and the rejection of division Hauerwas extends to the church catholic when he assumes
the importance of “Africa and Asia” for the US’s “reception of the gospel.”649 Thereby
the church’s diasporic existence dispossess any privileged status for US Christianity.650
What, then, is Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference? The gift of friendship for
human relations. Although gift is present in Dorrien’s work and friendships support his
writing, he lacks his own normative account of human agency with the union of gift and
friendship. For Hauerwas, “agency rides on the back of friendship.”651 Friendship, in
effect, is another name for humanity living together in the peaceful triune economy. This
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divine economy not only makes human creatures into friends of God by the gift of time
necessary for humanity to participate in God’s life. The human participants themselves
are also transformed into friends of each other, because together they embody Jesus’s
story of befriending humanity through his kenotic self-gift. To be friends together is to
give as Jesus gave and receive one another as gifts of God. As such friendship expands
and develops, permeating and forming reality in accordance with the gracious truth of
God’s love that is Jesus and his work of forgiveness.652
So Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference here is their respective emphases and
how they relate them. Dorrien stresses equality because freedom is how humanity
flourishes, but flourishing is difficult to think about in a world rife with deadly injustice
that creates inequality. It is love that brought Dorrien to the fight for equality, and it is
love that keeps him in the fight. However, Hauerwas sees the gift of friendship as the
beginning and end of what it means to be human. He frames freedom in relation to truth
which is a gift of friendship. And he argues for actually living in friendship as the first
task of Christianity. So out of love Dorrien seeks transformation for equality, choice, and
ultimately free flourishing. Hauerwas argues that the practices of friendship, such as
reconciliation, are transformative.
Those differences create different accounts of the common good and of the
politics to realize it. In 1995 Dorrien blasted Hauerwas, claiming that “he calls for a
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social Christianity that renounces moral responsibility for the common good” because he
refuses “to accept responsibility for the right ordering of society.”653 By contrast, Dorrien
opts for justice as “right order” and John Stuart Mills’s stress on equality, because
Dorrien’s moral direction is taken from Christianity’s love for the common good and
from his assumption that “the principles of freedom and equality” are constitutive to the
common good.654 Hauerwas has a retort. The common good cannot be grounded in
abstract ideals such as freedom and equality, which are in fact “common interests”––“the
sum of our individual interests”––that liberalism misinterprets as “goods in common.”655
But this critique goes hand in hand with the fact that, contrary to Dorrien’s criticism,
Hauerwas has been for the common good since at least 1970.656
For Hauerwas, the common good is found in the time-filled process of mutual
“discovery,” of discussion and friendship.657 So working towards the common good is a
journey in community, truth-telling, and hope, which requires patience and stubbornness
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in the parlance of Hauerwas and Dorrien respectively. However, Hauerwas’s contention
that justice is confessional healing is simultaneously more precarious and assured than
Dorrien’s firm ground in human rights and his hope for progress through justice. Truth is
essential to humanity’s pursuit of God’s peace, but truth is not always readily available. It
is only found by positioning oneself with, by exposing oneself to, and by caring for
others rather than securing oneself over them. Since human creatures are social beings
determined by one another, what it means to be a human being is to be in a vulnerable
position.658
Here then are two forms of human equality. The first is creaturehood. The mutual
friendship of equal creatures and gift-giving grounds Hauerwas’s work on the elderly,
children, medical ethics, disabilities, and death.659 The second is the vulnerability of
creatureliness.660 Humanity has a penchant for power plays in which one party is
invulnerable and oppresses the already vulnerable. When one person, in their selfrighteousness, asserts a dictatorial authority over another in order to force the oppressive
submission of the perceived offender, vulnerability is used to legitimate asymmetrical
power plays. Hauerwas works against these asymmetrical relations through his
constructive vision of mutual vulnerability. All parties, even the “wronged,” “confront
one another as sinners,” and therefore they “share” in the “need to be and have been
forgiven.”661 That account of mutual, “radical subordination” may seem like a platitude,
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or worse a way of legitimizing an oppressive status quo.662 However, the recognition of
sin and the need of forgiveness are how, he argues, Christianity can face the horrors of its
anti-Semitic past and can work towards reconciliation “between Christians and Jews.”663
Given that the church does not secure God’s peace through violence but rather shows
God’s peace through truth and forgiveness, the work to embody God’s peace may appear
tenuous and risky at best. Indeed, the Christian life is ambitious. It is only knowable and
possible when one is “incorporated into a community constituted by the stories of God”
that practices kingdom virtues.664 Yet Hauerwas is all the more confident. The
embodying of God’s peace and justice is not only possible, it is the church’s mission and
is creation’s reality because the triune God is sovereign.665
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies are an
account of divine sovereignty. However, they still sharply differ on divine sovereignty.
Dorrien incorporates an account of grace according to the primacy of the Spirit’s
universality and love. Hauerwas assumes an account of love ordered by the particularity
of triune grace. These different accounts of divine sovereignty are intimately linked to
their different descriptions of human subjectivity and agency responding to God and to
other human spirits or creatures. For Dorrien, love orients autonomous spirit in a creative
relation to autonomous spirit in accordance with his understanding of creative
interpenetration between ineffable Spirit and autonomous spirit in love. For Hauerwas,
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creaturehood and friendship are the way things are for humanity because the triune
creator gives particular gifts for friendship. These different accounts support their
different political realities. Dorrien argues for economic, liberative, and ecological justice
in order to secure equality, freedom, and the common good from his beginning point in
love. Hauerwas maintains the primacy of friendship and obedient patience within a
community that moves to God’s tempo. In that framework is found freedom, but the
beginning, middle, and end is friendship.
One might be tempted to turn to the church-world distinction at this point.
However, doing that now would fall back into overlooking the complexity of Dorrien’s
and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Dorrien’s 1995 critique of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing the
world between Christian and pagans” was built on the accusation that Hauerwas eschews
the common good.666 But Hauerwas’s concern for the common good complicates
Dorrien’s assertion that how they understand the church-world distinction separates them.
A better diagnosis is to locate their differences about how reality is made of intra-human
relations created and shaped in light of God’s sovereign, participatory agency. The next
chapter shows that their different accounts of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity
and agency issue forth in rival accounts of political sovereignty. One might be tempted to
summarize such different accounts of theological and political sovereignty as a churchworld distinction. However, that again could easily be a misleading generalization.
Although the issue is specifically the modern nation-state, I conclude with Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s similar turn to radical democracy for the common good. Any narrative of the
church-world distinction must be significantly qualified by Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s
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disagreement over reality as determinative interrelation concerning particular institutions.
A better account of their difference is how the relation between divine sovereignty and
intra-human relations is positively realized or negatively undercut by the modern nationstate’s claim to sovereignty.
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CHAPTER 3
Integration or Hegemony:
God’s Sovereignty and the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty
Previous chapters argued that Dorrien and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness
presuppose truth and reality, which assume, in turn, an account of divine sovereignty.
Their disagreements are rooted in differences about the character of divine sovereignty
and about human subjectivity and agency. These deep differences, I contend here, issue
forth in strikingly divergent positions about the modern nation-state’s sovereignty.
Dorrien integrates his account of the Spirit and Christian agency with the state, while
Hauerwas rejects the state’s sovereignty as hegemonic.667
I spend the bulk of this chapter on Hauerwas’s position partly because he has
written much more about the nature of the modern state than Dorrien and partly because I
offer a constructive development of Hauerwas’s position on state sovereignty. By
political or state sovereignty, I mean the modern state’s claims to both its own
autonomous sphere (politics) and its final authority for governing its citizens and lands.
Such claims include not only the state’s monopoly on legal violence and the state’s
enforcement of its boundaries, but also the state’s pursuit of autonomous power to secure
its claims. The state’s claims and its pursuit of them are necessary, asserts political
liberalism, because of the state’s mission to keep the peace and to secure national and
individual interests. I problematize this legitimization, particularly on the issue of the
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state’s pursuit of self-serving power, in light of Hauerwas’s position and my development
of it.
My development serves two further points. First, I aim to show that the trajectory
of Hauerwas’s work takes him even further from Dorrien. Both their positions on
political sovereignty are interrelated with their respective understandings of divine
sovereignty. Dorrien’s conception of divine sovereignty is not, but Hauerwas’s can be,
understood apart from the sovereignty of political liberalism’s modern nation-state. As a
consequence, Hauerwas is able to and does reject the legitimacy of the state’s
sovereignty, whereas Dorrien cannot or would not want to.
Second, by splitting them on the issue of political sovereignty, I can conclude
where the end of chapter one began: Dorrien and Hauerwas are fractured over the issue of
sovereignty. Two vectors, divine and political sovereignties, are at work here based on
chapters two and three respectively. Dorrien’s theology––loving Spirit interrelates with
spirit in a way that transforms the world––is inherently open to perceiving the sovereign
state as a constructive force for positive transformation. Hauerwas’s theology of
particular grace sees the hegemonic state as humanity’s disobedient attempt to rival God.
Hauerwas’s rejection assumes a better hope: Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is
sovereign through gift-giving. The theological projects of integration with or rejection of
the state’s sovereignty are not independent phenomena. They are instead different
responses to the state’s pressure to conform. Dorrien opts for liberalism’s subtle
supplanting of Christianity, while Hauerwas rejects the hegemony of liberalism’s
policing of Christianity.
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These differing theological and political positions within the two vectors are the
source of their theopolitical fracture made evident in issues like the church-world
distinction. Yet, I end with hope rather than despair. I emphasize the two vectors in order
to highlight their importance and then to undercut them. The vectors and the different
responses to them, in their current manifestations, obscure the surplus of political thought
in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitical positions. The fullness and similarities of their
constructive works are only visible within a horizon wider than what the status quo
discussion centered on political sovereignty. Necessary, then, is work that opens up a
horizon within which their discussion can relax in an unconfined space, and through
which the promise of their thought can be explored in a fresh discussion. The next
chapter shows that Rowan Williams provides just such a horizon.
I. Dorrien’s Divine Sovereignty Integrated with
the Sovereignty of the Modern Nation-State
Chapters one and two addressed Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over
how to characterize the relational nature of reality because of their differences over the
God-human relation, intra-human relations, and the connection between the two. These
relations––indirectly the God-human relation and directly reality and intra-human
relations––underlie Dorrien’s definition and contextualization of liberal theology.
Through the modern heritage, the modern world is more or less as determinative as the
evangelical heritage. But that dialectic only covers the internal workings of liberal
theology. Dorrien also contextualizes “the founding of modern theology [as] an aspect”
of philosophical, political, and economic liberalism.668 Philosophical liberalism set the
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concepts of autonomy and human dignity for everyone. Political liberalism sought to
ensure autonomy and dignity through equal freedom, human rights, and tolerance.
Economic liberalism attempted to establish autonomy through private ownership rather
than political equality. Dorrien fits within just such a narrative, except for his emphasis
on political equality over private ownership since private ownership undermines equal
freedom. Like the social gospelers, Dorrien argues for economic democracy because
equality through democracy is already an ideal in political liberalism. Implicitly, then,
they assume an account of political sovereignty.669
But how are divine sovereignty and political sovereignty interrelated for Dorrien?
He has yet to give an answer. However, considering his claims that unity is on the level
of spirit, that the world is interrelated, and that liberal theology is part of liberalism’s
project, Dorrien must have an understanding of how divine and political sovereignty
together form a liberal subjectivity. Chapter two already addressed subjectivity by
equating Dorrien’s co-operative economics with his understanding of spirit relating to
spirit. I argued so in terms of autonomy-in-relation for freedom. That human subjectivityagency for equal freedom in politics and economics is achieved through liberal justice
ordered by the need for liberation. But as chapter one argued, justice is not the totality of
Dorrien’s concerns. For him, liberation comes about by not only raising oppressed voices
and concomitant deep socioeconomic analysis, but also by those informing his union of
theological morality and political liberalism. Yet that union is still hazy in terms of divine
and political sovereignties. So how are those interrelated for Dorrien? Dorrien’s account
of a gospel-centered personal Spirit, I will argue, operates within Rauschenbusch’s
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configuration of the kingdom, state, and church. Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration
allows for a sometimes critical but fundamentally complementary interaction between
God’s sovereignty and political liberalism’s sovereignty in order to produce social
transformation. This framework is why Dorrien is correct to note that “in its short term
politics the social gospel was a theology of the state.”670 So it should not be a surprise
that, accordingly, loving Spirit’s transformative work in intra-human relations is achieved
through the political sovereignty of the modern nation-state.
Dorrien Assumes Rauschenbusch’s Kingdom-Church-State Configuration
Some context is required before explaining Rauschenbusch’s tripartite
configuration since Dorrien is fundamentally an updated social gospeler. He critiques
more subtly and lists more frankly the social gospelers’ faults to a greater extent than
even the (in)famous critiques by R. Niebuhr. Yet Dorrien observes that Christian Realism
was a reaction to the social gospel which, unlike the social gospel, “inspired no hymns
and built no lasting institutions.”671 By contrast, the social gospel, a 50 year movement
and “a third Great Awakening,” “produced a greater progressive religious legacy than
any generation before or after it.”672 The social gospelers, not Niebuhr, “paved the way
for everything else in social ethics”; the social gospel, not Christian Realism, was “the
greatest surge of social justice activism ever waged by the mainline churches in this
country.”673 The concerns of the social gospel’s kingdom vision were broad: “peace,
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social justice, cooperative relations, healthy families, international order, and the spirit of
Jesus.”674 All but family are core foci in Dorrien’s constructive work, and he often gives
similar answers as the social gospelers. In fact, Dorrien participated in the National
Council of Churches’s most recent update and expansion of the “The Social Creed of the
Churches” (1908 and 1932), the social gospelers’ famous ecumenical document that
made their vision of a Christianized social order into a platform of concrete, social
goals.675
Dorrien is deeply indebted to Rauschenbusch in particular. Dorrien asserts that
Rauschenbusch was the “greatest social gospeler.”676 He “provided the movement’s most
powerful case for” a theology of social salvation.677 According to Dorrien,
Rauschenbusch “represents…the kind of idealism that is needed today, because he
struggled unfailingly to promote and fulfill the ends of attainable justice in a fallen
world.”678 The issues of idealism (kingdom) and of justice exemplify how and why
Dorrien assumes Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration of kingdom, church, and state.
Constitutive to that configuration is Rauschenbusch’s multi-layered understanding
of God’s kingdom. Rauschenbusch privileged the kingdom as a spiritual reality in which
God is ultimate, “the common basis of all our life.”679 The kingdom was “initiated” in
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Jesus’s “personality,” a new human personality of hope and love in line with “his
consciousness of God.”680 Within the kingdom as “commonwealth of co-operative
service,” humanity could be organized together, into a “world-wide consciousness” of
“solidarity,” for the common good.681 The character of the kingdom, for Rauschenbusch,
was a multi-faceted composite. He recovered previous understandings of the kingdom:
“the kingdom of heaven,” the kingdom as “the inner life of the spirit,” the kingdom
indistinguishable from the church, the kingdom outside the “existing work of the church,”
and the kingdom identifiable with the parousia.682 Then he combined those facets of the
kingdom with “the apocalyptic aspect of the kingdom hope and the kingdom as an
ongoing ethical project” for both personal and social salvation.683 All of these are
hallmarks of Dorrien’s spirituality and ethics, most of which I have noted already.
Dorrien’s theology and politics of loving, universal Spirit fit with how
Rauschenbusch conceives of the kingdom permeating the church and state in their
separate roles. Rauschenbusch’s social gospel answers “the central ethical question” of
“how to exercise power in a morally responsible way” since the kingdom pervades social
structures and empowers them in a just direction.684 The details, however, make all the
difference. In Rauschenbusch’s tripartite structure, the kingdom, as “the master fact,”
informs both the church and state in their respective and distinct roles.685 The “Kingdom
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of God is not a concept nor an ideal merely, but a historical force. It is a vital and
organizing energy now at work in humanity. Its capacity to save the social order depends
on its pervasive presence within the social organism.”686 However, he rejected what he
saw as an over identification between the kingdom and church. The kingdom is “not
confined within the limits of the Church and its activities” because the church’s role is
“fellowship for worship” and the kingdom’s is “fellowship of righteousness,” the
“fellowship of justice, equality, and love.”687 The kingdom actually empowers and saves,
but the church’s mission is to push for a spiritual and moral vision of the kingdom in
individuals and society, respectively.688 As for the church-state relation, there can be
cooperation between church and state because society and state are not “hostile to
Christianity.”689 At the same time, there is also separation between the church and state
because of their different roles. The church works to achieve its mission as a “diffused
force” for “justice and mercy,” but the church does not enact justice because justice is the
purview of the state.690
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Fitting this tripartite configuration, for Dorrien, love transforms all on the basis of
Spirit-love permeating all. This fit is best seen in light of how Dorrien’s theology of the
Spirit’s transformative love aligns within Rauschenbusch’s construal of the church as a
prophetic handmaiden witnessing to the state. Rauschenbusch frequently appealed to the
“law of love and service,” but he was often vague, or at least indirect, on exactly what is
love.691 From his various descriptions of love, he characterizes it as self-gift and selfsacrifice within a social framework where love is recognition of value in the other, is
orientation of care to the other, and is solidarity with the other. What Rauschenbusch then
repeatedly stressed is that love is an equalizing force that “creates fellowship.”692
Dorrien’s views are largely the same. Martin Luther King, Jr. was the religious figure
who grabbed Dorrien’s attention and seared “self-sacrificing love” into him.693 But he
discovered a home in the social gospel because, he argues, King drew from
Rauschenbusch. As Dorrien dug deeper, he found Rauschenbusch’s Christianity and the
Social Crisis as energizing as the Civil Rights movement. Dorrien is of course attentive
to feminist concerns about kingdom language and self-sacrificing love, but the kingdom
vision and its love for the liberative justice of equality is still at the center of his work. On
this basis of Spirit-love permeating and transforming all, Dorrien engages the political
status quo in order to realize its role as the guarantor of justice. Like Rauschenbusch,
Dorrien’s kingdom theology is permeated by a Hegelian account of Spirit interrelated
with the world in a way that transforms the world. This allows for Dorrien, like
Rauschenbusch, to be more positive than Hauerwas towards the state and its justice, and
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more basically civil society. But Dorrien’s positive outlook is best seen framed by
critique about the Spirit and state’s interrelation merged with Dorrien’s own critique of
the social gospelers.694
Complications and Internal Critique
Rauschenbusch’s argument for redeeming US society attempted to avoid
conflating the Christianized society with the church by distinguishing between political
(state) and religious (church) spheres. Although Dorrien judges that Rauschenbusch
“equate[d] the kingdom with a particular socioeconomic system,” his attempt to avoid
conflation is crucial for Dorrien since “to absolutize or univocally identify the kingdom
of God with any relative construction is demonic.”695 But for someone like Hauerwas,
Rauschenbusch’s political-religious distinction assumes a disturbing relation between the
kingdom and state. The church’s role is to press the state towards the kingdom ethic, but
the church itself does not exactly mediate the relationship between the state and kingdom.
Rauschenbusch resisted the framework of medieval Christendom, in which the church
supposedly “ruled and guided” society.696 Instead, he saw that the kingdom, like Hegel’s
Geist, “realizes itself” in “the family, the industrial organization of society, and the
State.”697 The state is to be under and forcibly uphold the “law of service” or “law of
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Christ”; in this way, the state is also “a Christian community” but not a church.698 These
definitional roles for the church and state imply that both have access to and are
empowered by the kingdom. Whether or not the state must act according to an ecclesial
vision is debatable because the state as a democracy is “Christianized” already.699
Whether or not the state must go through the church is far more clear: not the church but
the state secures democratic justice in the political and economic spheres. While that
implication of Rauschenbusch’s distinction may still appear innocuous, or simply
Hegelian, the ramifications were bloody and oppressive.700
For the social gospelers in their time, their success in their Manifest Destiny to
democratize––to “intervene,” “liberate,” and “civilize”––the world was simply proof that
Christianity was influencing the humanity towards a better future.701 However, Dorrien
argues that the term “Christianization” was problematic and is “inappropriate today,”
particularly in light of US imperialism.702 The social gospelers’ mission of Christianizing
and their equation of US democracy with the kingdom inflated the narcissism of
American exceptionalism. It also supported the related colonial endeavor of Manifest
Destiny. The extension of US Anglo-Saxon sovereignty westward over the North
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American continent and beyond was legitimated not only by the conflation of national
interests with kingdom interests. The social gospelers also served the US’s colonizing
endeavors by “baptiz[ing]” them in terms of spreading the morality of the Christian spirit
that is democratic.703 So as Dorrien observes even in Rauschenbusch, the social gospelers
conflated “‘Christianize,’ ‘moralize,’ ‘humanize,’ and ‘democratize.’”704 That
exemplifies Dorrien’s agreement with both Niebuhr and Hauerwas. The social gospelers
on the whole over-identified God’s kingdom with the US order. The social gospelers
were often “sentimental, moralistic, idealistic, and politically naive.”705 Dorrien even
grants that Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament led him to overestimate the degree
to which U.S. Society had already become democratized.”706 In fact, Dorrien’s critiques
of the social gospel are more frank, exhaustive, and excoriating than most of the
criticisms mounted by Niebuhr and Hauerwas.707
Theology Supplying a Moral Vision that Informs State Justice
But even with those significant reservations, Dorrien appears to still embrace
Rauschenbusch’s configuration itself. Dorrien maintains that politics “has a relation to
redemption—the healing of life and the world (Hebrew tikkun)—only through its
connection to social justice.”708 Of course “social justice” is in continuity with

703

Dorrien, SEM, 60; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44. Emphasis mine. See also Dorrien, MALT, 1:334; Dorrien,
SEM, 75-77.
704
Dorrien, EDE, 22; Dorrien, MALT, 1:411; Dorrien, MALT, 2:57, 111; Dorrien, SEM, 100; Dorrien, SS, 42-43, 349.
705
Dorrien, EDE, 4; Dorrien, SEM, 60. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:145; Dorrien, SS, 148.
706
Dorrien, RCG, 46. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:115.
707
Dorrien, EDE, 260-262; Dorrien, MALT, 1:318-329; Dorrien, SEM, 73-79; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44;
Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order, 90-91; Dorrien, MALT, 2:145; Dorrien, SEM, 75-77.
For Dorrien’s critiques of the social gospelers, see EDE, 4-5, 10, 14-15, 22, 28, 400-404; MALT, 1:xxv, 310-311, 318-334,
407-411; MALT, 2:51, 57, 60-61, 70-71, 84, 94-96, 102, 104-105, 110-11, 120, 124, 141, 145-146; SEM, 29-32, 60-61, 73-79 92-93,
146-147, 163, 184, 674-675; “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14; “Kingdom Coming,” 28;
“Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44. For Niebuhr’s critiques of Rauschenbusch, see Dorrien, SEM, chp. 4 passim and pp. 675677; Dorrien, SS, chp. 3 passim and p. 356. For some of Hauerwas’s engagements with Rauschenbusch, see AN, pp. 28-29, 34-36, chp.
6; BH, pp. 18, 24, 55-56, 64, 67-68, chp. 5 and the endnotes 234-256; CET, 152-157, 161, 175-177; DF, chp. 4 passim and p. 193-194
n. 18; STT, 209-210. Also for Hauerwas on Rauschenbusch, see Dorrien, SEM, 481; Dorrien, SS, 356.
708
Dorrien, OQ, 2. Emphasis original.

201

Rauschenbusch’s role of the state in relation to the kingdom. But “only through” is
equally important, indicating Dorrien’s qualified continuity with Rauschenbusch. The
social gospel still has purchase for how to understand Christianity’s involvement.
However, the social gospel must be recovered with care and attention to criticisms made
against it by liberation theology. This adjustment is possible since the “corrective” to
Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament,” Dorrien argues, “was present in
Rauschenbusch’s work.”709 So the Christianizing rhetoric should not obscure what
positive meaning that still remains accessible today. For Dorrien, the social gospel’s
persistent value is a compelling vision of social redemption of the kingdom Spirit that
works to transform structures from within. A vision is always essential. It moves people
by a spiritual conviction that orients them towards a greater future. Vision is the fuel to
sustain the slow, difficult work for change. If there was one thing that the social gospel
had, it was vision of the beloved community connected to social justice.710
In particular for Dorrien, the social gospel’s spirituality of a kingdomcommonwealth provided “a vision of economic democracy that is as relevant and
necessary today as it was a century ago.”711 This vision, its moral call, and/or its
economic solution show up in nearly all of Dorrien’s books. These emphases, when
combined with his “only through” qualification, suggest a vision of a robust civil society
and far more limited state.712 Yet the state is still crucial. How the vision, morality, and
economics support present action is particularly illuminated in his 2012 pitch for the
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necessity of progressive liberals’ role in re-electing President Obama and shaping his
second term. Michael Harrington died too soon to be the needed strong, progressive flank
for the centrist president Bill Clinton. Similarly, Obama’s centrism needs someone like
Harrington as well for the same reason: to keep Obama looking towards progressive
goals rather than giving into extortion. So Dorrien challenged progressive liberals not to
give up on Obama as some already had. That was the aim of Dorrien’s The Obama
Question. Therein he rarely notes faith; it is presupposed and translated into another
register. Morality is the ground upon which he makes his appeal to further realize social
justice in politics and democratic justice in the economy. Therefore, The Obama Question
implements the project of US Protestant liberalism’s performative role, to inject morality
into the soul of society in order to realize justice within the state’s sphere.713
How the kingdom, church, and state are ordered matters. The kingdom is the
ideal, and the church does not stand over the state. This framework, looking back, is in
accordance with Dorrien’s commitment to idealism, his rejection of Hauerwas’s churchstate distinction, Dorrien’s presupposition of truths in plurality, and his dedication to a
relational dialectic in reality. But important here is political sovereignty. Christianity
proclaims truth, a prophetic word of love, informed by the eschatological banquet that
offers a political vision of equality and liberative justice. The realization of this vision is
achieved, albeit limited and incomplete, in the state’s sphere by the work of the Spirit.
Those roles for Christianity and the state are why Dorrien is both concerned about
Christianity maintaining its spiritual center and generally oriented positively towards
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state sovereignty. Without a spiritual center attentive to the Spirit’s work, there can be no
positive vision to inform the state nor ground to critique the state.
A Response from Hauerwas’s Position
In the past Hauerwas granted “that liberalism has, sometimes almost in spite of
itself, some beneficial results.”714 He also appreciates Rauschenbusch and Dorrien’s
emphasis on the kingdom and on truth. But towards Dorrien’s position there are a slew of
criticisms that emerge from Hauerwas’s work. On the particular point of the church’s
relation to the state, Hauerwas’s primary concern is whether or not the church is “capable
of saying no to the state.”715 Dorrien’s appeal to the social gospel’s emphasis on morality
resists R. Niebuhr’s deeper acceptance of translation but does not yet overcome the
problems of Constantinianism, privatization, and translation. That capitulation, Hauerwas
would presumably contend, is because Dorrien argues for integration on the basis of
compatibility with and service to US democracy. Like Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr,
Dorrien argues that Christianity’s ideal of love shares the values of democracy, especially
equality. Since both democracy and equality are necessary for justice and peace in the
face of sin, the promotion of democracy is a good. From their assumptions and point of
view, Hauerwas concedes that “the modern nation state is an extraordinary invention for
peace since at least it limits the number of warring factions on this limited globe.”716
Nevertheless, Hauerwas rejects that political liberalism can bring “world peace.”717
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Liberal democracy does not truly unify the US, rather liberal democracy is used to justify
a US empire. In the latter, unity is compelled by the “fear of death” and by the
commitment to use violence (war) in order to secure self-interests.718 These unifying
forces and imperial designs are not anomalies; they go hand in hand with what Hauerwas
identifies as essentials in US liberal democracy. Liberalism’s autonomous anthropology
(the “common citizen”) denies external authorities in the name of equality.719
Liberalism’s politics of desire, under the guise of tolerance, has a thin conception of the
good at best. Liberalism’s values, like autonomy and self-interest, police Christianity by
privatizing faith and forming the church into a liberal democracy and capitalist
economy.720
Fundamental to Hauerwas’s break from political liberalism is the nature of
politics related to the sovereignty of God. Hauerwas rejects the assumption that “all
politics presupposes violence,” which underlies the necessity of democracy for R.
Niebuhr and Dorrien.721 Instead, “God created all that is with a desire to be nonviolent”
and Jesus transforms the meaning of politics.722 Hauerwas frames Christian ethics
accordingly. He refuses to “begin with [the] assumption” “that the subject of Christian
ethics in America is America.”723 Instead, he begins “with the claim that the most
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determinative political loyalty for Christians is the church.”724 That Christian citizenship
is always first found in God’s reign for reasons ranging from God’s sovereignty, as
chapter two delineated, to the church’s mission to be a social ethic in order to be a
faithful witness of Jesus, as chapter one noted.725
But as chapter one noted as well, Dorrien affirms to one degree or another
Hauerwas’s emphasis on counter-cultural witness. Hauerwas also grants Dorrien’s
assumption that God’s kingdom is more determinative than the church. So what marks
their difference here? Hauerwas’s self-described position of “theocrat” makes liberals
“nervous.”726 The nervousness is not simply derived from “‘Jesus is Lord’…[as] a
determinative political claim.”727 The implication of that claim does not grant the state its
own “autonomous” sphere.728 But that autonomy is precisely what the state claims and
pursues. For Hauerwas, then, humanity’s pursuit of autonomy opposes divine sovereignty
by raising against it humanity’s own autonomous, hegemonic corollary and “most
nefarious brand of tribalism––the omnipotent state.”729 Under the guise of peace-making,
the modern nation-state jealously undercuts Christian citizenship as part of the state’s
attempt to secure its own autonomous power from divine sovereignty. Accordingly, not
only has “modern politics...rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less
unintelligible.”730 For, as Hauerwas observes, Christians “have lost the ‘sources,’ the
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practices, necessary to sustain our conviction that God is the origination and end of our
existence.”731 But also replacing that loss and conviction is “the idolatry most convenient
to us”: “the presumed primacy of the nation-state.”732
II. Hauerwas Against the Hegemony of
the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty
Chapter one framed Hauerwas’s argument about liberalism policing Christianity
in terms of subtle supplanting and negating exclusion. From above one can see that
functionally Dorrien works within the supplanting frame in order to avoid Christianity’s
exclusion from politics. But Hauerwas illuminates the depth to which Dorrien’s approach
is built on accepting the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects both
supplanting and excluding because they are two prongs of the same hegemonic project.
Dorrien argues against US imperialism, but Hauerwas’s focus on loyalty to Jesus is
predicated on the more basic disagreement. The sovereignty of liberalism’s modern
nation-state conflicts with Jesus’s sovereignty. Since chapter two and above already
covered Jesus’s sovereignty, here I focus on the modern nation-state’s attempt to
undercut and replace divine sovereignty. In lieu of God’s sovereign gifts, the state
attempts to secure its self-interests over and through death in the guise of protecting the
individual’s peaceful pursuit of one’s self-interests.733
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In effect, the liberal state creates to the very problem that it claims to solve, which
in turn, legitimizes the state. To differentiate people in terms of self-interested desires
dissolves relations between “friends” so that only “strangers” in pursuit of their
individual self-interests are left.734 But for political liberalism, such fragmentation
threatens to actualize Thomas Hobbes’s fear of political chaos. So liberalism’s political
order asserts that it must be strong enough to at least ensure the primacy and fullness of
autonomy against chaos. This presumed necessity, in turn, ironically establishes
homogeneity and hegemony. The confluence of liberalism’s universal anthropology,
autonomy, and strong unity means that liberal unity depends on accounting for
everything on liberal terms in order to ensure autonomy. That accounting establishes a
social homogeneity through a political hegemony. Some liberals, Hegel in particular
Hauerwas notes, acknowledge that gaining more freedom coincides with an equal rise in
national “homogeneity” that suppresses the sources of difference––other social groups––
in the name of brokering difference.735 This hegemonic homogeneity is, in turn, part of an
attempt to secure autonomy. In the name of unity, political liberalism aims to “create an
independence against contingency” through a regulatory strategy, “a mastery” of all
through a “panoptic practice” that orders and polices everything on liberal terms.736 So
liberalism relies on a hegemonic homogeneity to achieve autonomy. Liberal unity
depends on cooperation by individuals under the principle of autonomy. The many
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individuals need to conform to autonomy (homogeneity), and in turn they must support
what it takes to secure autonomy (hegemony). Thus the framework of homogeneity
necessitating hegemony serves to legitimate the autonomy of political sovereignty.737
However, Hauerwas rejects the autonomy of political sovereignty and its
legitimating narrative of the wars of religion, the presumed specter of religious violence
that threatens homogeneity. He also criticizes its legitimizing claims of efficiency, among
other critiques that I will address later. But rather than simply reiterate his criticisms of
the autonomy of political sovereignty, the wars of religion, and the claim of efficiency, I
will place them within the frame of the French political concepts of raison d’être (reason
for being) and raison d’état (reason of state). Raison d’être and raison d’état illuminate
the yet unnoticed developmental continuity in Hauerwas’s work. I will contend that this
development has resulted in overturning the state’s self-justification for hegemonic
sovereignty. A latent aspect of Hauerwas’s thought can be expounded by using raison
d’être and raison d’état to emphasize the underlying continuity of monopolizing
sovereignty between the early and contemporary modern state-nation. This argument
contributes to understanding Hauerwas by connecting together his robust rejection of the
wars of religion and his limited criticism of state efficiency.738
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Explaining Hauerwas’s Critique of the State’s Legitimacy
through Raison d’être and Raison d’état
Hauerwas’s account of political liberalism draws on Thomas Hobbes. From
Hobbes onward, death is the “determinative” measurement for the “meaning” of life
because death is the ultimate limit to be overcome by liberal politics.739 The state,
accordingly, seeks to “control” death in an ironic attempt to self-transcend human
nature.740 The control of death is achieved through a biopolitics that regulates and
violently enforces who lives and dies. One might construe biopolitical control as one of
many missions of the modern nation-state. But for Hauerwas such control is at the heart
of the modern nation-state’s reason for being. A primary, if not the primary, characteristic
of state sovereignty and its function is a “monopoly on violence” within its borders in
order to police death for securing peace.741 So for Hauerwas, the fear of death and the
monopoly over violence together are employed to justify the state’s sovereign power.
A tradition in French political theory can help to interpret and develop
Hauerwas’s claim. Officially from around the time and through the work of Cardinal
Richelieu on (1585-1642), the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison d’état
(reason of state) have been understood to be mutually informing. Raison d’être outlines
the state’s mission and responsibilities, such as keeping the peace and controlling death
respectively. Raison d’état is a claim that the state has its own basic, autonomous
interests, such as power and securing it. Those interests have their own, self-grounding
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form of reason that is not based in divine reason and that is more specific than a
generalized natural reason. So in short, raison d’état is about delineating that sphere of
human relations called politics, and that it is autonomous with its own interests and
reason.742
Political liberalism’s conventional narrative often more implicitly than explicitly
maintains that, as Richelieu assumed, the state’s raison d’être requires raison d’état. The
modern state’s mission is to create and sustain the peace for the flourishing of
liberalism’s aspirations (raison d’être). Yet the state cannot enforce its raison d’être
without first attaining the power to do so. The state must therefore seek the necessary and
autonomous power to police (raison d’état). Hauerwas has also described that liberal
construction in 1984 in all but name and in 1988 when he explicitly used the French
terms: “the state’s raison d’état depends on its raison d’être.”743 But Hauerwas
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countermands that narrative. Raison d’état not only preceded the modern nation-state’s
mission. The state’s raison d’être of peacemaking is used to legitimate the tautology of
raison d’état, the state’s autonomous power and seeking more of it. Hauerwas makes
three moves to note here. First, the modern nation-state’s policing for peace includes “a
bureaucracy that is more intrusive than the most absolute monarch,” which is
“legitimated by its promise to be efficient and effective” for securing the self-interests of
its citizens.744 Second, Hauerwas moved from presupposing that “Christians need to
develop a theory of political authority” to the converse by agreeing with John Howard
Yoder’s view that the state and its authority simply exist as a fact of reality.745 But even
in this change, Hauerwas still questions the legitimacy of the modern nation-state’s
mission to produce “‘peace and security’ promised by” state “power.”746 That suspicion
overlaps with his point on efficiency since he notes that “the first responsibility of the
president of the United States is to protect the United State’s self-interest.”747 Third,
Hauerwas has long rejected liberalism’s separation of disciplines into their own
autonomous spheres of reason, which is reflected in the autonomy of the state and its
raison d’état. He explicitly rejected a “self-validating,” “autonomous created order…to
legitimate the state as an end in itself.”748 The points of efficiency and autonomy I will
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take up later in terms of autonomous exception. But for now, between the three points
Hauerwas undercuts important aspects of raison d’état.749
More recently Hauerwas effectively overturns the liberal configuration that the
state’s raison d’être to secure national interests requires the self-interested power of
raison d’état. Even though Hauerwas does not explicitly argue the reversal in so many
words, he does so by following Michel Foucault’s work on power and others’ on the
state’s commitment to war. Hauerwas describes that the state’s ‘neutral’ position of
determining who lives and dies for peace (raison d’être) is to ensure freedom as selfinterest. That framework, Hauerwas argues, is little more than a biopolitics for securing
state power through the same power dynamics “manifested in war” (raison d’état).750
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This ‘turn’ countermands the liberal narrative, exposing that the state’s raison d’être is
predicated on the state’s tautological raison d’état.751
But rather than delineate Hauerwas’s use of Foucault, Hauerwas’s critique of the
wars of religion is a more faithful and clearer way to show his implicit reversal of the
modern nation-state’s narrative of raison d’être requiring raison d’état. Unlike Foucault,
Hauerwas’s critical view of the modern nation-state is always related to the state’s
policing of Christianity. He also does not set out “to develop a theory of political
authority.”752 Instead, he develops his turn in his arguments about the modern nation-state
as historically formed out of and as continuing to be unified by self-interested war. So
Hauerwas ‘backs into’ reversing political liberalism’s raison d’être-raison d’état
narrative by engaging historiography on the wars of religion narrative and by critiquing
political liberalism’s use of the narrative to police Christianity.753
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that liberalism understands itself as a response
to the narrative of the early-modern European wars of religion. The conventional story
goes that 16th and 17th century Europe erupted into religious wars following the
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Reformation. With Protestants and Catholics at each others’ throats, Europe was thrown
into political chaos and the presumed foundations of reality were overturned. Established
hierarchies, their claim to authority in revealed, objective truths, and even revelation
itself were called into question. In the light of ‘reason,’ the scandal of violence between
Christian traditions suggested that traditions and their appeals to revelation were
subjective and irrational rather than objective and rational. Pre-modern religious truth
was eventually deemed to be largely fideistic assertion. Religion itself was declared a
destabilizing force in society because of its proclivity to demand loyalty and attempt to
convert adherents from other religious traditions. So the liberal narrative runs that the
wars of religion revealed that religion is inherently violent and a danger to society
because it is exclusionary, partisan, and irrational passion. Christendom, then, could not
keep the peace. But conveniently, starting with the peace of Westphalia (1648),
liberalism claimed that it could make and keep the peace through the autonomous nationstate privileging the autonomous subject, especially her or his reason and experience,
while excluding the irrational and oppressive external church authorities from public life.
In the aftermath of the wars of religion, major figures in liberalism argued that crucial to
peace-making is the political, universal freedom of the individual supported by a strong
state sovereignty to ensure freedom. In order to maintain the peace for the arbitrary
pursuit of self-interest over and against a primordial, chaotic force like religion (raison
d’être), the newly created nation-state demanded loyalty to its claim of “administrative
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monopoly” (raison d’état) over its boundaries and the use of violence within to ensure its
neutral and objective policing of the public square.754
Leaning on William Cavanaugh and others, Hauerwas argues that the wars of
religion narrative is essentially a historical fiction that is “anything but innocent,” despite
its prevalence in political liberalism historically and today.755 The ‘wars of religion’ were
not the impetus for the rise of the modern nation-state to save Europe from chaos. Rather,
the violent conflicts attributed to religion were more so the “birth pangs” of the modern
nation-state as it redefined its sovereignty by solidifying state power and eclipsing
ecclesial power.756 The state’s solidifying and eclipsing are exercises of raison d’état.
The narrative is fundamental to the state’s raison d’être because the narrative
“legitimates the power of the nation-state in the West to wage war” and “to save us from
the violence of religion.”757 Liberalism contends that the “secular orders are” universal,
rational, and “inherently peaceful” while religion is partisan, irrational, and divisive
rather than peaceful.758 The liberal order can therefore bring peace if it has the power to
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enforce its moral-political order. However, Hauerwas argues the converse against the
modern nation-state’s self-legitimating claim that it created a peaceful order over
medieval chaos and continues to limit the Hobbesian state of nature. The modern nationstate arose and continues to exist in order for leaders to control a population and
economy, in particular go to war for self-interest, without the interference of ecclesial
oversight or mediation. Such self-interest, especially the pursuit of autonomy and
autonomous power, is tautological by definition. Irony then abounds when that tautology
is justified by its liberal determined raison d’être, for “the state defends us from threats
which it itself creates.”759
So the wars of religion narrative masks that the liberal narrative of raison d’être
requires raison d’état is wrong. Not only did the state’s securing of its strength
historically precede it securing anything else. That historical insight also uncovers an
ideological commitment. The state’s self-interested raison d’état employs raison d’être
in order to support the larger, self-justifying narrative: that the state’s reason for being as
peacemaker requires the state to secure its self-interested power for policing. However, as
much as raison d’être and raison d’état are helpful interpretations of Hauerwas’s work,
there is more to them and more in Hauerwas’s criticism of the modern nation-state than
so far has been realized even in his recent publications. I will develop Hauerwas’s work
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through the relation of raison d’être and raison d’état to clarify a future step in his
critiques that fundamentally question political liberalism. Those French political concepts
are not simply political theory; they have a history that goes hand in hand with the
development of the modern state to today.760
Bobbitt’s Discontinuity on Raison d’être and Raison d’état
Hauerwas leans on Philip Bobbitt’s work in two major ways. First, Hauerwas has
absorbed Bobbitt’s thesis that “the modern state came into” being through coercion and
war-making for self-interest.761 This helps flesh out Hauerwas’s account of the wars of
religion and maintains in some ways continuity with the present. But Bobbitt’s thesis
notwithstanding, in substance Bobbitt downplays that the nation-state never turned from
its roots in pursuing self-interested power. This problem occurs in his categories for the
different evolutions of the modern state.
Second, Hauerwas employs Bobbitt’s distinction between the state-nation (17761870) and its successor, the nation-state (1861-1991). In the state-nation, the state
musters “a national, ethnocultural group to act on behalf of the state,” with the example
being Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) rallying the French.762 But in the nation-state,
“the state [is] for benefit[ing] the nation it governs.”763 The state-nation and nation-state
distinction is important and helpful. So are Bobbitt’s other, chronologically preceding
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categories of the state: the princely state (1494-1572), the kingly state (1567-1651), and
the territorial state (1649-1789). However, Bobbitt is less helpful when he implicitly
relegates the various forms of reason of state to the early modern age of the princely state
(ragione di stato), the kingly state (raison d’état), and the territorial state (Staats
raison).764
This historical relegation of reason of state, I will show, creates a rupture between
the early modern state and the contemporary nation-state. Bobbitt’s historical account
only pays lip service rather than robustly develops the fact that the transition from kingly
state to territorial state to state-nation to nation-state did not mean that the power
dynamics and the state’s self-serving legitimation of its sovereignty were changed in a
fundamental way. Raison d’état is not only a political doctrine of sovereignty crucial to
the rise of the early modern state’s birth through self-interested war. But also, by paying
only lip service, he overlooks that raison d’état remains vital to the modern nationstate.765
My break here from Bobbitt begins my development of Hauerwas’s thought
beyond Bobbitt. Hauerwas sides with Foucault’s contention that “politics is the
continuation of war by other means” to overcome Bobbitt’s view that “war simply
‘is.’”766 But whenever Hauerwas appeals to Foucault’s work, Hauerwas does not include
Foucault’s treatment on raison d’état. Perhaps this is because, like Bobbitt, Foucault
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describes political liberalism in the nineteenth as breaking from raison d’état. Yet unlike
Bobbitt, Foucault robustly argues that raison d’état still subtly continues today. It was not
only fragmented and diffused into aspects of the state’s sovereign mechanisms over civil
society, but also part of that process was developed by the rise of a political economy
birthed from the principles of raison d’état. I will, however, leave the link between
raison d’état and political economy for another time. I also have to leave a historical
genealogy of raison d’état from its roots in antiquity and medieval Europe to today for
another time. Instead, after addressing Bobbitt, I will show how focusing on raison d’état
deepens Hauerwas’s critique of the past and present modern state without Bobbitt’s
problems.767
Bobbitt carefully distinguishes, chronologically and ideologically, between
ragione di stato associated with Italian “princely states,” raison d’état with French
“kingly states,” and Staats raison with German “territorial states.”768 Ragione di stato, he
summarizes as, “rational, unprincipled justification for the self-aggrandizement of the
State.”769 Ragione di stato “distinguish[es] the state code of behavior from the moral code
of the prince (such as deceit or treachery) when the state takes on the role of the prince
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and the prince is relieved of his moral obligations as an individual.”770 Raison d’état, he
summarizes as, “a parallel justification [to ragione di stato] through the personification of
the state, and [raison d’état] leveraged the imperatives of this justification to impose
obligations on the dynastic ruler.”771 Accordingly, raison d’état represented “a reason
invoked on behalf of a king justifying his acts as being those imposed on him by the State
(such as aid to Protestant princes by a Catholic king); it identifies the king with the State
when he takes on the role of the state.”772 Similarly, the shift from kingly state to
territorial state was concurrent with a shift from raison d’état to Staats raison. The kingly
state’s raison d’état was a constitutional imposition on the “monarch-as-embodiment of
sovereignty.”773 In the territorial state, reason of state shifted to the “monarch as minister
of sovereignty.”774 There “Staats raison is the rationale given on behalf of the State, an
imperative that compels its strategic designs (such as the seizure of a proximate province
for geostrategic designs). It identifies the state with the country, the land.”775
I whole heartedly affirm Bobbitt’s attention to historical details, but there are
problems in his account. He grants a general fluidity and progressive accumulation in
history that his Hegelian historical classification is too rigid to accommodate.
Nonetheless, and counter to Hauerwas’s project, Bobbitt’s categories and historical
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narrative lend an implicit affirmation of liberalism’s raison d’être-raison d’état narrative
through two steps that actually break historical continuity.776
First, Bobbitt’s strict emphasis on the discontinuities among the Italian, French,
and German versions of reason of state underplays an important overlap between raison
d’état and Staats raison. Bobbitt clearly notes that both are constitutional and deeply
ambitious. However, less clear, and at best only partially noted, is that both raison d’état
and Staats raison are imposed upon the monarch/minister by the “constitutional orders”;
both are the ground for realpolitik domestic and foreign policies; and both are justified by
the state’s raison d’être of “special responsibilities.”777 This basic continuity is crucial. It
covers the historic period when, for example, the French state was developed through war
and justified by raison d’état. By that manner of development, the state in turn
established and partially secured essential characteristics that formed the modern French
nation. The state’s role as such is in continuity with Hauerwas’s claim, through Bobbitt,
that war formed the state preceding the nation. However, Bobbitt’s nuanced emphasis on
distinguishing raison d’état and Staats raison is a form of classification that breaks
important continuity. This downplays the importance of reason of state, and in turn serves
a historical supersessionism in the next point.778
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Second, Bobbitt creates an oversimplified break between raison d’état and today.
With reason of state fragmented, he gives an historical description of the kingly state and
the territorial state replaced by the state-nation without an account of reason of state. This
formula, on the one hand, serves a careful historical account that distances the territorial
state from both the state-nation and nation-state. On the other hand, the formula and
distance also serve Bobbitt’s normative understanding of the nation-state. It is one
without an account of reason of state, even though some have noted that raison d’état
undergirds modern “executive prerogative.”779 And in a somewhat similar fashion,
Bobbitt’s Hegelian historiography allows that the princely state’s “balance of power” and
the kingly state’s “ideological hegemony” were maintained in later state iterations.780 But
that continuity is precisely what he pays lip service to concerning raison d’être. Instead,
his account, for both the state-nation (historical account) and for the nation-state
(normative account) above, replaces raison d’état-Staats raison with history identifying
and shaping the state’s raison d’être. With the distance provided by changes over time,
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the state’s reason for being is informed by the wisdom of hindsight and by the need to
protect the present from recurring problems, rather than the state ideologically driven by
justified self-interest. History, then at least indirectly, gives the state its mission. That is,
unfortunately, another way of construing liberalism’s narrative of raison d’être leading to
raison d’état.781
One of the nation-state’s chief responsibilities includes controlling the use of
force for the “survival” of the state and its citizens, as Bobbitt asserts.782 Essential to this
understanding of the state’s own sovereign power is its “monopoly” over legitimate
violence and a policing of illegitimate violence.783 The question is not if one should see
that raison d’être and raison d’état are still linked today. Rather, the question for
contemporary liberals is whether to privilege state/national interest outright, like R.
Niebuhr and Hegel, or to maintain the Kantian legacy by stressing the modification of the
reason of state for universal human rights through the UN, like Dorrien. These
differences notwithstanding, the basic ground is still the same. The liberal narrative treats
the nation-state’s raison d’être as a security service to the nation that precedes, and

781

Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 5-6, 173-175. For Bobbitt, “the State exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive
for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history” (ibid.,
6. See also ibid., 204, 206-208, 216, 280, 334-336.).
The irony here is palpable. Privileging history could be helpful considering Bobbitt’s argument that war formed the modern
state. It is that formational account which Hauerwas employs most. However, Bobbitt’s emphasis on history supplants raison d’étatStaats raison in both Bobbitt’s historical account and his normative understanding of the state. This supplanting exemplifies his larger
break between the failures of the past and the potential of today. That runs against Hauerwas’s project. But continuity between the
nation-state and kingly state’s power dynamics is, I believe, helpful for illuminating Hauerwas (AE, 120-136). Recovering the
historical connection is vital not only for maintaining Bobbitt’s insights, but also for that connection establishing an alternative, a
robust historical account about the world’s aeon from then to now. Without that alternative, Hauerwas opts to segue from critiquing
Bobbitt to critiquing Kant on the basis that war just is (AE, 123-125). If Hauerwas bought into critiquing them on their terms, he
would have implicitly bought into R. Niebuhr’s ahistorical existentialist account of human sin that Hauerwas connects to Kant (ibid.,
134). But Hauerwas rejects their ahistorical terms, opting to critique them in light of the wars of religion and the category of religion
followed by a Yoderian eschatology (ibid., 130-131, 135-136).
782
Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 6. This is continued in his account of the market-state (ibid., 235-328).
783
Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 206.

224

thereby justifies, the state securing its own self-interested power through coercion and
violence.784
Developing Hauerwas’s Position through Autonomy,
Exception, Raison d’être, and Raison d’état
One might then grant that raison d’être and raison d’état are at most mutually
informing. Yet, the logic of raison d’état is more fundamental to political liberalism than
it admits. Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben, Hauerwas, and others have exposed political
liberalism’s failure to realize that law is not self-grounded on its own autonomous reason.
Instead, liberal law stands upon a secularized theology of the sovereign who decides
exceptions to law in light of necessities and interests. To add to their critiques of political
liberalism, the continued presence of exceptions to the law shows that raison d’état is
still crucial for the nation-state’s sovereignty and its biopolitics even in an international
world with a UN.785
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The very nature of raison d’état is about making the state itself and its interests an
exception to not only the rule of law, but also to other facets of life. Reason of state is the
claim that the state has its own autonomous sphere and concomitant morality because the
state’s basic interests are their own form of public rationality. Less recognized is that the
state’s act of making itself an exception undergirds autonomy inherent in the reason of
state. Richelieu’s raison d’état asserted a separation between the monarch’s personal
morality and his public role. He did so to demand, as the monarch’s chief minister and
confessor, that the monarch set aside his personal morality of Christian charity in order to
act according to the morality of raison d’état. The latter can require personally immoral
acts in order to secure justice and peace, but for the monarch to not act accordingly is
actually to act immorally in the position of monarch. Richelieu and others argued as
much under the guise of, broadly, the monarch’s God-given duty to secure the public

Schmitt is most famous for that insight, which is largely why I mention him. But he need not be the only one or the primary frame of
reference. For instance, I will prepare soon the ground for noting later that reason of state was initially a quasi-religious and quasisecular version of the divine right of kings.
Citations for Schmitt, Agamben, and others could be very long if I were to include the incredible amount of articles on
them. So for brevity I will mostly note a selection of books: Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of
Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014); Carl Schmitt,
Legality and Legitimacy, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Schmitt, Political Theology, chps.
1-3; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Giorgio
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Homo Sacer II, 2), trans.
Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften,
vol. 1, Abhandlungen, part 3, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 887; Walter
Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1968), 257; Walter Benjamin, The Origin
of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (New York: Verso, 1998), 65-66; Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter
Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 2005), 58, 126 n. 71; Bretherton, Resurrecting
Democracy, chps. 6-8; Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004), pp. 60-64,
chp. 5; Andrew W. Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror?: Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War, and Exceptionalism,” in
Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008);
Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009);
Hauerwas, AE, 35 and n. 35, 69-71, 128-132; Hauerwas, WAD, 59; Hauerwas, WT, 172; Hauerwas, WwW, 49-51; “Hauerwas on
Hauerwas and the Law,” 236, 244, and n. 64, 249-250; Kahn, Political Theology; Smith, Weird John Brown, pp. 48-49, 136, chp. 3.
Foucault could be included in the list above, but sufficiently delineating the reason why would take too long here. So I will
simply note the following. Despite Agamben’s criticism of Foucault for overlooking exception, Foucault could be read as showing
how exception becomes the norm––a permanent state of exception––through sovereign power wielding the law for exception. That
much is precisely what Schmitt and Benjamin contend. For just such an argument, see Mika Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on BioPower: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (2005): 17-18. Hauerwas also makes his own Schmitt-Foucault connection
through Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, which illuminates the normalization of war (AE, 123-124, esp. 124 n. 15; WAD, 47-48).

226

interest and, narrowly, the monarch’s political responsibilities to his lords’ interests. The
Cardinal’s Constantinian salve accordingly minimized theological interference by
reducing Christian salvation to “attrition” instead of “contrition.”786 So Richelieu may
appear to situate the monarch as simply responding to realities and necessities of ruling.
But in truth Richelieu’s arguments were about exempting the French monarch’s violent
domestic and foreign pursuits from the prevailing social morality, ecclesiastical
influence, and political arrangements that obstructed the autonomy of state interests.787
Richelieu’s project is far from antiquated. The separation of private and public
morality and its use to legitimate the state’s self-interested power are fundamental
assumptions undergirding R. Niebuhr’s project. The private-public morality separation
parallels his distinction between moral man’s selflessness and immoral society’s
selfishness. The latter’s selfishness restricting reason may countermand Richelieu’s
emphasis on ruling through reason. But in more significant continuity with Richelieu,
Niebuhr’s account of the nation’s selfishness is its distinctive rationality not only inherent
to the nation but also necessary for its unity and survival. In that society, for Niebuhr,
only justice can be obtained. So Niebuhr’s realist solution accordingly privatized Jesus’s
love ethic and accommodated US’s violent pursuit of national interests. Thus, even
though Hauerwas attributes the separation of an ‘external’ “‘morality’…from economics
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[and] politics” to Kant’s legacy, Hauerwas has been implicitly working against the logic
of raison d’état for most of his career.788
Political liberalism assumes war would be an exception, an “aberration,” if the
state is sovereign over violence, but Hauerwas has recently argued the reverse.789 In
terms of raison d’état, the exceptional status of the state’s autonomous interests secured
in violence makes war normal. With the state and war as such, they precede and override
law. The early modern state’s rise was predicated on making it an exception in order to
make war for self-interests. So, the formalization of war went hand in hand with the
formation of the state. Ironically, that actually ensures war. War, the power to wage war,
and the power over war are inherent in the politics of the modern nation-state, Hauerwas
contends, is not an aberration.790
Initially, then, Hauerwas appears to undercut issue of exception and to limit
himself to concerns only about war. But Hauerwas also employs Paul Kahn’s contention
that war is fundamentally sacrificial, and thereby a form of sacred violence. Kahn asserts
that in war “sovereignty shows itself as an end in itself,” and that a war, like the US ‘war
on terror,’ cannot be bound by law.791 Law and humanitarian police actions follow the
logic of sacrificial honor that intensifies violence, and the sacrificial character of war
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cannot but keep making exceptions to law. “Kahn suggests,” Hauerwas concludes, “that
war is the way states sanctify their existence––an ironic result, given the widespread
presumption that creation of the modern nation-state system was necessary to stop” the
wars of religion.792 For Hauerwas, it is “war that makes clear that there is no higher value
than the continued existence of the state,” or as Hauerwas employs Kahn, “war is about
the existence of ‘the sovereign as an imagined transcendental value.’”793
An alternative expression of this irony is that the state’s raison d’état, as its own
end, precedes the modern state’s raison d’être and its laws. From the early modern state
born from war up through the contemporary nation-state, the modern state exists first as
self-grounding power for realizing its own self-interests through war and others’
sacrifices in war. The irony of this is that the state created itself through exception, and
therefore the state is ultimately beholden to its own exception and violence before it is
bound by law. The state will always make exceptions for war and self-interested power
that override law because the state’s violent autonomy precedes it mission of
peacemaking by lawful ordering. That, for liberalism, construes war and raison d’état as
the tail wagging the dog. But political liberalism’s attempts to enshrine the fundamental
primacy of law misunderstands exception.794
The responsibilities, interests, and ultimately the sovereignty of raison d’état are
undergirded by the state’s power as an exception to the mechanisms for peace that it
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ensures. The state can then declare an exception to mechanisms like law. Fundamental
state interests, like policing power and a monopoly over violence in particular, are
synonymous with what is necessary for the state to exist in light of its responsibilities
(e.g., securing national interests and safety). Yet the sovereignty of the state makes the
state an exception from what the state oversees––a non-democratic sovereignty to secure
a democracy––despite appeals to rule by the people. In raison d’état “the sovereign
power of the state could only be truly effective if it was separated from the form of
government that enacted it.”795
One particularly clear instance of this separation, and in terms of efficiency, is
found in the 1994 Supreme Court Case Waters v. Churchill. The case was about a former
employee of a public hospital who was fired for criticizing her superior in a private
conversation with another employee while taking a break at work. The Court vacated an
earlier ruling in her favor because the court rejected that she could claim her First
Amendment right of free speech. In continuity with precedent set by earlier Supreme
Court decisions and with the majority of the other judges on the bench, Sandra Day
O’Connor’s plurality opinion distinguished between the state as sovereign and state as
employer. She asserted that, on the one hand, the state as sovereign does not limit First
Amendment rights. But on the other hand, the state as employer “may under certain
circumstances violate” public employees’ First Amendment rights for “the interest of the
State…in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
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employees.”796 I expect Schmitt, Kahn, and others would note that the sovereignemployer separation is an ironic exception instituted by jurisprudence. But more to the
point, this exception is the raison d’état logic in two ways.797
First, the Supreme Court separates state power (employer) from the form of
governance (democratic free speech) in order to secure the state’s effectiveness in terms
of efficiency. Waters and others can be fired on the basis of their superior’s reasonable
judgment without the due process of law in a liberal democracy. Thus jurisprudence
hands itself over to bureaucracy for efficiency, which Hauerwas has critiqued.798
Second, while this separation of power and governance is shot through with
exception, undergirding the separation itself is, ironically, an act of sovereignty masked
by the category of employment. Under the guise of efficiency (raison d’état) to achieve
the state’s mission (raison d’être), the state as employer can make an exceptional
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sovereign decision (raison d’état) to limit the mission of state sovereignty (raison d’être)
in order to ensure self-serving power in the interests of the state (raison d’état).
Both making the exception and limiting free speech for raison d’être are deep
illiberal incoherencies within political liberalism, due to jurisprudence recognizing that
power and decision-making-an-exception are the ultimate ground, not the law.
Liberalism’s nation-state cites its mission of creating peace by ensuring rights in order for
the state to appear as ordered (ordinata), legitimate power (potestas). However, when the
mission for peace conflicts with the state’s raison d’état, then raison d’être is overruled
for the state’s actual grounding in sheer, autonomous might (potentia absoluta), and its
desire for more power. Thus, political liberalism’s narrative of raison d’être requiring
raison d’état is actually the reverse. Raison d’état is a tautology that, to justify itself,
employs a raison d’être.799
Up to now I have contended that, in French political terms, Hauerwas’s more
recent work argues that raison d’état is legitimated by raison d’être. Despite the modern
nation-state putting on airs of neutral objectivity for war, state warfare is instead
ideologically driven by a pathological securing of its own self-interested power. This
project is achieved further under the guise of protecting ‘public’ self-interests from “the
fear of death,” and protecting the status quo for the greed and banal illusions of autonomy
in capitalism.800 Such a project is nothing short of rejecting the politics of friendship and
its source, the gifts of God’s sovereign agency, as outlined in chapter three. I have
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developed Hauerwas’s work by establishing his early engagement with raison d’état, by
teasing out how he continued to reject raison d’état, and then by combining my
constructive work on raison d’état with aspects of his criticisms of privatization, war, and
efficiency. But for Hauerwas there is one more element to, broadly, the state’s hegemonic
sovereignty and, narrowly, the wars of religion narrative. The state ‘created’ the category
of religion in order for the state’s sovereignty to replace divine sovereignty.801
The Category of Religion and State Sovereignty as Sacred
The rise of the modern nation-state through self-interested war is predicated on
the concomitant creation of the decidedly non-neutral category of religion. Hauerwas,
using Cavanaugh, describes the modern characterization of religion as some kind of
“trans-historical” and “trans-cultural” private belief or spirituality “essentially distinct
from public, secular rationality.”802 Construing ‘religion’ as such is deeply problematic.
The category of religion is an abstract universal that separates faith from its particular
language, content, and/or social existence. That separation, in turn, creates a broken
definition of religion no matter how it is construed. When religion is defined by its
substance in doctrines or practices, religion is too narrow to incorporate all faiths. The
alternative is defining religion by its “function,” but doing so is too expansive because
issues like “nationalism” could fit as well.803 These definitional problems indicate that an
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alien framework is at play, rather than the category simply collecting together different
faiths describing themselves.804
The religion category, Hauerwas and Cavanaugh contend, is determined by
distorting liberal mechanisms that marginalize ecclesial influence in order to serve state
power. Political liberalism’s social contract means that “the only entity with political
standing is the individual,” and so the citizen-state relation precludes room for other
socio-political entities.805 That policing already excludes faith from being recognized as a
source of politics, but this strategic goal also goes hand in hand with disenfranchising
faith communities. The issue is, then, what to do with faith. Since the wars of religion
characterized faith as irrational, chaotic, and violent, faith cannot be allowed in public
without restrictions. The generic category of religion is just such a fundamental
restriction. ‘Religion’ re-defines faith as a belief relegated to one’s private life in order to
keep faith away from significant discussions and actions in society. The privatization of
faith and a strong state enforcement of an autonomous moral-political order, by liberal
accounts, should keep the religious conflict at bay. But considering the actual histories of
the category of ‘religion’ and of the ‘wars of religion,’ Hauerwas maintains not only “that
any attempt to isolate ‘religion’ from any social, economic, and political realities cannot
be sustained.”806 Those two ways of understanding ‘religion’ are instead part of an
“attempt to legitimate state control of the church.”807 There is warrant for such a striking
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claim even when the state appears to take seriously the separation of church and state.
Since religion is construed as nothing more than an individual’s private interest in the
contemporary US, salvation has become accordingly “individualistic.”808 This reduction,
Hauerwas argues, enables and supports coherence with market-values and “modern
democratic presuppositions” of autonomy.809 The reduction and coherence have the effect
of replacing discipleship as learning the “craft” of following Jesus from tradition and a
masterful community.810 Consequently, liberalism’s abstract politics of the autonomous
citizen-consumer supplants Christian particularity, formation by an ecclesial community,
the supreme Good, and the theological and moral virtues that belong to Christianity’s
distinctiveness and mission.811
State control through privatizing ‘religion’ not only exposes liberalism’s
hegemonic attempt to police Christianity. The privatization of faith also creates a public
gap for the state to fill with its own attempt to be divinely sovereign. To make matters
worse, liberal theology is complicit in that endeavor. But how can that be? After all,
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Hauerwas notes that R. Niebuhr places state sovereignty in a subordinated position to
divine sovereignty, even though both Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray argue that the
state’s attempt to be neutral, that is secular, means there is room for divine sovereignty.
However, through a rare appreciative use of Murray, Dorrien appears to agree with
Hauerwas at least on concluding to a superficial plurality in a liberal society and on
liberalism policing faith. Yet then Dorrien and Hauerwas differ.812
Dorrien finds liberative promise in the liberal emphasis on equality. So he argues,
in terms of justice, for developing religious freedom to overcome superficial pluralism
that ignores or suppresses real differences. Hauerwas eschews the nation-state’s
categories of religion and religious freedom that demand privatization and translation.
Those categories and demands distort the substance of Christian faith by shearing it from
its socio-political constitution crucial to social salvation. The all too often result is that
Christianity “becomes” tantamount to “a court religion held captive to the interests of a
nation-state” and no longer “capable of calling into question ‘the public.’”813
Dorrien’s valuing of truth and giving up success for a prophetic stand, as noted in
chapter one, are aimed at keeping Christianity from becoming a court religion. Yet
Rauschenbusch’s role for the state in his tripartite structure and Dorrien’s qualification of
that––the state’s involvement in redemption limited to justice––correlate with the spheremaking of raison d’état. The monarch in the early modern state claimed access to God
not limited to the confines of papal power precisely because raison d’état was initially a
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quasi-religious and quasi-secular development of the divine right of kings. The historical
development of political liberalism, even some liberals admit, accordingly furthered the
secularization of the divine right rather than “break decisively from” it.814 This continuity
explains why, in contrast to Dorrien, Hauerwas undercuts the presupposition that the
modern nation-state makes room for divine sovereignty. The state claims ownership over
the keys to death since the state asserts “a monopoly on legitimate violence to save us
from the violence of religion.”815 In effect, the state creates a sacral order “supplanting”
alternative, authoritative sources like Jesus and the church.816 The state’s most significant
raison d’être as sacred, neutrally objective peace-maker is a trumped up charge to justify
the state’s raison d’état, the state as the ultimate authority, as the exception determining
life and death through death. That emphasis on death is, Achille Mbembe argues, not so
much a biopolitics but a “necropolitics.”817 In accepting this new sacred order, Christian
loyalty is exchanged for what is tantamount to another, perverse kind of sacred, the
necropolitics of the state that seeks to regulate and transcend death through unity in
violence and rules. Thereby the gifts of God’s sovereignty, the gifts of creaturehood, true
peace, and Christian witness, have been rejected and supplanted to support a selfinterested rival, human autonomy.818

814

Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 199. See also Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 508; Meinecke, Machiavellism, pp. 135, 355,
and chp. 17; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice, 116-117, 123, 147.
815
Hauerwas, AE, 132. See also ibid., 131.
816
Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence, 113. See also ibid., 114-118, 120-121; Hauerwas, AC, 66; Hauerwas, AE, 131-132;
Hauerwas, CET, 189 n. 30; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 5; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 9-12.
817
Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture, 15, no. 1 (2003).
818
Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 472-504; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 198-199; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious
Violence, 4-5; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 196-199; Hauerwas, AC, 142-144; Hauerwas, DF, 150-151, 194-195 n. 22;
Hauerwas, WAD, 8-11; Hauerwas, WW, 57-58; Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, 99-100; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice,
117, 123; Philip Windsor, “The Justification of the State,” in The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory, ed.
Michael Donelan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 176; Hauerwas, AC, 66-68, 71; Hauerwas, AE, 131; Hauerwas, CET, 182183; Hauerwas, WAD, p. 5, chp. 5; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 9-10, 113-114, 120-121, 123, 210, 226; Cavanaugh,
“A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House,” 407-411, 414; Phillips, War, Religion, and Empire, 137-148.

237

Dorrien’s Presumable Suspicion
Hauerwas’s critique of state sovereignty is problematic on Dorrien’s terms, which
value liberalism’s liberative potential because of its ideals and its historical success in
realizing the ideals. His pragmatic streak further strengthens his objection to the isolation
of the church and faith from liberal democracy. On those terms, Hauerwas’s rejection of
an activist church is as overblown now as it was when Hauerwas first made the argument.
It would be inconsistent for Dorrien not to judge that Hauerwas’s claim of a new agency
still has yet to fully make good on relating to aspects of society that aim at fulfilling the
liberative commands in the Bible. As much as solidarity is about living-with, even
suffering with, solidarity is part of making sure all needs are met for liberation.819
In some respects, the above is an update of the church-world difference that
Dorrien saw at the heart of their disagreement. But simply interpreting the issue of
hegemonic sovereignty as such would be too simplistic. It is addressing human intrarelations and thereby reality that underlies their disagreements over the church-world
relation as Dorrien saw it. Hauerwas’s later work, then, seems even further isolated from
a society where “politics is finally an arena of limited options.”820 Dorrien may grant that
one could not work with a state so diametrically opposed to Christianity, but he does not
hold to the same description of the state as Hauerwas. Dorrien appears to assume the wars
of religion narrative, and he repeatedly claims that “the way beyond modernity is through
it.”821 So I assume Dorrien would extend the same criticism to Hauerwas as Dorrien
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levels at Barth. He did not given enough credence “to the apologetic aspects of theology
done as ‘faith seeking understanding.’”822 A sufficient enough commonality and some
measure of translation are necessary for intelligible communication and the mutual
endeavor of seeking the truth.
But earlier in Resident Aliens, Hauerwas and Willimon’s advocacy for a radical
break, a “revolutionary ethics,” was already about a revolution from liberalism rather than
a revolution within liberalism.823 Six years later, Hauerwas went further in an excoriating
critique of Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr’s embrace of liberal democracy as justification
for Constantinian power.824 Hauerwas still holds to rejecting procedural democracy,
despite Stout’s 2004 critique of Hauerwas “as decidedly anti-democratic.”825 Dorrien preempted Stout here too, criticizing Hauerwas and Yoder’s “Christian anarcho-pacifism”
and its support from Yoder’s account of Jesus’s Lordship.826 Dorrien still maintains that
Resident Aliens was “unintended aid” to injustice and oppression.827 I note, then, that my
work on raison d’être and raison d’état only creates further distance between Dorrien
and Hauerwas at the most basic level. That is if the discussion were simply left here.
III. Conclusion: Fracture and Hope
Divine and political sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency are at the
heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different understandings of the
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two sovereignties at work exemplifies a deep fracture in the political voices of Christians
in the US. Granted there are other facets of Christianity’s political voice, like the
Evangelicals and Catholics that Dorrien and Hauerwas have addressed in varying
degrees. But I agree with Dorrien’s assertion in 1995 that he and Hauerwas represent the
two most promising, albeit divergent, options for a post-Christendom, Protestant
Christianity in the US.828
For Dorrien, divine sovereignty and spiritual subjectivity work with and in the
world to transform the world. But from Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s accounts of
divine sovereignty, of humanity as creature-friends, and of liberal democracy set him in
an isolating direction that is still potentially unbiblical. For Hauerwas, his understanding
of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity fundamentally question the modern nationstate’s sovereignty because Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is sovereign by giftgiving. From Hauerwas’s perspective, Dorrien’s divine sovereignty and human
subjectivity fundamentally integrate with state sovereignty. Hauerwas has not explicitly
accused Dorrien of Constantinianism, but the social gospelers’ and R. Niebuhr’s forms of
integration with state sovereignty is a major hallmark of Constantinianism. From
Hauerwas’s position, then, it is difficult to see how Dorrien sufficiently avoids
Constantinianism, even considering Dorrien’s arguments for a counter-cultural witness
from the margins and a recovery of the evangelical heritage. This articulation of their
differences stresses the theological vector of the two sovereignties at work covered in
chapter three.
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In the Hauerwas section of this chapter, I raised the other vector: liberalism as a
whole, and the liberal nation-state specifically, operating on them also contributes to their
different responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s divine sovereignty fits with state
sovereignty, but as a sometimes critical voice for the internal development of liberalism.
This critical continuity occurs because liberal theology is part of the larger liberal project.
Hauerwas’s project is not part of the liberal project. He questions the state’s mission of
peacemaking and its reasons for doing so based on his better hope in Jesus’s sovereignty
and in turn humanity’s new agency. As a result, Hauerwas illuminates the modern state’s
sovereignty as intrinsically hegemonic, rather than hegemony as a symptomatic
expression of US imperialism.
Hauerwas and Dorrien’s friendship and their generosity toward each other’s work
are helpful. But how is the next generation of theological discussion not fated to repeat
their categorical impasse? Is development beyond that impasse possible? Answering
these questions is vital since Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s divergent trajectories seem to be
moving further apart. As I have argued elsewhere, the theological roots of liberation
theology have slowly given way to simply social solidarity and moral praxis. Hauerwas’s
worry about the separation of theology and ethics is being further realized; and while
Dorrien’s historical work has been recognized, his call for a spiritual center is largely
overlooked. If this situation continues unabated, soon enough the faithfulness versus
social justice narrative will become self-fulfilling as a solidified conflict forcing a false
decision for US Christians.829

829

For Hauerwas and Dorrien’s friendship, see some their correspondence in box 4, accession 2008-0123, Stanley Hauerwas Papers,
David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. For the rest of the paragraph, see Horstkoetter, “Getting
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Yet hope is still present. Hauerwas and Dorrien both maintain a vision of human
relations more expansive than the state’s conceptions of politics. That political surplus is
found in both of their arguments about achieving the common good through a
decentralized politics of subsidiarity, localism, and radical democracy. Despite
Hauerwas’s rejection of liberalism’s “procedural” democracy, he advocates for
“deliberative democracy” in local communities so people with significant differences can
discover the common good together.830 Hauerwas’s work on friendship, hospitality, and
disability not only reflects the heart of l’Arche; he also raises them as exemplars in his
discussion on radical democracy. Dorrien’s advocacy for breaking up the banks among
other regulatory mechanisms constitute a socio-economic policy to be lobbied for in
Washington D.C. But the larger issue of economic democracy is about a grass roots
movement to “suit particular social and cultural contexts” in the expanding pluralism of
US society.831 Additionally, while Dorrien’s vision is about co-operatives and workerowned enterprises, he also critically appreciates the Occupy movement and supports the
churches’ involvement in it. Those two ‘prongs,’ of vision and activism, can be construed
as forms of radical democracy in the framework of subsidiarity.832
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chp. 3).
831
Dorrien, EDE, 141. See also ibid., 283-286; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144
832
Hauerwas, AN, 7 Dorrien, EDE, 258; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 26;
Hauerwas, AE, 184-185; Hauerwas, CDRO, pp. 13, 103-105, and chps. 8, 14; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 8; Hauerwas, WT, 184-185;
Hauerwas, LGVW, chp. 4, esp. pp. 89-92; Dorrien, EDE, chp. 8; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine
Commonwealth,” 27; Dorrien, “Occupy the Future,” 16; “Questions for Gary Dorrien: On the Ethical Roots and Uncertain Future of
Occupy Wall Street,” interviewer unknown, Mar. 12, 2010, http://americamagazine.org/issue/5132/100/questions-gary-dorrien; Gary
Dorrien, “The Case Against Wall Street: Why the Protesters are Angry,” Christian Century, Nov. 15, 2011; “Savvy Occupiers: An
Interview with Gary Dorrien,” by David Heim, Christian Century, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.christiancentury.org/blogs/archive/201110/savvy-occupiers; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144.
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Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus is intelligible in their rejection of the
self as self-constituted or self-determined. They maintain a positive understanding of
multiple sources that determine the self. So there are multiple communities and narratives
at work, although some may be more authoritative than others. Yet as much as their
surplus countermands the sphere-making of raison d’état, their surplus is obscured by the
terms of the discussion beholden to political sovereignty as it is, and more superficially,
social justice versus faithfulness. So how can they be freed for complex space? How can
communities be recognized as authoritative in a political sphere where the power of state
sovereignty is predicated on the individualism of the social contract? The answer lies in
Rowan Williams’s work on multi-layered, decentralized politics.
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CHAPTER 4
Williams’s Political Horizon:
With and Beyond Hauerwas and Dorrien
Rowan Williams advocates for state sovereignty, constituted by securing raison
d’état hidden under the guise of procedural policing, to be transformed into supporting a
decentralized, co-operative, and discussion-oriented politics. In his vision, the identity
forming power of social groups and their concomitant traditions are recognized to be
authoritative for the subject’s identity and to play an essential role in public life,
including politics and the common good.
The transformation of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty is a tall order; however,
there is significant warrant for doing so. Williams’s concerns are partly about recognizing
the plurality of society that is suppressed by England’s monopolistic jurisprudence. I
have similar concerns about the US context. The US government’s hegemonic
sovereignty forms our imagination in a way that leaves us incapable of receiving and
responding to the plurality of US society in an adequate and healthy manner. Consider
the plight of the Native Americans, the chattel slavery of Africans, and the historical
effects of those oppressions that are still real today for both groups. We are encountering
similar problems today with other social groups. In particular, the xenophobic trumpedup ‘specter’ of Islam and Shari’a law has stimulated unsuccessful and successful attempts
to establish laws excluding the possibility of Shari’a in state jurisprudence.833
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For those who scoff at the idea of the transformation of state sovereignty, it as a current reality has been well recognized by
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As much as there is warrant to transform the fundamental nature of state
sovereignty for the common good, the central concern of my argument here is that
Williams’s work provides a new horizon for the theological discussion. Specifically, I
argue that his political horizon opens up the Hauerwas-Dorrien discussion, on the one
hand, by meeting much of the political criticisms and surplus in their thought, and on the
other hand, by going beyond them toward transforming state sovereignty without
Constantinian presumptions.
Like Dorrien, I am wary of “giganticist analyses that sound radical but which
strangle political agency.”834 I emphasize, therefore, the practical aspects of realizing
Williams’s transformative vision. But in this chapter the most significant value of his
thought is that it opens up our imagination. The situation of Hauerwas and Dorrien’s
argument, not just the argument, is crucial. Williams illuminates the division over
political sovereignty, and he shows how it need not be that way. He sketches a vision of
state sovereignty that frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from the pressure of the state’s
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hegemonic sovereignty. The hegemonic issues of privatization and translation disappear
in Williams’s decentralized, discussion-oriented politics, in which the social groups and
their particular languages matter. This transformation alleviates the pressure state
sovereignty contributes to the impasse and fracture in US Christianity. Indeed,
Williams’s vision of transforming state sovereignty frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from
their different responses to the constraints of a common assumption: the permanence of
state sovereignty. By permanence of state sovereignty, I do not mean that state
sovereignty does not shift. It seems to be transforming from a nation-state to a marketstate, as I will address. I also do not ignore the fact that Hauerwas and Dorrien critically
engage the state, even opting for alternatives to it. Those critical shifts object to but do
not unravel the state’s own pathological compulsion to secure its self-serving power
through mechanisms like privatization and translation. What I mean by permanence is
assuming rather than transforming the state’s own self-understanding and its mechanisms.
The assumption of permanence is a weed that strangles their political surplus. But if we
are freed from this presumption, we can act––as I believe Hauerwas and Dorrien want––
in a relational way to each other that is not beholden to hegemonic sovereignty, no matter
if the state initially wants to co-operate or not. In such “ad hominem” practical reasoning
we can realize where and how we can know one another differently.835 Hauerwas and
Dorrien could be brought together in a fresh way through advocating for the
transformation of state sovereignty in the process of proleptically realizing its new form.
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In short, we can live in “complex space,” and thereby call the state to catch up.836 So my
interpretation of Williams’s new horizon has implications that can change the internal
discussion of Christianity in the US and the nature of Christian work for the common
good.
Williams opens, then, the possibility that the Dorrien-Hauerwas discussion can be
freed from disagreements over political sovereignty’s status quo. But Williams’s work is
not simply a pragmatic bridge through ethics. Ethics and theology are united. So the final
conclusion not only shows that his political vision issues from his theological horizon,
but also suggests that his theopolitical horizon critically develops crucial aspects of
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitics. By addressing Williams’s challenge, the DorrienHauerwas discussion can be re-freshed for beginning to move beyond fracture.
I. Williams’s Programmatic and Procedural Secularisms
In 2008, then Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams gave a lecture on civil
and religious jurisprudence at the Royal Courts of Justice in London. He primarily argued
that monopolistic state jurisprudence ignores but should accommodate Shari’a law in a
way similar to what the Jewish court system (Beth Din) already enjoys. The dominating
response was a public uproar displaying anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment with
woefully uniformed opinions about Shari’a law and what Williams actually meant, much
less why. The ‘Shari’a lecture’ continued his long standing engagement with secular
political liberalism in England, by building on his knowledge of the English state
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pluralists John Neville Figgis (1866-1919) in particular, as well as G. D. H. Cole (18891959) and Harold J. Laski (1893-1950). The heart of Williams’s political thought lies in
this engagement, not in the popular, mass media misunderstandings of his claims that
were reported to the public.837
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In a more recent publication that mostly consists of lectures prior to the ‘Shari’a
lecture,’ Williams defines secularism as “a functional, instrumentalist perspective,
suspicious and uncomfortable about inaccessible dimensions.”838 Williams might then
appear to reject political liberalism. But he is for it if framed as “the idea that political life
can and should be a realm of creative engagement” for the common good.839 This
definition of liberalism is aimed against reductive political accounts. The realm of
creative engagement cannot be reduced to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor of
individual liberties.”840 The liberal state is secular in the sense that “loyalty to the state is
not the same thing as religious belonging.”841 From this framework, Williams
distinguishes two forms of secular political liberalism: “programmatic” and
“procedural.”842 He rejects the programmatic understanding of liberalism, but he
embraces the procedural. Programmatic liberalism follows after French secularism,
which is characterized by sheer “functionality” and by the requirement of “clear public
loyalty to the state.”843 Programmatic secularism, in a Kantian-like fashion, also reduces
religious faith to “private convictions” or “choices,” construing the sacred as about more
than what we might see and thus out of bounds.844 Faith can affect private morality, but if
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faith ever enters the public square, faith’s content must first be translated into secular
concepts to divest faith of religious markers. In contrast, procedural secularism focuses
on plurality. The state cannot give “advantage or preference to any one religious body
over others,” nor may the state “requir[e] any specific public confessional allegiance
from its servants.”845 Social bodies, not just individuals, are also emphasized in
procedural secularism’s plurality. Social communities and their particular corporate
nature are recognized as authoritatively constituting the individual subject and the local
community. Such corporate plurality welcomes difference without privatization or
translation. This is because the local communities are in direct discussion in public; they
are not policed into the private sphere by a state that enforces a ‘neutral’ public
language.846
Williams’s differentiation between programmatic and procedural secularisms is
crucial to his work for the transformation of sovereignty. I argue next that Williams’s
critical analysis of programmatic secularism complements both Hauerwas’s critique of
political liberalism as hegemonic and my development of that critique. Then I focus on
Williams’s procedural secularism in order to show his transforming vision of the state.
Only then can I show later how that vision offers a new horizon that parallels and opens
the promise of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus without the limits of their
impasse.
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Programmatic Secularism’s Monopolistic Sovereignty
Williams’s account of programmatic secularism broadly corresponds to
Hauerwas’s contention that political liberalism is hegemonic. Programmatic secularism’s
aim is the “almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality” in order to secure
individual autonomy and peace.847 To achieve this end, programmatic secularism
privileges the autonomous freedom and reason over and against external authorities like
religion. However, Williams rejects not only just such an account of autonomy, but also
the veracity of individual and state neutrality. Programmatic secularism creates a
‘neutral’ public space under the auspices of a desire to create peace. Yet to do so requires
the state to marginalize all rival authorities. The state does so through monopolizing
public space, citizenship, and juridical mechanisms. This form of state-sovereignty
demands that citizens “detach their perspectives and policies in social or political
discussion from fundamental convictions that are not allowed to be mentioned or
manifested in public.”848 However, this detachment is situated instead of neutral, and the
state’s monopolization of public space and language is constraining rather than
liberating.849
There is more to Williams’s description of programmatic secularism, which has
more points of congruity between Hauerwas’s and Williams’s critiques of hegemony. For
instance, Williams critiques the wars of religion narrative, the category of religion, and
the use of them to legitimate procedural secularism for the same reasons as Hauerwas and
Cavanaugh. But it is worth emphasizing how Williams’s view is distinct from
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Hauerwas’s within their similar critiques of hegemony. I focus on first the influence of
Roman sovereignty in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Then I highlight the
importance of jurisprudence before concluding with the issue of pluralism.850
In order to illuminate the imperial nature of the modern state’s sovereignty,
Williams raises the connection between Roman sovereignty and the modern state’s. The
latter emerged through its own additions and subtractions to Roman sovereignty in order
to support the state’s claim of autonomy under the auspices of serving its subjects
autonomy.851
Following Figgis, Williams characterizes Rome’s imperial sovereignty as
“intensely centralized” and as “systematically suspicious of private societies.”852 To
achieve this Rome “imposed upon all nationalities an absolutely uniform culture,
reinforced by a formidably organized army.”853 Rome’s aim of universal rule was
achieved on the basis of “a higher law” than “local jurisdictions.”854 That “centralized
system” was recovered shortly preceding and during the sixteenth century by monarchs
seeking to become the “single source of all legality and jurisdiction” in order to be
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“inviolable, beyond challenge” or “appeal.”855 This form of sovereignty is the heritage
upon which programmatic secularism is built.
State concerns about unification and an underlying fear indicate a fundamental
acceptance of Rome-style sovereignty. Political unification is achieved by a supposedly
universal, “timeless,” and “instrumental” autonomous rationality.856 By contrast, loyalties
that tie citizens to alternative, historical communities are deemed sources of violent,
irrational passions that create political chaos. So like the Roman Empire, programmatic
secularism fears external loyalties and communities. Constructively, programmatic
secularism also employs a monopolistic sovereignty like that of imperial Rome. The
state’s mission, it claims, is to ensure an autonomous public order of autonomous
individuals. But since external loyalties threaten social cohesion, programmatic
secularism asserts that monopolistic sovereignty is necessary for peace. The wars of
religion narrative exemplifies that irrational, violent, and competitive religion overthrew
public order until the modern state made peace through claiming sole jurisdiction over its
geographic boundaries.857
Williams puts questions to the narrative sequence that state’s mission requiring its
autonomous power. The state’s reason for being is a justification for its self-serving
“monopoly” on violence and for the demand “exclusive loyalty” over-against the
communal bonds in other corporate groups.858 Specifically concerning faith, it is
privatized. Historically rooted faith communities in particular contribute distinctive
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differences to the identities of persons and society, but programmatic secularism
sequesters the communities from politics, economics, and society in order to make room
for autonomous self-creation. By securing the private-public distinction over and against
“‘alternative citizenship’... [like] the Christian community,” political liberalism “turns
itself into a fixed and absolute thing, another pseudo-religion.”859 This ironic
transformation into the state as “the sole source of legitimate common life” reflects
Rome’s “absolute and universal” sacred sovereignty transcending any “local tradition” or
governance.860 Programmatic secularism’s form of sovereignty excludes rivals in order to
privilege the autonomous, self-interested subject. That pattern reflects the imperial and
monopolistic designs of Roman sovereignty.861
Chapter three argued that the state’s ambition for hegemonic sovereignty
undergirds its sacral order in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Williams, like
Hauerwas, effectively overturns liberalism’s narrative of reason for being requiring reason
of state, but without noting doing so in such terms. Above highlighted issues in
Williams’s work that are specific, constitutive elements of the overturning. Programmatic
secularism holds a pseudo-sacred sovereignty, enforces it through privatization, and
justifies it by the wars of religion. Although those issues on their own are not sufficient to
show the overturning, other parts of Williams’s work complete the overturning of the
narrative of autonomous political reason grounding reason of state. He exposes the state’s
use of exception and rejects its claims to autonomy, which are key characteristics of
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raison d’état in the modern nation-state. Williams notes that the state “claims the right to
assess and on occasion overrule individual liberties” so the state can fulfill its mission
against threats like terrorism.862 Yet in doing so the liberal state actually violates its
mission of ensuring rights in order to secure its own sovereignty. Raison d’état
undergirds exception with the state’s autonomy in its uniquely ‘natural’ reason. But
Williams opposes that autonomy when he rejects its “ungrounded authority.”863
Williams objects in two ways that when joined undercut the logic of raison d’état.
First, Williams rejects a state metaphysics (“Staatsmetaphysik”) because it makes “the
state…a thing in itself.”864 Second, he disputes the state’s claim that its power is––as he
and Karl Barth use the term––“potentia” as “pure might, defining its own ends.”865 This
kind of power is illuminated when Williams makes his own connection of it to nuclear
weapons. “The nuclear state…identifies its own Recht with eternal value and legitimacy,
and regards itself as having in principle the authority to exterminate what threatens it––
not to resist, control, or discipline, but to exterminate.”866 The key words here are “state
metaphysics,” “potentia,” and “own.” At the core of reason of state is the state’s own
self-grounding, metaphysical rationality for the “eternal value and legitimacy” of the
state’s potentia absoluta.867
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Williams further countermands reason of state’s autonomy and all-encompassing
nature with his alternative proposal to programmatic sovereignty. For him, “procedural
secularism is the acceptance by state authority of something prior to it and irreducibly
other to it” and “a theology of the state in functional terms” is “essential.”868 This
rejection of a state metaphysics and assertion of state function supplies the ground for a
“theological critique of a positivist view of sovereignty.”869 Williams asserts the
sovereignty of Jesus, which relativizes any claims by reason of state.870 The state’s
“sovereignty is not a claim to be the source of law,” but rather the state’s sovereign
power ought to be “potestas…power defined in terms of the purposive capacity to serve
and effect law.”871
The second issue of the state’s sovereignty is found in its jurisprudence as part of
the state’s larger project. Williams argues that the modern state enforces a legal
monopoly through the mechanisms of citizenship and jurisprudence in order to secure
privatization and its sovereignty. Citizenship is how the programmatic state universally
enforces its minimalist, autonomous anthropology and private-public distinction. For the
sake of political unity, everyone is primarily determined by the minimal identity of the
social contract. The social contract, in turn, resists the substantive recognition of
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“additional level[s] of social belonging” that constitute the subject’s public life.872
Privatizing other communities undermines their claims to public authority. Put more
negatively, programmatic secularism’s form of “citizenship” creates a social space in
which the state polices expression of any other social loyalties.873 That state’s
sovereignty, much like Rome’s, at best becomes “in some sense a source of legitimacy
for other social groups.”874 That is, they have no political legitimacy on their own.875
Although Williams’s emphasis on citizenship is similar to Hauerwas, Williams’s
focus on jurisprudence is largely a different avenue than Hauerwas’s critique. At the
intersection of citizenship, conflict, and a “monopoly of legitimate force” is the state’s
jurisprudence as the single and definitive authority.876 Monopolizing jurisprudence may
help bring order, but it also tends toward monopolizing the resolving social relationships
in a juridical frame. The latter, making the state’s juridical justice the adjudication of the
conflicting freedoms of individuals, undermines the social resources for reconciliation
and peace-making outside the state. This monopolistic reduction to individual, juridical
subjects involves the state in policing both relations within the internal life of corporate
bodies and relations among communities. Ironically, this involvement occurs in spite of
the state’s claims of neutrality and self-distancing from the private sphere.877

872

Williams, FPS, 39, 64.
Ibid., 61. See also ibid., 79-80.
874
Ibid., 51.
875
Ibid., 38-39, 80, 119-120.
876
Ibid., 45. See also ibid., 51, 61.
877
Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 6; Williams, FPS, 18-19, 23-27, 61, 120-125, 132-133. Williams’s focus on
jurisprudence touches on a central issue in legitimating state sovereignty (Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, 13).
Hauerwas has critiqued a juridical decision by the US Supreme Court, and Hauerwas has exhibited appreciation of lawyers and
juridical work in terms of the common law tradition as non-foundational practical reasoning (IGC, 199-202; “Hauerwas on Hauerwas
and the Law,” 247). But those are not in the stated focus of, respectively, his critical broadsides at political liberalism and his
constructive position.
873

257

Consider for instance Williams’s (in)famous ‘Shari’a lecture.’ As a speech-act it
was an intercessory attempt, in his capacity as the most senior Archbishop of the English
state church, to raise the importance of Shari’a law for Muslim life in England to English
state jurists. He argued that the state’s monopoly on jurisprudence and its imposition of
the public-private distinction excluded Muslims’ own communal resources in Shari’a law
for mediating internal disputes from being legally recognized or accommodated. Lord
Chief Justice Nicholas Phillips, “the most senior judge in England and Wales,” affirmed
the use and legal acknowledgment of Shari’a as Williams suggested.878 However,
constructive conversation after Williams’s infamous ‘Shari’a lecture’ was conducted in
the state’s ideological categories. Interfaith discussion, even when calling for change, was
oriented by the state’s terms. There could be public, legal accommodations in accordance
with the state’s external pressure of privatization on the internal politics and public
visibility of the Muslim community. Actual accommodations made to Muslims, from the
state’s point of view even as argued by Phillips, are to individual citizens in pursuit of
personal freedom. Accommodations are thereby directed to individual citizens of the
realm. In turn, accommodations are granted indirectly at best to juridical bodies for
arbitration such as the various Jewish law courts or various Muslim “councils.”879 But
accommodations are not made directly to the alternative communities themselves as
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social bodies. Doing so would require the state to legally recognize alternative authorities
outside of the state’s scope.880
The third issue of state sovereignty is its negative relation to pluralism. In parallel
with Hauerwas and partially with Dorrien, for Williams the regime of programmatic
secularism leads to a superficial and ultimately harmful pluralism. Pluralism in general,
and multiculturalism in particular, are at odds with liberalism’s secularized sacred
sovereignty. The state’s boundaries do not determine the boundaries of politics, Williams
contends. However, the “‘totalizing’ spirit” of programmatic secularism’s state
sovereignty falls into the “danger of behaving and speaking as if it is the only kind of
human solidarity that really matters is that of the state.”881 Such hegemonic homogeneity
“silenc[es] the other” and, ironically, fragments the subject and society as a whole.882 The
state’s timeless (ahistorical) monopoly is a claim to its own autonomy realized in
autonomous individuals pursuing arbitrary desire and in privatizing social relationships.
These ideals and mechanism suppress difference by hiding the sources of identity.
Corporate forms of life, like faith, are reduced to social clubs centered on individuals’
inconsequential, private opinions. Faith is thereby rendered “invisible” and/or
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“decorative” without significant meaning.883 Although this strategy of political liberalism
has produced gains in equality, the strategy also “isolate[s] us further from each other”
and frames relations in terms of competition.884 The US fixation on abstract rights makes
“the fragmentation…even more acute.”885 The reduction not only harms citizens, it also
eliminates the ground and sources crucial for robust discussions necessary to discover the
common good among differences. The modern state thereby works against a broader,
substantive vision of politics for the common good.886
The similarity between Williams and Hauerwas is clear. But Williams’s thought
on procedural secularism does not so easily cohere with Hauerwas’s critique of the
modern liberal state. Williams’s account of procedural secularism allows him to argue
that “loyalty to the state is not the same thing as religious belonging: not that the state has
no claims, but that it is a mistake to see those claims as beyond challenge in any
imaginable circumstance.”887 That position for now, on Dorrien’s terms, seems more
similar to Dorrien’s understanding of liberative, agapic Spirit working in the world than
to Hauerwas’s accounts of the church-world distinction and the state’s sacral endeavor.
So what kind of state does Williams have in mind? How can it be open to other loyalties
rather than be monopolistic?
Interactive Pluralism, Procedural Secularism, and Cooperative State Sovereignty
The state’s hegemonic sovereignty compromises other traditions by displacing the
role of tradition in public discourse. As immigration and Islam rise in social prominence,
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the nation-state is at a crossroads that affects its future shape. It can entrench its
sovereignty by expanding its ‘war on terror.’ The state can develop into a market-state in
the service of global capitalism. Or the state can change by listening to and by providing
space for distinctive traditions in public on their terms. Williams opts for a robust version
of the third, where change is achieved by and pluralism is realized in listening to
distinctive traditions in their particular languages. This discursive politics can transform
state sovereignty into serving a cooperative and truly pluralist society. Williams calls this
form of society “interactive pluralism.”888 For him, “the sphere of public and political
negotiation flourishes only in the context of larger commitments and visions” rather than
by privatizing and rejecting them.889 In that vision of interactive pluralism, political life
hinges on the interrelatedness in an Hegelian account of “mutual recognition,” beginning
with the “acknowledgement that someone else’s welfare is actually constitutive of my
own.”890 So on the one hand, mutual recognition illuminates differences and grounds a
pluralistic politics of discussion for Williams. On the other hand, his position is
distinguished by a “loosening of monopoly” that shifts loyalty from to “a sovereign
authority” to loyalty for discussion-in-difference, especially among the neighbors and
among the corporate communities that both constitute one’s identity.891 Thus, operating
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in this short summary are two different but connected relations of mutual recognition,
interactive pluralism itself and its relation to state sovereignty, that I will develop now.892
For Williams, mutual recognition requires fundamentally acknowledging crucial,
substantial differences. Corporate bodies authoritatively determine the person and
participate in shaping society. These communities are not only different than one another;
they also exist prior to and alongside liberalism’s political apparatus. But difference and
mutual recognition are undercut by the hegemonic mechanisms of political liberalism in
the name of overcoming potentially fragmenting difference. The distinction between
Williams’s “more-than-liberal” option and political liberalism then becomes quite
sharp.893 Interactive pluralism recovers the possibility of acknowledging different
corporate communities and their role of authoritative role crucial for the common good.
In contrast, the common good is subverted by a thin pluralism or blasé multiculturalism
constituted by the primacy of individual self-interest, the state’s superficial
accommodations to plurality, and the global capitalism’s commodification of plurality.894
While listening to other traditions on their terms constructively emphasizes their
corporate nature, together they also have a critical edge. They break open the pseudosacredness and autonomy of state sovereignty. Williams maintains theological arguments
about the necessity of Christianity reclaiming its corporate nature for itself. But that
Christian end also serves a common good. Corporate “religious identity” is “one of the
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most potent allies possible for genuine pluralism.”895 In the face of an ahistorical and
universal rationality, an emphasis on religious communities de-sacralizes the state and
opens room for true pluralism. The corporate nature of Christianity shows that there are
other “source[s] of legitimate common life,” like “intermediate institutions, guilds,
unions, churches, ethnic groups, all sorts of civil associations.”896 In effect, Williams
maps a vision of local to global relations intersecting through the subject and thereby
determining it. This subjectivity does not reduce to individuality; it merely emphasizes
the irreducible social constitution of subjects in a broader political frame. Williams’s
vision of interactive pluralism requires a politics with more flexibility and permeable
boundaries than “any specific state.”897
Interactive pluralism provokes, then, a tricky question suppressed by the
liberalism’s autonomous anthropology and the state’s monopolization of sovereignty.
How should society be united and the state be organized if we recognize other
authoritative communities besides the state? Williams’s answer is twofold. The first
develops a politics of interactive discussion in mutual recognition. The second forms the
state in accordance to that politics.898
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Difference-in-relation, for Williams, can only be negotiated in concrete,
interactive discussion, which is absolutely necessary to determine the common good. In
contrast to political liberalism, interactive pluralism’s mutual recognition does not
assume a substantive conception of rationality (“apodictic” reasoning) in order to enter
into conversation.899 That would render impossible any recognition between
incommensurable positions only overcome by “the priority of force.”900 Instead, Williams
opts for, in all but name, Charles Taylor’s “ad hominem” practical reasoning.901 Though
some might maintain the need for a common culture or heritage, the “conversation”
between people is already held “in common” despite vastly different cultural or historical
differences.902 Not just plurality, but also social intimacy, hospitality, and cooperation
make possible discussion for discovering and working towards the common good. In the
conversation among distinctive difference can occur “the breakthrough into a recognition
of common goods, things we can only value or enjoy together.”903
Mutual recognition also presupposes that each person and each group possess “the
freedom to be themselves” with each group holding a concomitant vision of the common
good.904 Williams stresses accordingly that individual and corporate equality, with
attention to the interests of particular corporate bodies, is vital for mutual recognition and
negotiation. He calls “covenantal mutuality” these mutually interactive relations taking
place inside a co-operative agreement.905 In this agreement, all parties “promise that no-
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one’s interest is written out of the social script and––crucially––that a long-term
perspective on social needs is being taken for granted.”906 This mutual relation makes
critical discourse possible. Williams’s framework allows for more than individual
interests to play a significant role in shaping society. But corporate or individual interests
cannot be recognized or negotiated without discussion.907
The importance of maintaining communal discussion is, for Williams, “a kind of
moral interest” constitutive to the state.908 So does he recapitulate reason of state? No. In
his words, the state “cannot in any simple sense have goals of its own, goals that are
potentially in competition with those of its constituent communities.”909 Or in terms of
reason of state, the state’s self-interested assertion of self-grounded autonomy, its
demand of singular loyalty, and its pursuit of centralized power are eliminated because
the state’s role in procedural secularism is formed by Williams’s account of mutual
recognition. That is, corporate bodies can be in direct discussion with one another
because “state authority” recognizes “something prior to it and irreducibly other to it.”910
Following the English state pluralists, Williams distinguishes two levels in the complex
space of society’s political arrangement. “‘First-level’ associations” are “self-regulating”
and “relatively unreconstructed forms of belonging” that appear in everyday life, such as
faith communities, “trade unions, …co-operative societies, professional guilds,” “ethnic
groups,” etc.911 But individually they do not “occup[y] the whole political and social
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territory.”912 Neither does the second-level, the state. It is “a particular cluster of” the
first-level associations “agreed on a legal structure” that “provides the stable climate for
all first-level communities to flourish and the means for settling, and enforcing,
‘boundary disputes’ between them.”913 Rather than providing a rival source of identity or
demanding loyalty to itself, the pluralist state is an “ideologically neutral,” or
“disinterested,” “broker” who maintains discussions among the first-level communities so
they can be “partner[s] in the negotiations of public life” for the common good.914
Accordingly, the secular part of procedural secularism here means the refusal to
“privilege” a “confessional group” over others, not the absence of faith.915 On this vision
of the state’s new mission “to harmonize and, to some degree, regulate this social
variety,” the state as broker fundamentally assumes the previous histories of diverse firstlevel associations, accepts the commitments of subject to them, and values the
complexity of their interactive “co-existence.”916 That new recognition of alternative,
complex loyalties not only transforms state sovereignty by shaping the state’s new
mission. The state’s recognition also limits its sovereignty by its openness to “scrutiny”
and criticism from first-level communities in order to keep the state faithful to its new
mission for the common good.917 State sovereignty, then, is not “inviolable” nor selfgrounding.918 Rather, the state is a de-centered, cooperative service for the procedural
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facilitation of and generated by public, interactive discussion among a plurality of firstlevel associations.919
II. Situating Williams in Relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien
There is much more to say about Williams’s project, but I will do so below in
relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien. It is tempting to employ Williams for mediating
between Hauerwas and Dorrien, since there is so much warrant for doing just that.
Williams has worked for dialogue in politics, and he has attempted to broker discussion
in the same global denomination to which Dorrien (priest) and Hauerwas (layman)
belong. Williams also moves in-between seemingly incommensurate positions such as
Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s. Hauerwas and Dorrien can appreciate Williams’s positive
description of “the central conviction of political liberalism”: “the idea that political life
can and should be a realm of creative engagement” between valued, diverse peoples.920
More complex is how Williams meets the divergent positions of Hauerwas and Dorrien.
On the one hand, with Hauerwas, Williams emphasizes the particularity of individuals
and of corporate bodies; in effect, he opts for radical democracy in the political sphere.
On the other hand, with Dorrien, Williams works through liberalism to get beyond it
through Hegelian mutual recognition, equality, and universal human dignity. But
Williams configures equality and human dignity differently.921
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I will develop those points of continuity, but I do not use Williams primarily to
mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien. Williams as mediator would miss
distinctiveness and promise of his work about and for discussion. That work is not only
revolutionary in regard to the modern nation-state’s sovereignty, and so his work
deserves a hearing in its own right. Williams also provides more than a mediating
position for Dorrien and Hauerwas.
For two reasons I focus on Williams in relation to Hauerwas and then Williams in
relation to Dorrien in the next sections. First, I support my contention that Williams
maintains much of the political surplus in each of Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought.
Second, I develop the roots upon which Williams draws in going beyond them to open up
a new political horizon. I begin setting up the latter argument here by contending that
Williams’s work is about transforming state sovereignty. This contrasts with Hauerwas
and Dorrien who assume the permanence of state sovereignty, albeit in complex,
different ways. Then I can detail further how Williams goes beyond them in order to
bring them together informed by the promise of Williams’s work.
III. Williams and Hauerwas on Radical Democracy,
and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Hauerwas
Hauerwas has praised, defended, and incorporated Williams’s thought with
increasing regularity. Over the last fifteen years their positions have further converged on
important points. They construct democracy similarly, for instance. Both emphasize
democracy as decentralized, local, and ad hominem discussion between individuals and

presidential-address-to-the-lambeth-conference; Rowan Williams, “Archbishop’s Pastoral Letter to Bishops of the Anglican
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groups in their traditioned particularities. In contrast to liberal democracy’s suppression
of difference and of conflict, Williams and Hauerwas emphasize the possibility of
nonviolent conflict and resolution among particulars in discussion. Both emphasize
deliberation between particularities as a form of practical reasoning. This interactive
discussion with others in immediate proximity is fundamental for discovering the
common good. Both reject theocracy, even though Hauerwas calls himself a “theocrat,”
and Williams affirms the primacy of God’s sovereignty over the state.922 They also
approach interfaith dialogue similarly. Although Williams argues that Christianity plays
an important role in England’s political recognition of a deeper pluralism, nevertheless he
and Hauerwas refuse to accept––and Dorrien too––the position that Christianity ought to
play a special role over other faiths in interfaith relations. For all three, interfaith dialogue
operates best through practices like the scriptural reasoning project, in which people of
different faiths interpret their texts for one another and reason practically together.923
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The tensions between Williams and Hauerwas emerge in Williams’s constructive
understanding of state sovereignty, his transforming of state sovereignty, and his
presuppositions undergirding both. Given Hauerwas’s critiques of political liberalism and
liberal theology, there is at least tension specifically over the general layout of Williams’s
pluralist state, its neutral role, and its monopoly on legal force. Then there is the issue of
Williams actually working to transform state sovereignty itself from hegemonic to
pluralist. I focus on the four points of tension in order. Some of the tensions can be
resolved in ways that show how Williams is congruent with Hauerwas’s political surplus.
Other issues remain tendentious. The most important of these places concerns the
transformation of the state’s structure. It is the site for both fruitful overlap between
Hauerwas and Williams, and for Williams going beyond Hauerwas.
Agreement over Pluralist, Deliberative Democracy in Practical Reason
The first point of tension is Williams’s description of the pluralist state as an
“association of associations” or “community of communities.”924 Hauerwas once seemed
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and Modernity: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); David Marshall and
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Georgetown University Press, 2014).
924
Williams, FPS, 3, 126; Rowan Williams, The Truce of God, updated ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 128
(hereafter TG).

270

to reject Martin Marty’s construal of “association of associations,” because it demands
“distance” rather than “personal intimacy.”925 The emphasis on argument in such a
framework, Hauerwas argued, is ultimately a call “to be ‘civil’ to one another.”926 But the
reasons undergirding Hauerwas’s criticisms are not easily applicable to Williams. He
assumes social intimacy rather than social distance, as I noted earlier. In fact, Williams
claims that distance is the source of violence. Yet, the tension on civility and argument is
more complicated since Williams assumes both.927
For Hauerwas, civility is a “bourgeois project” that suppresses pluralism by
privatizing “affect,” conflict, truth, and the good for the illusion of peaceful “public
demeanor.”928 When civility as such frames association of associations, Hauerwas argues,
a notion of peace is achieved by an overarching morality of civil relations without “any
theological justification.”929 Marty, consequently, interprets US Christianity in light of
the US but not the converse. In contrast, Williams rejects an account of civility or
tolerance that re-enforces the privatization of religious belief, for his account of politics is
in search of the truth.930
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Lending Williams further credibility here for Hauerwas’s position is that more
recently Hauerwas cites Williams on “truth-telling” and Jesus as the truth right after
Hauerwas rejects civility.931 This raises the fact that Williams provides theological
support for his vision of interactive pluralism. He asserts that mutual argumentation
directed toward the truth can replace the state’s hegemonic sovereignty “because…the
theological roots of modernity” are “a Christian-inspired culture of argument and what a
theologian would call ‘eschatological reserve’ about excessive political claims.”932 This
entire framework, from mutual argumentation to eschatological reserve, is supported by
his trinitarian theopolitics that I will raise in the final conclusion to this project. But
suffice it to say for now, these theological points shape Williams vision of argument and
the limitations of the state. Williams meets Hauerwas’s concerns about association of
associations by endorsing social intimacy and truth and by providing a theological
justification for his approach.933
The second point of tension is the issue of neutrality. Hauerwas has long rejected
the notion of political liberalism’s neutrality. But in Williams’s pluralist account, the
“state apparatus” “must be ideologically neutral” in order to be “a reliable and creative
broker” among first-level associations.934 Williams may, at first glance, appear to reinstitute aspects of political liberalism that he and Hauerwas reject, but the truth is more
complex.
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Earlier I noted Williams’s agreement with Hauerwas that the neutrality of the
liberal order, undergirded by autonomous rationality, is far from neutral. Accordingly,
Williams’s pluralist state need not claim the neutral objectivity in autonomy provided by
autonomous reason. Any sense of the state itself is not autonomous, and the state’s
neutrality is ordered by the common good. These are seen in Williams’s alternative to
programmatic secularism’s reduction of the individual to rational self-interest. Williams
privileges instead the particularity of individuals and of corporate bodies. Each
particularity determines its understanding of the good, and through mutual relation to one
another they realize the common good. The state, then, “cannot in any simple sense have
goals of its own, goals that are potentially in competition with those of its constituent
communities.”935 Rather, the state’s mission and laws are oriented by the first-level
associations finding the common good in discussion. So the state’s immediate goal is “to
create the conditions, within a complex social environment, that allow each group to
pursue what it sees as good. If any group’s notion of what is good veers towards
undermining the good of other groups, the law’s task is restraint and control of any such
tendency, as well as the defense of the whole network against destabilizing from
outside.”936
Hauerwas affirms such practical reasoning between social bodies in order to
determine and pursue the common good. Yet, Williams’s qualified account of pluralistic
neutrality may still be too much for Hauerwas. He observes that “attempts to create a
stable human community, to ensure we can communicate, have ended in failure.”937 This
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is because, for Hauerwas, “our ability to communicate depends on being a member of a
particular community,” and “the more concrete our discussion…the more we become
isolated from one another.”938 He “do[es] not know how” to give an account of how to
“negotiate diversity” without liberalism’s transcendental endeavor to oversee diversity
that actually suppresses diversity.939 Instead, with MacIntyre and against Hegel,
Hauerwas argues that “traditions…resolve conflicts” within themselves and “between
traditions.”940
So Williams’s pluralist state might appear to fly in the face of Hauerwas’s
tradition-dependent view. But in fact Williams is giving a partial account of how to
negotiate diverse particularities without liberal hegemony. The reason why Williams’s
account is both constructive and partial is because he forms an account of the state in
light of discursive practical reason between particularities. For him, “the law of the state
is what provides the stable climate for all first-level communities to flourish and the
means for settling, and enforcing, ‘boundary disputes’ between them.”941 Williams’s
view of a multi-layered society and the broker state has a Hegelian background, since he
argues “it is a great mistake to think of Hegel as some kind of an apologist for monolithic
centralism.”942 But Williams also distances himself from the abstract universalism of
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Hegel. Williams rejects the notion that one can have “a position outside or beyond
diverse faith traditions from which to broker a union between them in which their
convictions can be reconciled.”943 This rejection of an objective, outside position means
for Williams that no rationality or state violence can create unity by the state resolving
diverse “transcendent values.”944 Healthy peace cannot be achieved nor truth realized
through the homogenized suppression of diverse particularities. Rather, all that is left,
and is absolutely necessary, is “negotiation and the struggle for mutual understanding”
among particularities.945 The state’s raison d’être is to serve traditioned dialogue and to
“facilitate…co-operation” between individuals and corporate bodies “through [the
state’s] own sponsorship and partnership” in order to achieve the common good.946
As chapter one noted, Hauerwas’s critique of neutrality relies on rejecting
liberalism’s procedural system of rules that enforce and frame the morality of selfinterest. How then is Williams’s pluralist state not reproducing a similar procedural
morality? Are ‘procedure’ and ‘discussion’ the new morality for illuminating an abstract
“common moral ‘property’” between faiths?947 No. Similar to Dorrien’s position,
Williams uses terms like “common moral ‘property’” and “universal horizon” in political
life to denote unity through interrelated difference for the common good.948 Yet,
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Williams qualifies such unification in a way that overlaps with Hauerwas’s concerns.
Unity, from start to finish, describes “corporate…discernment” among distinctive
particularities in equality and “mutual generosity” rather than abstract, universal
rationalism.949 Williams’s position can be understood as corporate discussion discovering
a universal horizon like human dignity, but always in particularity. Any “common moral
‘property’” is about the particular common good discovered in particular discussions
between particularities. The procedure, then, is practical reasoning between particularities
that are historical, corporate, and public instead of “timeless,” individual, and private
communities.950 In this case, Williams’s notions of neutrality and procedure lack the key
hallmarks of programmatic secularism that Hauerwas rejects, and Williams promotes
much of what Hauerwas embraces.
Tension over Legal Force and Transforming the State
The third point of tension is the issue of legal force. Earlier I raised Williams’s
sympathy for Hauerwas’s and Cavanaugh’s argument against the wars of religion
narrative, which illuminates that the state’s sovereignty is through its monopoly on
violence. However, nuanced as always, for Williams the pluralist state’s sovereignty is
“the agreed monopoly of legal force and a recognition of where the ultimate court of
appeal is to be located for virtually all practical and routine purposes.”951 Phrases like
“the ultimate court of appeal” should not be separated from Williams’s reliance on
practical reason, his argument for multiple jurisprudences, and his emphasis on corporate
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particularity.952 Hauerwas has made similar arguments about such matters. The phrase
“monopoly on legal force” is the sticking point, and not just between Williams and
Hauerwas. William’s theology and politics, as Hauerwas rightly argues, are effectively
pacifist witness. Williams understands the major world religions as inherently nonviolent,
despite his “brush with death” on September 11 in lower Manhattan.953 He has
consistently been deeply critical of war, of state violence, and of their isolating roots in
fear, security, and hubris. Hauerwas, in his arguments on just war and nuclear
proliferation, appreciatively cited Williams’s work on peace. In an activist move that
would hearten Dorrien, Williams with others performed an act of civil disobedience on
Ash Wednesday 1985 at Alconbury airbase. They were arrested “at gun point” and
briefly jailed for “scaling the fence” and occupying a runway––by holding a service of
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“sitting and singing psalms” and “scattering ashes”––in protest against nuclear
weapons.954 How then should legal force be understood?955
On one level the “monopoly of legitimate coercion” is not the same as legal
force.956 In Williams’s thought, coercion has a consistently negative connotation, and it is
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constitutive of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty. Legal force allows for armed services
and police to protect human dignity: “the state provides protection against homicide.”957
But how can legal force be affirmed if the state’s violence is intrinsic to the state’s
sovereignty? Williams is not beholden, in theory or practice, to the legacy of the modern
state’s formation by war and coercion. His understanding of legal force issue located
instead in other historical roots and in the notion of the pluralist state’s different
sovereignty. Christianity’s legacy of attentiveness to Jesus’s sovereignty and of providing
a culture of deliberative argument changes the state’s raison d’être. This change allows
for defense or enforcement of values while mitigating state violence more thoroughly
than just war principles designed to limit coercive state sovereignty. How? The issue is
sovereignty.958
Just war principles are applied over the regnant understandings of sovereignty. In
this frame, Williams grants that state violence may sometimes seem to be “the only
available option” for some, like “police action” under “international law” and working
with “non-national moral communities.”959 But killing involves a “total mutual rejection”
that closes any discussion with finality.960 In this way, the state’s violence “denies the
deepest purpose of the state.”961 Williams can make this qualification because he
endorses an ordained potestas, not an absolute potentia, in a specific way. Discussion is
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the state’s raison d’être, not violence, since it has in a different kind of sovereignty. His
pluralist, second-level state does not have the autonomous exercise of raison d’état
because that exercise is limited by first-level associations. This means two things
concerning violence. First, the church, a corporate body with responsibility to be a
faithful witness to Jesus’s gracious and loving alternative, is vital both for
“challeng[ing]…all war-oriented policy” and for recovering truth, health, hope, and
repentance for true peace.962 Second, transforming the state’s sovereignty and its reason
for being in line with the common good should structurally and practically change the
state’s orientation to violence. This change reduces actual violence.963
Hauerwas is quite critical of international police-like intervention. On his terms, it
seems that Williams’s witness makes warfare more sober and self-critical. It may then
appear that there is no way to reconcile Williams and Hauerwas on the state’s use of
violence. However, Williams’s appeals to the role of discussion and to the use of legal
force raise the related issues of domestic policing and punishment. Here there is not only
the potential of merging Hauerwas and Williams, but also the possibility of their
convergence concerning the state more broadly. Hauerwas’s rhetoric against warfare and
violence appears to preclude policing tout court. But he affirms domestic policing in
order “that the innocent be protected from homicidal maniacs.”964 Hauerwas can do so
because he makes a nuanced distinction, a qualitative difference between policing and
war. He “assumes[s] most of what police officers do is nonviolent response to violence,”
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and as a pacifist, he would like to see police “not [be]…required as part of their task to
use lethal weapons.”965 It seems then that the police have to think on their feet, ask
questions, and address concerns in order to resolve conflict. Williams’s category of
potestas––at least in publication––surprisingly lacks such a distinction, or even much
mention of the police. However, Williams offers a judicial mirror to Hauerwas’s policing
framework. Williams’s vision for reforming the UK system of punishment privileges
mutual recognition and dialogue to protect the victim, to care for the perpetrator, and to a
restorative end for all affected parties. That specific domestic account is in continuity
with his larger vision of the state. He does allow for the state to defend the politics of
discussion. But the most basic ground for the state’s reason for being is to serve
discussion, not engage in violence or forms of self-serving power such as President
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. So Williams opens the door to Hauerwas’s
hope, “the possibility that a state could exist for which war is not a possibility.”966 But
how does that come about?967
The fourth point of tension is transformation. Williams seeks to transform state
sovereignty through a politics of recognition, while at most Hauerwas favors altering
specific state practices in light of Christian witness. The heart of Williams’s proposal is
the transformation of the meaning of state sovereignty from the hegemonic monopoly

965

Hauerwas, BH, 280 n. 19. See also Hauerwas, DF, 128-129; Hauerwas, PF, 27; Hauerwas, WAD, 80. In fact, he actually finds
public services like the police are unduly burdened by the community’s privileging of self-interest rather than the services oriented by
the common good (Hauerwas, WAD, 141). There is further possibility of convergence between Hauerwas and Williams concerning
prison. But Hauerwas’s constructive proposal, the transformation of punishment practices, is too brief. So I will raise it soon towards
another end.
966
Hauerwas, AN, 196.
967
Hauerwas, DT, 176, 184-186; Stanley Hauerwas, “What Makes America So Prone to Intervention? A Conversation with Stanley
Hauerwas, Pacifist Theologian, on Syria and Why ‘Humanitarianism’ is a Red Herring,” by Noah Berlatsky, Atlantic, Sept. 5, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/what-makes-america-so-prone-to-intervention/279393/; Hauerwas, WAD, 80;
Williams, FPS, 253-262; Williams, TG, 128; Williams, “The Ethics of SDI,” 166-170.

281

over the public sphere into support for interactive pluralism. Hauerwas agrees with the
attempts to recognize diversity, but he has long rejected the idea of transforming the state.
For him, the church’s job is witness, not “control.”968 Against Constantinianism,
Hauerwas likens the church to a “peasant” that “does not seek to become the master, but
rather she wants to know how to survive under the power of the master.”969 In this light,
Williams’s work to transform the state could appear similar to liberal Protestantism’s
Constantinian impulse to control history to make it come out right. Williams’s project
could also seem parallel to what undergirded liberal Protestantism’s work, specifically a
theology of the state and Christianity’s mission to be a handmaiden to the state. After all,
from a theological ground Williams gives a theory of the state, and he was the highest
ranking archbishop of the English state church that is caesaropapist by definition.970
If these congruities are true all the way down, they would place Williams more on
the side of transforming culture than on Hauerwas’s emphasis on the primacy of ecclesial
embodiment being witness. However, Williams is more in continuity with Hauerwas than
it may seem because Hauerwas’s position and Williams’s proposal are more complex
than what I have already delineated. Their difference is not over the idea of social
transformation, but rather the kinds of engagement through which that transformation can
be achieved.
Transformation is a word Hauerwas avoids because it evokes H. R. Niebuhr’s
account of transforming culture. But despite Hauerwas’s rhetoric, his critiques and
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positive witness acknowledge a different kind of transformation. In his rejection of state
and society’s autonomy on the basis of Christian witness, he implicitly allows some sort
of transformation of the state “by Christ.”971 Constructively, Hauerwas’s account of
ecclesial agency and witness assumes his infrequent but explicit acknowledgement that
the world can, and he hopes it will, respond positively to Christian witness. This
distinguishes Hauerwas’s understanding of transformation from H. R. Niebuhr’s. The
process of transformation further distinguishes Hauerwas. Transformation is achieved
through practical reasoning between particular individuals and groups. Rather than
supply “a better theory,” Hauerwas points to “a practice of” Christian justice and
“punishment that can be imitated” for ending capital punishment and reforming
prisons.972 Hauerwas focuses on practice instead of theory, in part, because of his concern
for particularity over and against an abstraction like the term “state.”973 The issue for
Hauerwas is the faithful witness of Christian particularity to society, especially the
specific individuals in government offices.974
Hauerwas limits engaging power dynamics to thoroughgoing, ad hoc practical
reasoning in particular, immediate contexts. He employs this methodological “tactic” to
create a critical response to liberal hegemony alongside a constructive understanding of
transformation through the witnessing practice of faithful Christian embodiment.975
Hauerwas’s account of the church is in order for it to challenge the world to be more like
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the church. His political thought could then be construed as a call to transform state
sovereignty to allow for the particularity of Christian witness. That call, however, is
generally subtext at best. Most of Hauerwas’s work concerns asserting Jesus’s
sovereignty, maintaining faithful witness to it in community, and critiquing the dangers
and failures of liberalism in light of Christian faith. Without faithful witness, which has
been lacking, the world would not know what or how state sovereignty should be.976
Though vital, this project maintains an implicit assumption of state sovereignty as
permanent in a specific way. Hauerwas’s longstanding claim that the church as an
alternative political order appears to preclude tearing down the state’s mechanisms and
replacing them in terms of the state’s self-understanding. His emphases on practical
reasoning in opposition to hegemonic mechanisms and to overriding theory mitigate
transforming the undergirding state sovereignty in line with a different ‘theoretical’
vision. Though Hauerwas opposes liberal hegemony and would like to see it transformed,
he lacks the conceptual resources to, or simply declines to, reach in and transform the
underlying structure––or to give an account in Hauerwas’s parlance––of state
sovereignty. Well of course, one might say, if he tried to do that he would be succumbing
to Constantinianism! That is not the case with Williams’s vision, as I will address below.
But to the point here, a Constantinian charge hides the implicit assumption of
permanence. Hauerwas’s political alternative of radical democracy exposes the poverty
of the state because cultivating an alternative is just as much resistance as embodying an
alternative. But both resistance and embodiment can be problematic here in terms of
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assuming permanence. Resistance presupposes something to reject. But rejection need
not be permanent if the constructive alternative takes over, or at least if radical
democracy is practiced locally. However, while Hauerwas is trying to help develop a
complex space, he is not constructively addressing the state’s account of itself that
reduces the complexity of social space. There could be complications to such a claim in
view of Hauerwas’s recent publications. But any thought about substantive, constructive
change of state sovereignty is marginal.977
Although often subtext, Hauerwas understands that “as Christians we will best
serve God and our neighbor by seeking to form a common life in the world as we see
it.”978 So Hauerwas notes that this “may well mean we must attempt to develop
institutions, like the university,” that are “necessary for the development of practical
reason.”979 Yet, it is unclear whether or not the state could be included in “institutions”
because the next sentences emphasize Christian witness and reject liberalism’s political
order.980
Further, like Williams, MacIntyre, and Benedict XVI, Hauerwas supports the
notion of subsidiarity that is heavily weighted towards the local community. He does so,
like Williams, in light of a diasporic Christianity and an encroaching, leveling global
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capitalism. But on the issue of subsidiarity, Hauerwas gives scant attention to the modern
state.981
Hauerwas also claims that “an alternative imaginary needs to be constructed” to
“the logic of war and the imperatives of the war system,” within the context his argument
that state sovereignty depends on war and sacrifice, and vice versa.982 This claim appears
to be the closest Hauerwas has come recently to calling for the transformation of state
sovereignty, but the call is indirect. His “Appeal to Abolish War” was primarily aimed at
the church, even though Hauerwas also saw the appeal as contravening the “barrier”
between “church and world.”983 Despite Hauerwas’s sympathies for Williams’s political
vision, Hauerwas lacks both a constructive vision about the state as detailed as
Williams’s pluralist state and an execution of its implication––that it requires
constructively transforming state sovereignty itself.984
I will return to later the assumption of permanence in terms of complex space
because both raise an issue worth addressing now. One might argue that Williams
replaces hegemonic sovereignty with a ‘better theory,’ the English state pluralists’ social
vision of interactive pluralism and of the pluralist state. Such an argument would assume
an overriding distinction between practice and theory in Hauerwas and William. That
separation might explain why Williams ends up calling for the transformation of state
sovereignty and Hauerwas does not in explicit terms. However, the practice-theory

981

Hauerwas, AE, 112; Hauerwas, WAD, 142-148, 157-158, 161; Williams, FPS, 55, 276; Williams, TG, 129. I will deal with
Williams’s sympathy for subsidiarity in more detail later.
982
Hauerwas, WAD, 51. See also ibid., 48; Hauerwas, AE, 35-36, 120-136, esp. 124.
983
Hauerwas, WAD, 39. See also ibid., 45-46.
984
Typifying Hauerwas’s desire and reticence is his line: “I am more than happy to work to make the kind of modest state…[that]
Stout wants [as] a reality” (PF, 237 n. 46). The question that Hauerwas puts to Stout is that he "needs to tell us a good deal more about
what he means by a ‘civic nation’…and how that ‘nation’ is or is not related to the modern nation-state” (ibid.). Williams works for
the vision of a “modest state” that at least gives some answers to Hauerwas’s question.

286

distinction does not need to determine Hauerwas and does not do justice to Williams.
Hauerwas’s aversion to “a better theory” has not kept him from using descriptive
categories that are currently more theoretical than a reality.985 He explicitly frames his
argument for the Christian transformation of policing within Williams’s rejection of the
“market-state” because the market-state undercuts the common good.986 Williams’s
expansion of politics might lead one to see him as working from a ‘better theological
theory’ of culture or society to order a theology of the state. However, such a conclusion
would only be true if construed too broadly. Not only, as I will note in the final
conclusion to this project that his account of the imago trinitatis is a trinitarian formed
ecclesial account of creation––not a theology of the state in the Staatsmetaphysik sense.
But also four important details show that his ‘theory’ of the state is not simply a theory,
and is built on much that Hauerwas embraces. The latter significantly qualifies any
similarity with US liberal Protestantism.
First, Williams is not attempting to give a full or universal account of culture
precisely because it is always dynamic. Rather, it is more accurate to say, that like
Hauerwas, Williams broadens politics beyond the boundaries of citizenship and the state
by emphasizing mutual practical reasoning and authoritative corporate bodies other than
the autonomous state. Constructively similar to Hauerwas, recall that Williams puts
forward a theology of politics constituted by particularity, corporate bodies, mutuality,
discussion, practical reason, and the common good.987
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Second, Williams’s practical theory parallels Hauerwas’s arguments that
emphasize political virtue, construe the state in terms of function, and privilege the
common good. Williams’s argument about “a theology of the state in functional terms” is
for “a theology of ‘political virtue’ rather than a Staatsmetaphysik.”988 His understanding
of “covenantal mutuality” includes, for deepening relations, both “carefully crafted
compromises” and “formation of political character” in “virtues like prudence…justice,”
and “mutual” or “social trust.”989 Within this functional approach, not only is state power
limited by the critical and co-operative participation of first-level associations, but also
both levels are in accord with the teleological direction of discovering and working for
the common good.990
Third, Williams’s concrete work to transform state sovereignty began with him, in
his then pastoral office, in the mode of practical reasoning. In this, he argued for
expanding the state’s practice of accommodations to faith to include corporate faith. In
following sections, I will focus on Williams’s concrete work of expansion, and how that
transforms state sovereignty. But the point here is that Williams calls for the
transformation of the state through Christian witness for the common good.
Fourth, one might argue that the reason Williams’s voice was heard nationally is
indebted to modern Constantinianism: his pastoral work is inseparable from his highest
ecclesial office in a caesaropapist church. This critique misses that the substance of his
vision, which runs against modern Constantinianism. Williams’s political ecclesiology is
effectively pacifist. The church as a particular, corporate body challenges the state to
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change its understanding of its mission from primarily monopolizing violence to
adjudicating discussion. So discursive, practical reasoning for interactive pluralism marks
both Williams’s political vision and his attempt to realize it. This vision and his work for
it does not privilege Christianity in a way that it controls the situation or becomes a
handmaiden to state hegemony. Christianity is to be one of the diverse communities in a
society where all faiths have an equal voice in procedural secularism.
So does Williams give into the idea that Hauerwas avoids that the “social
order…must be destroyed for the church to be the church”?991 Is Williams at once
Constantinian and tribalist? He is neither precisely because he does not opt to destroy but
to call the state’s sovereignty to cohere with complex space. Hauerwas objects to
Constantinian “control” because it is predicated on the delusion of autonomy.992 He
continues, “we lose the necessities that create imaginative alternatives that make it
possible for us to live without denying the difficult task of acknowledging our humanity
and that of our neighbors.”993 That objection, however, does not apply to Williams. His
understanding of “covenantal mutuality” and procedural secularism are precisely an
imaginative alternative that countermands autonomy and makes space for corporate
Christian discipleship.994 In recent work Hauerwas shows sympathy for the work on
difference by Jonathan Sacks, who Williams draws upon for “covenantal mutuality.”995
In earlier work, Hauerwas appreciatively evaluated Williams’s “work [as] an invaluable
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resource for helping the church ‘to be where we are.’”996 Hauerwas emphasizes
Williams’s sense of God’s open time and love for dialogue and redemption both inside
the church and between the church and the world. The issue of time is particularly
important since the two aeons framework is fundamental to rejecting Constantinianism
and constructing an alternative.997
What marks the difference between Williams and Hauerwas is not whether to
transform political practices. Instead, Williams calls for the wholesale transformation of
state sovereignty, while Hauerwas does not. Hauerwas’s critical position is
simultaneously rich and limited due to his concerns about theory’s relation to practice,
particularity and witness, liberalism’s hegemony, and Constantinianism. In light of
similar concerns, however, Williams still calls for the transformation of state sovereignty.
Therefore, something else is in play. It is, in short, divine sovereignty. A chapter five
would have argued that the issue is ultimately rooted in a seemingly ‘small’ trinitarian,
soteriological point concerning command and obedience which reverberates into
Hauerwas’s church-world distinction. Divine gift is turned into command to Jesus and
thereby to humanity, and their proper response is turned into obedience. But for the sake
of space, in the final conclusion I will describe Williams’s account of divine sovereignty.
Then in reference to Hauerwas, I will simply take up a significant implication of his
trinitarian, soteriological point: his distinction between obedient creation (church as
faithful witness) and disobedient creation (world). That is, Williams answers a question
that Hauerwas has not fully accounted for: on what theological basis does the church have
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a developing argument with the world? Before I can develop this claim and further
engage Hauerwas’s solution of practical reason, I need to develop further how Williams’s
interactive pluralism is predicated on his understanding of discussion and mutual
recognition. 998
IV. Williams and Dorrien Going through Liberalism to Go Beyond It,
and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Dorrien
In contradistinction to Hauerwas, Dorrien has almost never engaged Williams’s
work. Dorrien’s only published note about Williams is indirect and less than positive.
Dorrien briefly summarizes Theo Hobson’s 2005 characterization of Williams’s
“ecclesiology…as standard Anglo-Catholicism sandwiched by an unwieldy Radical
Orthodox compound of anarchy and utopia.”999 In Dorrien’s own nuanced way, he
affirms Hobson’s assertion “that the best context for speaking and living the gospel is the
liberal state,” over and against positions held by Hauerwas and John Milbank.1000 Dorrien
does so, in part, because “the way beyond liberalism is through it.”1001 His positive
valuation of the state and liberalism, set in contrast to Williams’s “unwieldy….anarchy,”
gives the appearance that Williams is on some ‘other side.’ However, the truth is far more
complicated.1002 Williams effectively opts for going through liberalism to go “beyond it”
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in a way somewhat similar to Dorrien and for some of the same reasons as Dorrien.1003
However, Williams wants structural transformation of the state because he is less
beholden to aspects of liberalism that Dorrien maintains. Here I will focus on the
congruities and incongruities of their politics, which are predicated on Hegel and the
English state pluralists. From that complex overlapping and distinguishing of Williams
work with Dorrien’s political surplus, I conclude that Williams goes beyond Dorrien.
Similarity and Difference in Human Rights and Mutual Recognition
Williams and Dorrien largely follow a Hegelian mode of reasoning to go, as even
Williams puts it, “beyond liberalism.”1004 Drawing from his and Gillian Roses’s
interpretation of Hegel’s conception of “concrete freedom,” Williams constructs a
politics of kenotic “mutual recognition.”1005 That politics opens up secularism to focus on
the common good beyond programmatic secularism’s minimal self-interests of individual
autonomy. So in the positive Williams parallels Dorrien’s insistence on the social aspect
of intellectual intuition that involves mutual recognition within the whole. There is also a
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parallel in the negative. Williams argues against ecclesial “tribalism” by asserting “a
prohibition against imagining any individual or group interest in isolation from the good
of all, and a procedural insistence upon self-questioning, in the wake of this
prohibition.”1006 Similarly Dorrien maintains the common good in an open perspectivism
and emphasizes the negative in Hegel’s dialectic.1007
The difference between Williams and Dorrien arises in who else they include
besides Hegel. Williams takes a philosophically realist turn by adding Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Since Hauerwas’s qualified realism also employs Wittgenstein, one might
then expect that Williams would reject the language of human rights in the manner that
Hauerwas does. Williams argues that “too much is at stake” not only for secularism to
ignore the critiques of rights as “excessively abstract.”1008 But also, somewhat paralleling
Dorrien’s criticism of Hauerwas, Williams criticizes those who use “anxieties about their
freedom to make religiously based ethical judgments an excuse for denying the
unconditionality––and the self-critical imperatives––of the language of rights.”1009
Instead, one must “salvage” and support “something from…the language of rights”
because it “is…the only intelligible way of expressing how the state is itself under
law.”1010 In that philosophically realist frame, Williams has critically accepted rights for
some time and has recently advanced a constructive argument for human dignity as
well.1011
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Instead of the minimalism of the social contract and autonomous freedom in
which rights are their own ends, Williams re-grounds human dignity and rights in a
cluster of ideas in order to serve negotiation for the common good. All persons are
created in the imago Dei. The Christian mission is one of universal proclamation.
Historical and communicative embodiment is inseparable from the mutual recognition of
another as gift. These points attend to how both the relation between God and humanity
and the relation between human beings constitute not only human dignity directly and
indirectly, but also in turn human rights. Williams grounds his support for human rights
in “an attitude of receptivity towards” the whole of humanity because all humanity is
related under God’s sovereign “invitation” in the gospel.1012 Williams’s advocacy for
“mutual personal recognition” shapes rights “language” such that it must be “grounded in
a clear sense of the dignity of the other, not simply of the claims of the self.”1013 Failure
to recognize human rights is not only unloving and inhospitable, but also rejects
recognizing equal belonging crucial for “civil discourse.”1014
There is much for Dorrien to agree with here, especially the issues of mutual
recognition, equality, and rights. In fact, like Dorrien, Williams could be understood as
framing religious pluralism partly as a justice issue. But Dorrien’s primary emphasis on
Hegel does not preclude Dorrien relying on the Kantian construal of equality in terms of
human autonomy and choice. In contrast, Williams argues for liberalism’s creative
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engagement as reducible neither to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor
individual liberties.”1015 Williams’s understanding of human dignity and rights relies not
on Kant, but on Williams’s assumptions about the nature of bodies and language. His
account of equality rests on his framework of discourse among particularities in mutual
recognition rather than on abstractions like choice. Ironically, this difference between
Dorrien and Williams now marks a place of agreement for rights language between
Hauerwas and Williams. In recent work Hauerwas shows appreciation for Williams’s
framing of rights as attentive to the communicative nature of human bodies in concrete
particularities and traditions.1016
Recall that, for Dorrien, equal autonomy is an end in itself as much as it is
necessary for flourishing. In attention to such ends, he allows his broader theological,
social vision to be reconfigured in light of liberation. However, also remember Dorrien’s
position that liberation theologies need to be grounded in a broader vision like the social
gospel and economic democracy. So questions remain as to whether or to what extent
Dorrien will let an even broader social vision transform his understanding of liberalism.
Williams’s vision offers an alternative of how to work through liberalism to go beyond it.
This can be seen in their similar and different visions of radical democracy.1017
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The Difference that Social Bodies Make
in Radical Democracy and Transforming the State
Williams was never for anarchy. Instead, he has long been for what is tantamount
to radical democracy in the same vein as Dorrien’s radical democracy: “pluralistic,
contextual, and pragmatic.”1018 In particular, they both draw from the English state
pluralist tradition for their normative visions of radical democracy. Hobson missed
Williams’s consistent reliance on the English state pluralists informed by Hegel’s
positive valuation of “intermediate civil associations.”1019 Dorrien’s arguments for a
“decentralized economic democracy” not only similarly rely on deep sympathy for guild
socialism.1020 But also that guild socialism he connects directly and indirectly to some of
the same figures in the English state pluralist tradition which Williams draws upon. In
fact, Williams and Dorrien see an overlap between, and argue for, integrating the English
state pluralists and liberation theology. Williams’s and Dorrien’s appeals to the English
state pluralists also indicate their affirmation of subsidiarity, which they do for similar
reasons. Hobson’s charge of anarchy misperceived Williams’s emphasis that the church’s
“focus is necessarily local and mobile.”1021 In the same vein, Williams emphasizes local
associations like “microcredit institutions in alliance with civil society bodies.”1022
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Dorrien also understands that “the building of healthy communities [is] best dealt with on
a community and regional basis.”1023
Williams gives an important role to the state at national and international levels,
in part, to promote ecological justice against the capitalist abuse of a finite world. Dorrien
also resists negating the importance of international and federal levels of governance for
ensuring universal human rights and healthcare, enforcing economic regulation of the big
banks, and negotiating ecological issues that invariably affect multiple communities. At
the same time, Williams broadens his interactive pluralism in mutuality to the
international level. He argues that a kind of ecclesial “advocacy” for “non-national,” nongovernmental organizations are essential to help resolve international conflict.1024
Similarly, Dorrien has worked with the World Council of Churches and social justice
organizations. Williams also, like Dorrien, engages the ecological crisis from a view
about the interrelatedness of the person within the whole.1025
Their difference here in terms of state sovereignty is that Williams opts for
transforming it through recognizing corporate equality. This is where the anarchism
charge may come from today, since Williams’s vision is an alternative to the nationstate’s sovereignty and to its ongoing transformation into the market-state. By contrast,
Dorrien’s privileging of equal choice is secured by the state. These differences can be
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seen in how Williams works for transformation, and how Dorrien works with the nationstate and key aspects of the market-state.1026
To claim that Williams’s transformation of state sovereignty is anarchic and/or an
impossible ideal overlooks the process of transformation that he proposes. It is ‘practical’
in Hauerwas’s terms and ‘pragmatic’ in Dorrien’s. The reconfiguration of state
sovereignty for cooperative, interactive pluralism begins by expanding the state’s
recognition of other corporate bodies through its legal accommodations to their
individual members becoming accommodations of the corporate bodies. In this legal
frame rather than public relations, Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture’ was a practical and
successful first step in expanding the state’s juridical accommodations according to the
corporate nature of faith. Granted the state may not have realized yet the social bodies
themselves as legal authorities in any full sense, but the pragmatic first step occurs in
corporate bodies such as English Muslim communities receiving accommodations
indirectly.1027
Williams then gives the corporate bodies a critical voice. He emphasizes that
pushing the state to re-conceive “religious belonging” in a corporate mode expands state
accommodation for intermediate communities so that they can be “critical participa[nts]”
inside “the institutions of the secular state.”1028 For Williams, “communities of faith have
a stake in the decisions of the state and its moral direction.”1029 The state can be held to
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ideals of protecting human dignity and of co-operation without losing the state’s role as
“a proactive transnational sovereign power.”1030 The immediate aim here is a state “that
can be held to account” rather than one that conceives of itself as sacred.1031 And that aim
is for a broader account of politics: the fullness of minority voices is crucial for
understanding the common good. They are accordingly raised up more robustly in
Williams’s framework than one that privileging the choices of autonomous individuals.
Thus, the first step in Williams’s proposal for transforming the state is built on situating
individuality and equality with and within authoritative corporate bodies other than the
state, but still working with the state.1032
Williams’s category of corporate critic is significant for understanding his
agreement and disagreement with Dorrien. When they are looked at from a distance, they
have significant parallels. Dorrien emphasizes minority voices and human dignity. In
order to achieve those ends, his project is about Christianity’s critical participation in
democratic process without giving up on gospel truth that makes Christianity Christian.
He also stresses the importance of “religious pluralism” in particular.1033 He critiques,
accordingly, theological resistance to it such as the social gosplers’ Christianizing and the
various forms of Christian supersessionism.1034
However, crucial points of disagreement between Dorrien and Williams concern
corporate bodies, equality, and state sovereignty. I assume Dorrien wants to hold up the
corporate nature of Christianity since he affirms that the church is a social ethic, since he
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is an Episcopal priest, and since he travels an ecclesial lecture circuit. But his published
work does not develop a corporate account of the church. Nor does Dorrien seek to
expand the state’s juridical accommodation to religious faiths for the individual or the
corporate body. Instead, he aims to publicly realize “the claim of the gospel to religious
truth” in a way that is beholden to the US liberal order’s ideals and its structure.1035
Dorrien’s argument for securing religious pluralism is about it as a “justice issue” that he
frames with the duty of “respect” in the First Amendment.1036 For him, developing the
First Amendment’s protection of respect grounds his resistance to the privatizing
dissolution of Christianity’s corporate nature. But simply asserting freedom of speech
plays into the individualism inherent to the social contract. There is a better way, despite
its limits. The US courts have the category of arbitration to make accommodations to
religious bodies and their laws. This is how law courts in Texas have acknowledged the
importance of Islamic law courts for a Muslim divorce. So Dorrien construes respect only
in the negative. Further, despite being an Episcopal priest, his published work lacks a
robust, constructive, and normative account in his own voice concerning corporate
bodies of faith. That lacuna presumably comes partly from his debt to state sovereignty.
He seeks to secure equality for choice on the basis of the state’s sovereign status quo in
two ways.1037
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First, Dorrien shores up the contemporary nation-state through ensuring equality
in politics and in economics without violating the individualism of political liberalism.
Dorrien’s normative relation between politics and economics is an ethos of democratic
equality. Because of this similarity, they can be mutually informing. On the one hand, he
upholds liberalism’s social contract in order to secure individual equality and to fight
“turbo-capitalism.”1038 On the other hand, economic democracy’s emphasis on equality
helps secure equality in the social contract. However, economic democracy does not
realize intermediate civil associations in the political sphere, just in the economic sphere.
Equality is between individual citizens in democratic politics, while equality is found in
communal forms like unions and co-operatives in democratic economics. So Dorrien
wants to change economics, but he does not extend the communitarianism of his
economics into the structure of democratic politics.1039
Second, although Dorrien does not engage the state qua market-state, he partially
embraces it insofar as he works to secure economic choice for all through and alongside
the state. Under the influence of global capitalism, the nation-state, which exists for “the
welfare of the nation,” is currently transforming into the market-state, whose reason for
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being is “maximiz[ing] the opportunity of its citizens.”1040 In terms of equality and
choice, Dorrien also seeks to secure just such maximization of opportunities in politics
and economics. To these ends, he critiques global capitalism running roughshod over the
local and global capacities of unions and the state’s regulatory power. One instance is the
major banks lobbying for economic autonomy.1041
These constructive and critical arguments put Dorrien against and with the
market-state. On the one hand, he requires aspects of the nation-state’s welfare. He
assumes it in his persuasive argument for the public option of single-payer, universal
health care. Thereby Dorrien also shows his resistance to privatization of the public
commons that occurs in the market-state. On the other hand, Dorrien’s economic
democracy coheres with the state’s acknowledgement of “other institutions” that rise
while the state increasingly centralizes its power in a more narrow way than before.1042
He emphasizes a decentralized, local, and grass-roots movement for establishing
economic democracy, “a third way between the systems of the competitive market and
the state.”1043 But some federal centralization is still important for Dorrien. It not only
secures “environmental protection” and public, universal health care.1044 Economic
democracy also requires social democracy. That is, the state provides some measure of
both “social ownership” and investment in the economy in order to help democratize the
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economy and to ensure choice.1045 Dorrien, then, seeks to maintain much of the welfare
state, but he works critically with key hallmarks of the burgeoning market-state.1046
Both Williams and Dorrien argue for broadening a sense of the “political” beyond
the state.1047 In fact, I understand Williams’s political horizon as the ground for fulfilling
Dorrien’s proclamation, that “we need new forms of community that arise out of but
transcend religious affiliation, culture, and nation.”1048 However, they differ as to how
much they embrace political liberalism. Dorrien is a communitarian through and through
with regard to his economics for equal choice. But in his politics for equal choice, he
implicitly assumes a social contract between equal individuals when he holds that their
equal and individual dignity, “rights,” and “opportunity” are absolutely necessary.1049
This political frame situates a welfare state in which operates the updated social
gospelers’ social creed for the proleptic but partial transforming the soul of society. Even
his emphasis on equal choice in economics, like the social gospelers, indirectly reinforces
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political equality over against those privatizing the commons. Because of his assumption
and project, Dorrien presupposes the permanence of the state’s sovereignty. He calls for
additions to it, but he cannot call for the transformation of it to the same degree that
Williams does. Yet, Dorrien’s communitarianism opens the door for him, in the future, to
follow Williams. Williams emphasizes that a corporate sense of equality should be a
primary component of a “broader vision of what political humanity looks like.”1050 So
what truly differentiates Dorrien and Williams is not so much if one should go through
liberalism in theory and the liberal state in practice. Instead, Williams embraces a broader
sense of the political on the wide terms of society’s complex constitution rather than on
the narrow terms of the state. Williams, then, is less beholden to certain aspects of
liberalism than Dorrien. Thereby Williams is more structurally transformative of the state
than Dorrien is. But Dorrien could move in Williams’s direction if Dorrien’s social
concern for democratic transformation will include state sovereignty itself entirely.1051
V. Williams’s Political Horizon Going Beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas
Hauerwas, Dorrien, and Williams have different answers on how to transform
political life. Hauerwas argues that the truthful, faithful witness of the church
proleptically embodies the eschatological kingdom. That embodied witness is how the
world comes to know itself as the world. Only then can the world be transformed in the
light of Jesus, the truth. Dorrien argues that Christianity’s truthful, faithful work is about
the liberative and spiritual transformation of society’s soul. Christianity is grounded in a
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spiritual center that is deeply concerned about justice for flourishing. Williams argues for
discussion in society in a way that coheres with aspects of both Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s
positions. So Williams’s position could mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien.
Yet there is potential for much more in Williams’s project. His focus on pluralist,
interactive discussion opens our imaginations to a new horizon for state sovereignty. That
is also a new horizon for Hauerwas and Dorrien, which can release their projects from a
dead-end impasse. Williams’s work helps move beyond an impasse about survival within
a political structure to changing the structure’s fundamental nature. So here I further
develop the horizon of Williams’s political vision in relation to Dorrien and Hauerwas.
The implications of Williams’s political work releases the pressure of the state’s current
understanding of its sovereignty that divides and limits both Dorrien and Hauerwas.
I have described some of the horizon’s aspects, but there are more implications in
his pluralist state that round out his vision and establish the new horizon’s potential.
Williams argues for reforming the state’s hegemonic sovereignty that demands private
faith be translated into secular categories in order for it to have a public voice. When his
work is extended to the US theological discussion, he illuminates how it is unnecessarily
fractured by a conflicted response to both the hegemonic sovereignty of the modern
nation-state and the categories of programmatic secularism.
Transformation: Cut Out the Permanence of Privatization and Translation
Chapter one raised Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s complex agreement and
disagreement about the privatization of Christianity and the translation of it into secular
idioms. This is worth returning to now since I have identified the heart of their
disagreement and since it serves as a foil to Williams. Dorrien thinks Hauerwas’s position
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leads to isolation from society; Hauerwas turned the charge back to Dorrien, questioning
Dorrien’s position as leading to isolation from the church. They have since effectively
responded to one another’s positions, although not in direct reference to one another. To
answer Stout’s criticism of isolation, Hauerwas has given accounts of radical democracy
that rest upon practical reasoning and the work of Yoder, Williams, and Sheldon Wolin.
Dorrien, for his part, has called for recovering truth and liberal theology’s spiritual center
in the form of a personalist gospel that once preached well in churches.1052
Yet Hauerwas and Dorrien are still beholden to privatization and translation, their
differences notwithstanding. Hauerwas still focuses on particularity, especially the
particularity of Christianity’s corporate nature, to provide an alternative to the dead-end
of liberalism’s political order. He looks to some like an isolated antagonist withdrawn
into his tribe because the liberal order’s ‘neutral’ public sphere and social contract
undercuts the particularity of Christianity’s corporate embodiment. But in truth, his
refusal to save the liberal order stems from the way he is un-willfully bounded by the
perverting illusions of privatization and translation that he resists wisely on the church’s
terms.
Dorrien is, however, willfully bounded by privatization and translation because of
his pragmatic streak and his sympathy for liberalism. But he also astutely maintains a
critical reserve while he works within the liberal order. He attempts to avoid the pitfalls
of privatization and translation. So he privileges idealism and intellectual intuition. He
emphasizes liberation and social gospel morality. He stresses the importance of love for
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social transformation. He recovers Christianity’s spiritual truth of loving, personal Spirit.
Yet, his own constructive solution for recovering liberal theology’s spiritual center is
only briefly mapped, in part, because of the 2012 presidential election. That kairotic
moment appeared to ‘necessitate’ a conventional response by social ethics: privatized
faith translated as morality into the public sphere. That was the method for Dorrien’s The
Obama Question, although in other ways it was an analytical and explanatory tour de
force. So Hauerwas and Dorrien are prevented from realizing their political surplus by the
categorical boundaries of privatization and translation that they assume are permanent
aspects of the liberal state.1053
In contrast to both Hauerwas and Dorrien, Williams cuts the Gordian knot of
privatization and translation. They are not simply absent in interactive pluralism. They
are replaced with precisely what they repress: the acceptance of authoritative corporate
bodies in public life. Privatization is no longer a tool for an uneasy ‘peace,’ since
corporate groups are recognized as legitimate authorities for members as political
subjects and for public life on the whole. Life together in an interactive pluralist society
depends on mutual recognition by such groups in direct communication with each other
so that their language does not need to be translated into a ‘neutral’ public sphere. Mutual
recognition raises up the fullness of political life in both its complex diversity and mutual
commonality. This fullness allows for multi-faceted co-operation in discussion for the
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common good, instead of orientation to the common good undercut by suppressing
plurality justified on the grounds of Hobbes’s state of nature.1054
Hauerwas finds such a vision attractive, and Dorrien may also at least in part.
Nevertheless, they are still bound to their disagreement over privatization and translation
because of their division over the issue of sovereignty. Dorrien critically appreciates the
triumphs and promise of liberalism’s political order, but Hauerwas sees a thoroughgoing
hegemony. I have shown how Williams holds to both. Like Dorrien, Williams appreciates
and constructively builds upon liberalism, albeit in somewhat different ways than
Dorrien. Like Hauerwas, Williams rejects state hegemony and its mechanisms of
privatization and translation.
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas’s appeals to subsidiarity counter increasing federal
power, but they lack a robust vision or argument for a new political structure to transform
the state’s account of itself. Williams is not so beholden to the immutability of hegemonic
sovereignty and its mechanisms (Dorrien). Nor does Williams’s critical response focus
strictly on constructing an alternative qua ecclesial polis (Hauerwas). Because Williams’s
political imagination does not assume the permanence of the modern state’s hegemonic
sovereignty, he is able to re-conceive it as procedural secularism for interactive pluralism.
Williams opts to transform state sovereignty by subjecting its potestas to a new political
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horizon in which corporate bodies, their particularity, and their authority are essential to
the primacy of mutual recognition and discussion in public life.
This is not impossible idealism as those with Niebuhrian concerns might object.
Very practical means, most visibly through jurisprudence, undergird the realization of
mutual recognition in Williams’s vision of interactive pluralism and the pluralist state. He
shrewdly but without deceit engages in practical reasoning to expand the state’s most
important self-referential categories. Expansion is to such a degree that the state’s
understanding of its mission, categories, and sovereignty are transformed. Such
transformation is in light of other corporate bodies and their authority in order to
approximate more closely to Williams’s pluralist state. In effect, Williams’s practical
theory expands the state’s categories and practices like over-inflating a balloon to the
point that it explodes. But here the analogy breaks down, for explosion might seem like
anarchy. However, the expansion transfigures rather than destroys, because what
Williams focuses on is not confined to the limits of liberal categories.1055
For example, Williams’s argument for expanding the state’s juridical
accommodations to corporate bodies recognizes that faiths, like Islam, have their own
juridical methods of reconciliation, like Shari’a, that are authoritative for their members.
Williams employs the Jewish scholar Ayelet Shachar’s notion of “transformative
accommodation” to describe “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to choose
the jurisdiction under which they will seek to [resolve] certain carefully specified
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matters.”1056 While this is called accommodation, what distinguishes it from the
accommodations by the state today is a process of “mutual” transformation through
relation “without compromising the distinctiveness of the essential elements
of…communal loyalties.”1057 In this new framework, jurisdictions of the state and the
corporate faiths transform each other through “overlapping,” “supplementary”
jurisdictions and work to keep from falling back into a monopolistic system of
jurisprudence.1058 Jurisdictions undergo at least a partial leveling, where religious
authorities do not merely fit into a simple category delineated by the state. In the latter is
the tired category of the state policing relationships themselves. But rather than through
the filter of the state and its language, multiple jurisdictions reflect a web of powers with
each distinctive node in direct dialogue with others.1059
There is an important feminist critique put to Williams here. He acknowledges
that such a system will not be without tension or even conflict, and so he attempts to be
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particularly sensitive to the plight of women.1060 However, some see conflict as indicating
failure and Williams’s vision as regression. More sympathetic critics, such as the Muslim
scholar Samia Bano, ask why Williams’s vision is any better or necessary in terms of
opening space for Shari’a courts. Bano raised important issues concerning women that
need to be further addressed. But she also answered her own question. In the fearful,
ignorant, and arrogant responses to Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture,’ Bano notes the
continued ghettoization and marginalization of Muslim women as unenlightened
Muslims. So very necessary is Williams’s fundamental point which Bano admires: to
open complex space in order to negotiate, rather than suppress, the conflict between
diverse peoples in their communities for the common good. In doing so, as Shachar
notes, jurisprudence is transformed, and accordingly the state’s sovereignty. In
Williams’s terms, the state begins to open the door to first-level associations when the
state opens up to the corporate reality of faith. This shift changes the state from
overriding the associations with the social contract’s individualism that creates
ghettoization and marginalization.1061
Situating Dorrien and Hauerwas in Williams’s Complex Space
Williams’s horizon goes beyond Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s in a way that calls
Dorrien and Hauerwas to greater attention to aspects of the other’s project while
eliminating some of the major reservations they have about each other.
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Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity and witness need not be understood as
isolation if political equality is reconfigured in light of corporate bodies. Williams’s
understanding of mutual recognition and in particular communal language actually
expands the category of equality to include corporate bodies in the political ‘sphere.’ This
expansion-inclusion opens the potential of liberalism’s stress on creative discussion to
allow for all aspects of life, including first-level associations, to participate in public life.
Williams’s incorporation of corporate bodies in politics also opens up new paths
for contemporary liberal theology. Liberal theology conceived anew would not cease to
exist for Dorrien as a mediating theology. In fact, mediation is all the more important in
Williams’s pluralist state. However, contemporary liberal theology would undergo
significant change in its basic assumptions of privatization and translation, which are
present even in Dorrien’s emphasis on morality. For Williams, mediation is about
discussion directly between particularities (e.g., scriptural reasoning) occurring in the
political ‘sphere,’ rather than mediation including translation into an abstract, third
language qua morality. The challenge for liberal theology’s hybridity is the need to
reckon better with conflicting distinctiveness and incommensurable truth/revelation
claims between communities. In doing so, liberal theology could then reclaim the
distinctiveness of the Christian truth that Dorrien affirms and that Hauerwas emphasizes.
Williams’s stress on living as participating in multiple communities might even
invigorate Dorrien’s hybridity and dialectical recognition of truth in liberal theology.
Once the first-level associations are recognized as important voices for the
common good of society, they can then be critical and co-operative participants in
politics without the trappings of Constantinianism. Williams argues for the recognition of
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first-level associations for three reasons. First, “politics is too important to leave to
politicians.”1062 Second, the converse, “politicians are too important to leave to
politics.”1063 Third, the recognition of corporate bodies is a necessary step for the
particularity of Christianity’s corporate witness to get a receptive hearing as a participant.
Hauerwas assumes the corporate nature of Christian witness and its importance for
politics. But there were problems even in his explicit but brief flirtation with Christian
witness aimed at transforming the practical aspects of the state’s disciplinary justice. He
does not sufficiently indicate how he thinks Christianity’s corporate body can be
recognized by state authorities. Nor does he develop how the church’s specific practices
can be “imitated” by the state authorities.1064
By contrast, Williams’s emphasis on corporate bodies could be quite helpful in, as
Hauerwas desires, reforming prisons away from their practices that create “social
alienation” and steer them toward communion.1065 That transformative vision is not
unlike Dorrien’s social gospel sense of transformation. But leveraging Williams towards
such ends cannot be set in the same frame as the social gospelers and R. Niebuhr. Unlike
them, Williams’s work is in the context of transforming the state in a democratic but nonConstantinian fashion.
I argued above that Williams’s transformative vision not only lacks the hallmarks
of Constantinianism, but it also emphasizes Christianity’s distinctive particularity that
modern, liberal Constantinianism suppresses. Christianity’s corporate nature is important
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for both its nonviolent politics of reconciliation and its role as critical witness to the state
rather than its handmaiden. Williams can maintain these while working towards political
transformation because his theopolitics are about having a developing argument with the
world. I will develop this ground in the final conclusion within a constructive criticism of
Hauerwas.
VI. Conclusion
Williams goes beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas because he establishes a new
political horizon, the transformation of the hegemonic state into a pluralist state for
supporting a robust, interactive pluralism. I argued that Williams maintains much of the
political surplus in Dorrien and Hauerwas. But I also contrasted William’s vision with
elements in Dorrien and Hauerwas in order to show that Williams opens up a new
understanding of political sovereignty, in a way that resists the contemporary framework
which both divides and limits Dorrien and Hauerwas. What results is a space for fresh
discussion in US theology and social ethics. By virtue of Williams’s horizon going
beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas, they can be freed from a conflictual discussion driven by
the categories of privatization and translation. Williams’s new vision, and his work to
realize it, can re-invigorate the discussion. Dorrien and Hauerwas can see each other’s
projects in a new light, specifically by re-thinking transformation and the distinctive
particularity of Christianity’s corporate body. But to do so requires considering how
Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics can stimulate development in Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s projects.
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CONCLUSION
Chapter four loosened the grip of problematic political assumptions and began to
chart a direction away from the social justice-faithfulness discontent. Support for these
changes and continuing development requires an engagement with deeper theological
issues. So by way of conclusion, I suggest that Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics of love
and gift in mutuality and plenitude provides a way to reconsider aspects of Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s projects. I will briefly address the issue of Trinity and plenitude in Dorrien’s
project, but I will focus on the church-world issue in Hauerwas’s project. Such
reconsideration is not a closure, as if Dorrien or Hauerwas should simply adopt
Williams’s position. Instead, reconsideration is about an encounter with Williams that
makes possible a fresh discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, or at
least those indebted to them.
I. The Ground of a Different Theopolitical Horizon: Trinitarian Gift and Love
Political liberalism’s attempt to create peace by autonomy, Williams argues,
ironically assumed a logic of violence. Self-determining became self-ownership in need
of security, which is tantamount to anti-gift. Supporting ownership and security gave rise
to a Hobbesian “law and lawlessness” dichotomy instead of a gift-economy and the
common good.1066 So Williams rejects holding tightly to oneself. Rather, God unites
human freedom with human dependence by, in Jesus and his church, calling one to
receive the difference of the other as a gift and to reciprocate in kind with gift. Out of this
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dynamic not only “emerge[s]…selfhood.”1067 Not only constitutive to the subject,
maturation, and peace are recognition, gift, and reciprocity mediated through a storied,
traditioned community. But also, for Williams, human flourishing implies a “deeper level
of agency or liberty.”1068
Later I will address Williams’s understanding of human agency. Here the issue is
how divine sovereignty itself is “a deeper level of agency or liberty.” Since divine
sovereignty is rooted in “the nature of God” who is triune, Williams maintains that the
Trinity is “of cardinal importance.”1069 Williams’s political vision is grounded in divine
sovereignty in terms of the triune economy of love, gift, mutuality, dispossession, and
freedom. But here I will only explicitly focus on divine sovereignty as trinitarian
difference-in-mutuality in terms of love and gift.1070
The Hegelianism of Williams’s account of mutual recognition is critically
appropriated in light of a more significant, theological truth: the Trinity is the root of
mutual recognition. Hegel circumvents his own account of difference-in-relation because,
according to Williams, Hegel does not abide difference in the end. By contrast, the
Trinity is a unity that spans all gaps of its internal differences while still maintaining
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difference. With Hans Urs von Balthasar, Williams describes the “positive otherness” of
the triune persons as relating in the “mutual sharing” of dispossessive “self-giving.”1071
One important implication of this relation is that “differences matter.”1072 But difference
is not sheer difference, but “unity-in-difference.”1073 Differences can be maintained in
unity because difference-in-relation is ordered by the fusion of love and gift.1074
For Williams, constitutive to difference is an open orientation toward the other,
much like Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s descriptions of love. Because this orientation of
love is in effect mutual recognition––or “mutually constitutive presence” in Williams’s
words to emphasize analogy more strongly––love constitutes triune difference and its
“positive distance.”1075 But love is more than orientation. From the orientation to another,
Williams articulates an outward going and relational understanding of love that is
common to Aquinas, Hegel, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Love is ecstatic affection
(“ecstasis”), which drives one to reach out to the other for a mutual indwelling (mutua
inhaesio or “reciprocal inhaesio”).1076 But ecstasy and mutual indwelling is also another
way of expressing kenotic, mutual “self-giving” in the Trinity that “grow[s]” in
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plenitude.1077 The Trinity’s internal kenotic self-giving is gift-giving that establishes and
affirms difference. This may appear to create a dueling articulation of God’s work as love
or gift. Or it may suggest that one precedes the other in the trinitarian life and God’s
interaction with humanity “because our speech is temporal.”1078 Either way, Dorrien
emphasizes love and Hauerwas privileges gift. But Williams simultaneously upholds love
and gift to the point that they converge like “a Moebius strip” in the intra-trinitarian life
because of its relational economy.1079 The openness of God’s love is a gift, and God’s
openness makes difference a gift. Similarly, the mutual indwelling of the triune persons is
achieved in ecstatic affection and self-gift.1080
On an initial glance, this convergence of love and gift may appear less than
helpful for engaging Dorrien and Hauerwas. After all, I went to lengths in chapter two to
show that Dorrien and Hauerwas are more complex than only love or grace respectively.
The issue is which one is privileged. This may simply reflect that, as Williams notes,
human analogy fails to fully grasp, in any concrete sense, this love-gift convergence in
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the intra-trinitarian life. So Williams’s convergence of love and gift may simply appear to
one as more of a rhetorical than substantive contrast to either Dorrien or Hauerwas.1081
But rhetoric matters; in Hauerwas’s parlance, “words matter.”1082 For Dorrien’s
idealism, words signify, no matter how incompletely, what truth undergirds and thereby
orients one’s thought within the Whole. So he privileges love’s openness in humanity’s
existence of interrelation, but he largely lacks gift and its dynamism in his normative
accounts. For Hauerwas’s Wittgensteinian position, words shape the person. So
Hauerwas subsumes love under gift: humanity’s existence is contingent on receiving and
responding to one another and to divine gift. Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree, then, about
what determines reality. This disagreement undergirds their difference on church and
world. In contrast, Williams’s convergence of love and gift in the trinitarian life is
maintained throughout his work. Of utmost importance for Williams is that the triune
establishment of and openness to difference are ecstatic self-gifts to humanity for
continually opening humanity to “flourishing” in God’s ever expanding economy.1083
Dorrien and Hauerwas would affirm much of that statement in different ways, but
Williams can simultaneously overlap with both of their respective emphases on love and
gift. The triune relations of love-gift in the mutuality of “positive otherness” characterize
both the difference between God and humanity and therein how God relates to
humanity.1084 As Williams writes: “God desires us [creatures], as if we were God, as if
we were that unconditional response to God’s giving that God’s self makes in the life of
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the Trinity. We are created so that we may be caught up in this, so that we may grow into
the whole hearted love of God by learning that God loves us as God loves God.”1085 In
other words, from the particularity of God pro nobis, Williams focuses on the relations of
God in se in such a way that the internal relations in mutuality are God’s sovereignty.
This account of divine sovereignty marks Williams’s difference from Dorrien and, to a
lesser extent, Hauerwas. With Williams, the Trinity’s fruitful, loving, and giving internal
relations are God’s sovereignty.
For instance, recall from chapter two that Dorrien’s apophaticism has difficulty
giving a trinitarian account of God in se, which has been supplanted with an account of
personal Spirit. Yet for Williams, the triune relations are the source of plenitude and,
thereby, the source of not only creation’s existence but also William’s apophaticism.
Humanity cannot full plumb the depth of the triune life. However, humanity comes to
know both this and its dependence by God’s pro nobis invitation to and humanity’s
responsive, developmental participation in the triune economy. The reason why
dependence and development are linked is partly because, for Williams, humanity is the
image of God’s “divine liberty…always exercised in mutual love and creative selfbestowal” (love-gift).1086 In other words, following Eastern Orthodox theologians,
Williams maintains that the imago Dei is the imago trinitatis. The imago trinitatis is, for
him, a cataphatic emphasis on relations within a larger apophatic turn. Human relations
are predicated on and analogous in terms of agency to the intra-trinitarian life of creative
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plenitude and “unity-in-difference,” not correlations between God and humanity like the
analogia entis or the incarnation as the model for human relations.1087 The imago
trinitatis effectively establishes the trinitarian economy as the ground for human agency
from which stems human development in human history within God’s plenitude.1088
Such a framework can critically develop, among other issues, Dorrien’s
personalist assumptions about human freedom, his concerns for interfaith dialogue, and
his advancements in economic democracy. For instance, although Dorrien has a far more
detailed account of a political economy than Williams, Williams’s account is shaped by
divine plenitude and gift whereas Dorrien does not. But I will leave such critical
development for another time. Instead, I will show here how Williams’s framework can
critically develop Hauerwas’s position on one specific issue in the disagreement between
him and Dorrien.1089
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II. Toward a Theological Account for a
Developing Relation between Church and World
Recall from chapter one that Hauerwas applies the term “the world” to Christians
in terms of disobedience (agency), but he also separates the church and world in terms of
their traditioned communities. Sometimes he even equivocates between world and
creation: the “world” can refer to the planet Earth, one’s social context as it is and as
deceptive, etc.1090 Despite these problems with clarity and consistency, I established that
Hauerwas’s work is primarily concerned about ecclesial witness to the human creatures
and their traditioned communities who do not know or who reject God. So my use of the
term “world” below reflects that emphasis in light of Hauerwas’s equivocation. The test
is how the church’s reciprocity with the rest of creation can turn enemy-creatures into
friend-creatures. Here I am concerned with part of that change, the turning of enemies
into neighbors. How can the church, as made up of God’s human creatures attempting to
be faithful to God’s invitation, on the church’s terms understand and enter into a
developing argument with the world, as made up of God’s human creatures who do not
know or who reject God?
I am not convinced by Dorrien’s 2009 description of his 1995 claim: that the
problem here is Hauerwas’s “sharp dichotomy” between the church and world.1091
Difference matters, especially on the issue of human violence and Christian pacifism.
Rather, Hauerwas has not given a sufficient theological account for a maturing
relationship, through response back and forth, between church and world after the world
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responds positively but partially to ecclesial witness. Hauerwas’s difficulty here, I will
argue, results from a two-tiered problem that undergirds Christian and non-Christian
difference and, in turn, that governs their relation. The first tier is Hauerwas’s accounts of
witness and friendship are categorically separated. Hauerwas attempts to overcome that
separation through practical reasoning, but it alone is insufficient for a theological
account of a developing relation between the church and world. The second tier regards
Hauerwas’s account of gift, that produces the obedient and not-obedient dichotomy
undergirding the categorical separation of witness and friendship. However, there is no
theological support for practical reasoning that can address the obedient and not-obedient
dichotomy. The sectarian withdrawal critiques levied at Hauerwas are not only wrong,
they are superficial misdiagnoses. They do not account for the tiers and the problems
therein. Nor do the criticisms, even Dorrien’s isolationist charge, offer a sufficiently
trinitarian solution for human beings as relational creatures. However, Williams’s
theological framework does through reciprocal trinitarian love-gift in abundance. The
imago trinitatis in creation supplies the necessary ground for how the church can be
appropriately open to the world and, in turn, how the church can have a developing
argument with the world.
Tier One: Friendship, Witness, and Practical Reasoning
For Hauerwas, ecclesial witness is revelation to the world. Witness makes
Christian truth intelligible by the particular embodiment of it in relations and in practical
reasoning, not by translating truth into claims of autonomous, abstract rationality.
Witness as such is the gift of representing God to the world, as according to Hauerwas’s
co-creator and representation dichotomy. Christian witness on Christian terms is the
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grounds for discussion rather than closes discussion, since Hauerwas grants “that the
world can respond to the distinctive character of Christian witness.”1092 However, the
proclamation of truth in word and deed has a narrow understanding of reciprocity for
those inside and outside the church. Witness is primarily about ecclesial faithfulness, not
for the sake of discussion with the world alone. Perhaps Hauerwas’s most explicit note
about the world’s reciprocity and its affect on the church is in Resident Aliens: “Now, one
of the problems with witness is that people hear it. Then they tell it back to you, and you
think, is that what I said? But the gospel is not the Gospel until it’s been received. That
often times works as a judgment on our lives.”1093 So Hauerwas understands the good
news as gift, and reciprocity is constitutive of it. But his articulation of ecclesial witness
is largely unidirectional and critical: to “identify the world as the world” exposes the
falsity of the world’s claim to autonomy.1094 In a rare occurrence, Hauerwas briefly
acknowledges that the world’s response to ecclesial witness can “create an
epistemological crisis within Christianity.”1095 But even granting that acknowledgment, a
question still remains. If representative witness is revelatory, then what about a
reciprocity that allows for development in the world that is not immediately
conversion?1096
Friendship is the gift of mutual care (love) that enables virtuous development. So
intra-human friendship might be the answer since witness and friendship are intertwined
for Hauerwas. Witness constitutes patient friendship, and witness is the result of
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friendship. But the church can only witness for friendship, because witness from
friendship only makes sense in the church. So witness and friendship are categorically
separated: witness is how the church relates to the world; friendship is how the church
relates internally. This separation stems from Hauerwas’s normative privileging of
ecclesial friendship as obedient response to a given, particular Christological command.
That account places friendship within loyalty to an ecclesiological frame. So in the
context of communities with different historical traditions, Hauerwas holds that “the
church is never a friend to the world,” which is “an enemy.”1097 Conversely, to be
“friends with the world” makes Christians “enemies of God and one another.”1098 But
such polemical frankness should not obscure that Hauerwas qualifies his rejection of
ecclesial friendship with the world in two ways.1099
First, he qualifies ‘the world.’ He notes that often “what we are wont to call ‘the
world’ [are] strangers who speak to us as friends.”1100 Elsewhere Hauerwas asserts that
“our commitment to the church finds expression through the necessity of friendship
beyond the church.”1101 While these qualifications show that the world as a concept is
more fluid than his rhetoric indicates, the qualifications are perhaps further equivocation.
Hauerwas leaves “the world” rather vague as a concept. Nor does he explain how
Christians can have friendship with strangers in relation to their different loyalties, even
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though the most important distinction between both Christians and strangers for
Hauerwas is their different loyalties.1102
Second, answers to both criticisms are found in the performance of Hauerwas’s
actual friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ The irony of Hauerwas’s explicit development
on radical democracy is that it was stimulated not by the criticisms of Christians––like
those of, as Dorrien narrates, his and Albrecht’s––that “rolled off Hauerwas for
years.”1103 Rather, it was the similar critique by Jeffrey Stout, the non-Christian and
friend of Hauerwas. Part of Hauerwas’s response was Christianity, Democracy, and the
Radical Ordinary, a co-written book of correspondence with his friend and former
colleague at Duke, Romand Coles, who is not a Christian. How can these friendships
with non-Christians be explained?
On the one hand, Hauerwas’s relating to the ‘secular world’ indicates a more
constructive understanding of the world than I have used the term for Hauerwas.
Insomuch as the term ‘the world’ simply names that in which human beings live, the
world as a concept is vague. The vagueness is because the world as such depends on
humanity existing in local, particular relations through which one reasons to act. The
world-as-particular-relations indicates that practical reasoning in discussion is operative
for Christian friendship with the ‘secular world,’ which has a different agency than the
church. On the other hand, Hauerwas is a friend through his “constancy”––similar to
patience and courage––embodying Jesus “across and through…many different loyalties
and actions.”1104 “Constancy” implies that witness is a perennial undercurrent at the very
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least. Therefore, to the question “How to have a developing argument with the world?,”
Hauerwas answers by eschewing abstract theory while upholding practical reason and
witness.1105 Christian worship, for Hauerwas, shows Christians their contingency as
creatures and ultimately their vulnerability to all in the manner of Jesus’s nonviolence.
Hauerwas performs this sort of vulnerability in his dialogue with Stout and Coles. To
give Hauerwas’s performance more weight, his discussions with Stout and Coles are
doing what Williams understands as negotiation for the common good.1106
So Hauerwas complicates an easy separation of witness and friendship through
his account of practical reason. Yet the latter is insufficient for a full theological account
of a developing relation between the church and world, for practical reason does not give
a developed account to answer the question, what about dynamic growth in the churchworld relation? I value performance as describing growth in friendship with a worldly
stranger; however, such performance still requires an interpretative account. Hauerwas
has given illuminating interpretation before in his narrative work. But a similar
interpretation of friendship with worldly ‘strangers’ is also necessary for the churchworld relation. Too often appeals to practical reason over against ‘theory’ give the
appearance of an alchemic bridge between points A and C, as unclear as C may be. That
is a pyrrhic victory since we are left with little imaginative vision about what to do next
in the mutual development (maturation) of friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ Towards a
next step, Hauerwas raises resources like the university for practical reasoning, and he
employs Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre for support on the university and practical
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reasoning, respectively. As important as cultivating a place for discussion is, this is in
continuity with Hauerwas’s normal tendencies. He focuses on witness for setting the
ground of discussion. Yet, he largely eschews giving a robust account of how to develop
the discussion other than his own aporetic practice of engaging the world. The latter is
still often in the primary frame of witness.1107
Practical reason alone is also theologically insufficient to link friendship and
witness. If there is no theological account, the door has been implicitly opened to liberal
theology’s primacy of experience and reason. Hauerwas’s response, witness and practical
reasoning (or practical “wisdom”), both guards against liberalism and repeats the witnessfriend problem.1108 But the framework of friendship within witness encourages the
appearance that Hauerwas holds to what Williams rejects: a theology that opts out of
“nature by treating ‘God’ as a successful rival for our attention.”1109 That is not true of
Hauerwas at his best, but there is some resonance since there is a deeper, theological
lacuna. Hauerwas lacks specific aspects necessary for a robust theological account of
how the church can have a developing argument with the world when it responds
positively but partially.1110
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Tier Two: Insufficient Theological Ground for
a Developing Church-World Relation
The deeper, second tier is that Hauerwas’s position needs a better theological
account to relate friendship and witness within the church-world relation. Gift might be
the way to address the link between friendship and witness since gift undergirds both. As
chapter two also showed, Hauerwas has, with some debt to Williams, a theology of
particular grace that plays a significant role in holding together Hauerwas’s constructive
work from God’s sovereignty to human creaturehood to human agency (friendship).
Further, within the context of reflecting on the elderly, the poor, the disabled, and
L’Arche, Hauerwas maintains that gift undergirds mutual recognition, love, and
friendship. But to the detriment of his understanding of grace and his categories of
friendship and witness, he has not sufficiently taken account of Williams’s full sense of
mutual recognition in theological terms.1111
Gift is the ground for humanity’s contingency, both in the asymmetry of the Godhuman relation and in the mutuality of intra-human relations. Yet Hauerwas extends the
command-obedience framework from the asymmetry of the God-human relation to
negatively impact the mutuality of intra-human relationships. The creator-creation
relation in non-mutuality frames humanity’s positive response as obedient, representative
witness. When that account is applied to ecclesiology and other traditioned communities,
the church’s obedient witness is set over-against the world’s disobedience to given
command. But that framework overlooks too much the extent of relational mutuality, on
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a theological basis, between human creatures as applied to the church and world relation.
Recall the categories of friendship and witness. Openness and mutuality are vital to
Hauerwas’s understanding of friendship. However, openness and mutuality are also
theologically underdeveloped in his account of the church-world relation because
obedience to gift undergirds ecclesial witness and creaturely existence.1112
Hauerwas’s concept of stranger, if derived from Mosaic law and so a theological
category, is not so helpful here as it might seem. His description of it is more
underdeveloped and equivocated than his account of the world. What is a human stranger
if she or he is a creature but not defined as either obedient to covenant-loyalty to God or
disobedient to their creaturely status ordained by God? Hauerwas’s answer employs the
ancient Greeks: “Strangers were those people who did not necessarily share your stories,
but who seemed capable of hearing your stories and appreciating them with
understanding.”1113 That answer shows an openness to mutual recognition; however, the
framework is nothing but sheer openness to potentiality. Strangers can be Christians and
non-Christians. The reason why someone is a stranger is simply that she or he is not close
relationally speaking and/or that she or he is not part of the immediate community
(assuming something in common). But that account of stranger is not truly a third
category between the dichotomy of obedient and not-obedient human creatures. Rather,
the concept of stranger is a product of practical reason that qualifies the dichotomy.
Strangers can be those who have yet to be recognized as obedient and not-obedient.
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Strangers can be those who are already recognized to exist but are either relationally
unknown Christians or not-obedient (non-covenantal loyalty) people who can be allies
with Christians. That description of strangers is too expansive to be the same as the
stranger as a theological category when transposed to Jews as covenanted and non-Jews
as strangers to each other in the covenant of the Mosaic law. Even when Hauerwas’s
focus on the non-Christian stranger parallels that Mosaic dichotomy, he employs practical
reason to solve a categorical, theological bind concerning reciprocity.1114
Coles also sees the problem of mutual reciprocity. He challenges Hauerwas to
take further account of gift and reciprocity between church and world, because doing so
would more positively develop Hauerwas’s understanding of witness. What gives weight
to Coles’s point is that he makes it in light of not only Jean Vanier and L’Arche, but also
Williams, who “calls Christians to the experience of being foot-washed by
‘unbelievers.’”1115 The need for further development is, I think, correct. At the same time
that D. Stephen Long defends Hauerwas, Long also echoes Nigel Biggar’s now partially
dated challenge to Hauerwas. He assumes God but actually writes little about God in
published work. A result of that was little theological exploration to ground theopolitical
avenues in addition to what Hauerwas has developed. For all of Hauerwas’s reliance on
gift and his narrowing of it for the church-world relation, Hauerwas’s account of a
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theology of gift itself is ironically underdeveloped. The point of his work is more about
developing the theopolitical implication of gift rather than, he once admitted, developing
a theology of gift itself. In Hauerwas’s terms, he refuses to separate theology and
practice. But despite even Hauerwas’s practice of dialogue, he has not articulated a
theological way of thinking about friendship and the economy of grace to sufficiently
account for his own practice of developing reciprocity between church and world.
Consequently, Hauerwas lacks crucial elements necessary for his and Williams’s
accounts of deliberative democracy.1116
So the issue here is the development of certain unfulfilled theopolitical
trajectories in light of a more robust trinitarian account begun with Hauerwas’s work on
the Holy Spirit. But the development of gift cannot be achieved by supercharging it on its
own. This would either fail to extricate the primacy of the command-obedience
framework or would expand grace such that it becomes little more than the sheer
openness of generalized love, eliminating particularity and difference. Coles overlooks
crucial theological similarities between Williams and Hauerwas because, as Cavanaugh
points out, Coles questionably construes Williams’s apophatic openness in order to
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extended in a more positive mode. Of course, that does not mean ignoring critique, a sharp no to sin––to violence.

332

challenge Hauerwas. Coles also glosses over: Williams’s stress on the importance of the
church as a corporate body built on the particularity of Jesus; Williams’s emphasis on the
necessity of Christian faithfulness in order to be witnesses; and Williams’s affirmation of,
like Hauerwas, the church-world distinction rooted in divine sovereignty. Further, to
follow Coles here would ask Hauerwas to simply be more like Dorrien since Coles
privileges the solidarity of love to construe receptivity but underplays gift like Dorrien.
So I am not repeating Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas on the church-world distinction.1117
Rather, Hauerwas needs a theologically developed account of the church-world
relation in light of a more coherent trinitarian framework that connects love-gift in
abundance and mutuality to intra-human relations. Even though he does not explicitly
connect the imago Dei to the imago trinitatis, he has linked the imago Dei to “imago
Christi” within an implied trinitarian frame.1118 A couple years later he noted not only the
importance of that trinitarian account, but also that he had insufficiently developed it. The
latter is still the case, especially concerning the church-world relation. More recently
Hauerwas has written that “what is required is a theological account of language in which
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the human being as a linguistic creature participates in the very life of the Logos, the
Word, that is, Trinity.”1119 Indeed, the trinitarian frame needs further development, even
if Hauerwas may not be initially interested in doing so in terms of the imago trinitatis.
Williams has achieved just such a development and extended it to the church-world
relation. His trinitarian fusion of love and gift in mutuality and abundance undergirds
mutual recognition and negotiation. This unified love-gift expands grace based on
theological particularity, the Trinity’s kenotic mutuality in love-gift. That particularity
frames humanity’s and Jesus’s obedience not as command-obedience but as open (or
attentive) and ecstatic self-gift in the mutual sharing of and the mutual dwelling within
one another. Through this account of reality, Williams gives a more adequately robust
account of creation to sustain Hauerwas’s practice.1120
Williams’s Theopolitics of Gift-Negotiation in Openness and Mutuality
Williams argues that, in intra-human relations, the gift economy by itself “fails to
be a politics at all.”1121 Instead, politics is constituted by gift combined with negotiation.
The church’s joining of gift and negotiation marks its internal relations and, in turn, its
relation to the world. Out of divine freedom, the church and creation on the whole are
given the “liberty” and the time for the “‘negotiation’ of needs, the patterns of giving and
receiving, speaking and hearing––stripped of violence-inducing anxiety.”1122 Accordingly
Williams goes beyond Hauerwas’s positive construal of the world’s response almost
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always in terms of clarifying the church’s witness. Williams stresses that the Holy Spirit
pushes the church into asking questions of both the church and the world for continuous
dialogue within the church and between the church and world. This question-driven
dialogue is how the Holy Spirit keeps the church open for creative growth internal and
external to itself.1123
Williams’s openness to externality and negotiation is undergirded by his
trinitarian account. The mutual trinitarian relations, the “necessary and irreducible
reciprocity between Logos and Spirit,” ground the “model of relation between Christ and
his body.”1124 That model, in turn, is the ground for a critical mutuality between church
and world. Williams argues that Christianity’s “commitment undertaken in baptism” is to
proclaim “that the Word of God is sovereign,” and to identify with that through
embodying Jesus’s life in the body of Christ.1125 This account of Christianity’s
distinctiveness in a Christological and trinitarian frame grounds “resistance” to what
Williams would come to call programmatic secularism.1126 Yet the church’s
“Christological and trinitarian focus” means that “the purpose of [baptismal] commitment
is” not only the self-gift of witness, but also the gift of love that emphasizes the other’s
voice and receives it in active listening.1127 This Christian subjectivity makes possible
“the free identification of the believer with the world.”1128 The political form of witness,
dialogue, and identification is Williams’s political vision of interactive pluralism and a
pluralist state. That vision works to create openness to mutuality in order to allow for the

1123

Williams, LI, 70-71; Williams, OCT, 73; Williams, OCT, 123-124, 144-145, 173-180.
Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 288; Williams, “Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness,” 28.
Williams, “Being a People,” 214, 216. See also ibid., 209-210; Williams, OCT, 230-233.
1126
Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 233.
1127
Williams, “Being a People,” 216, 221. See also ibid, 210-211.
1128
Ibid., 217.

1124

1125

335

mutuality in interfaith dialogue to be constitutive to public life. The openness to
mutuality in politics and in interfaith dialogue is an important first step for the church to
have a developing relation, even friendship, with the world. All these are based
theologically on the inherent openness in the triune relations for embracing the other.1129
Williams’s construal of mutuality also indicates presuppositions about the world.
It is open to the church, the world develops in negotiation, and the world’s openness and
negotiation are grounded in the triune relations, even though the world may reject the
triune God. The world’s openness can be described as “commitments need imaginative
testing” through negotiation, or “responsive testing,” since that is a method applicable to
atheist and Christian alike.1130 This method is, for Williams, about human development in
mutuality, not either side developing in itself where mutual interaction has only been
construed in terms of witness to the other. Development in mutuality, for goals like the
common good, marks a partial maturation of the world before any strict conversion
moment.1131
The maturing relation between the church and world is grounded by the answer to
a question, what is the theological basis for mutual development on the part of the world?
Like Hauerwas, Williams affirms Jesus’s particularity and the church-world distinction in
terms of identity and agency. But at the same time, Williams’s triune fusion of gift and
love in abundance marking all of creation allows for a partial overlap of the church and
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world in terms of agency. So in contrast to Hauerwas, Williams can maintain the
similarity and distinction between the church’s and world’s agencies. How Williams can
do so is critical. He holds that human agency is in the image of the triune relations.
Hauerwas need not fear this ‘natural theology’ about human agency. Eastern Orthodoxy
and Williams develop the imago trinitatis in an ecclesial-liturgical frame, rather than
focus mostly on mental faculties or appealed to some generalized abstract content.
However, here I will focus on the imago trinitatis as a theology of creation itself for
discussion.1132
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The Imago Trinitatis for Discussion with the World
Creation is constituted by its internal mutual relations reflecting the Trinity’s
creative economy of love-gift. Although the creator’s love is a vital theological ground
for human value, Williams maintains that everyone should be recognized as “not merely
bound to a common divine Master.”1133 Analogically similar to the triune economy of
God in se, every human being is “bound in a relation of mutuality according to which
each becomes the bearer of necessary gifts to the other.”1134 This “universal,” “mutual
recognition” and reciprocity is the way love’s openness to the other’s difference is
manifested socially.1135 Love’s mutual indwelling produces “a shared social world” for
the common good.1136 From this framework follows a political implication. Mutual
recognition and reciprocity of love-gift recognize “non-negotiable[s],” like human dignity
and equality, which are necessary to negotiate liberating discussion even with those who
may not seem “naturally loveable persons.”1137 Oppressive master-slave relations are
undercut by the notions that all human beings are “‘unique and irreplaceable’” and that
their inherent value is shared in the other.1138 Human creatures are in this together and
“responsible” for one another, even if one affirms a church-world distinction.1139 It is a
sin not to receive the whole of humanity as a gift.1140
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Human creatures’ participation in the openness and mutuality of trinitarian selfgiving includes receiving concrete human bodies. Williams’s arguments for mutual
recognition and human rights is rooted in the fact that material bodies are “a system of
communication” that “will always be carrying meanings or messages that are inalienably
[their] own.”1141 Communication is not reducible to speech or even “self-awareness”
since it does disservice to children or those with “mental disabilities.”1142 Rather, human
bodies are communicative simply by existing, and that is “realize[d]” through the
reception of another’s bodily communication.1143 Accordingly, attentiveness to
embodiment as communicating with the other is vital for humanity to develop together
and to resist silencing by physical abuse, even murder, by dominating institutions such as
slavery. In other words, giving oneself is always an act of vulnerability, and it calls for
similar vulnerability in the one who receives and returns it. That mutual vulnerability is
made possible because Williams frames the other’s body as ultimately a divine gift to be
received.1144
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Humanity can continue to dialogue together in love-gift because the
inexhaustibility of triune plenitude is the ground for dialogical exploration, and in turn,
for maturation. For one “to enter into conversation is always to be…at risk” of being
“misheard or consciously distorted.”1145 Feminist theology has rightly raised critical
concerns about self-gift used to justify coercing women into a vulnerable position of
passive and one-sided self-sacrifice. Williams implicitly addresses such concerns by
specifically noting that in self-giving there is a “capacity for confrontation,” which he
later repeats as “mutual answerability” in the context of Sophia.1146 Williams can allow
for vulnerable and confrontational self-gift because of plenitude. It includes not only the
gift of the other. Plenitude is also the “time and space” necessary to recognize the
“misrecognition” and overcome it in dialogue for development.1147 So triune
superabundance does not close history or suffocate human agency. Rather, “human
liberty posits a space for an ‘excess of being’…a background of depth and surplus in
reality itself which holds and makes sense of all these dialogical processes.”1148 As with
the triune relations, human relations have some measure of creativity in reciprocal speech
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to other human beings. That creativity is dependent on the mutually contingent
recognition of the other and intelligible dialogue with each other.1149
The imago trinitatis, then, underwrites Williams’s account of dialogue between
traditions for discovering the common good within one’s community. Human beings
develop through dialogue, the mutual and continual exploration of each other within
abundance. The theopolitics of relation-in-plenitude reflects the pattern of the triune
economy because the theopolitics stems from the triune God’s pro nobis universal
invitation––or open gift/given openness––and in se relations.
Since Hauerwas lacks a developed theological account like the imago trinitatis
that supports Christians’ dialogue with the world, his overly narrow theological
understanding of human agency in response to divine sovereignty privileges obedient
witness in a way that hinders a developing reciprocity between the church and world.
Williams’s better, internally coherent theological account of dialogue with the world
serves Hauerwas’s aims in a context responds partially but positively to witness. Witness
is indeed crucial for Christian participation in deliberative democracy. However, we need
a larger account of negotiation in a deliberative democracy than witness in practical
circumstances. Williams helps supply the ground for just such an account from
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Christianity’s particular understanding rather than from an appeal to an abstractly
theoretical or ideological external standard.
However, the value of Williams’s horizon, the imago trinitatis and dialogue
rooted in the mutuality and plenitude of triune love-gift is not nor should be reducible to
shoring up deliberative democracy. His theological horizon goes beyond both
Hauerwas’s faithful witness in gift and Dorrien’s mediating dialectic in love. But rather
than sublate and unify them in Williams’s horizon, I have argued that his horizon offers
critical help for developing aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions. These
developments take a step towards my larger hope, to constructively begin moving beyond
the fracture in US Christianity. Those who hold to the positions of Dorrien and Hauerwas
can enter into a fresh theopolitical discussion after they take into account Williams’s
horizon for their respective projects.
III. Conclusion
The faithfulness versus social justice binary is far too simplistic and superficial to
sufficiently account for the differences between Hauerwas and Dorrien. One should not
miss that Hauerwas is concerned about justice and Dorrien is equally concerned about
faithful, counter-cultural witness. However, even the church-world distinction, in terms
of Hauerwas denouncing but Dorrien critically affirming liberalism and liberal theology,
overlooks too much. Their different responses to liberalism and their similar critiques of
liberal theology are not simply undergirded by rival constructive projects. Those
responses, critiques, and projects are dependent on sharply divergent accounts of
relational truth and the nature of reality.
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But even the relations that determine human existence are created and shaped by
some-‘thing’ more. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and their
differences are divergent accounts of divine sovereignty, which determines human
subjectivity, human agency, and intra-human relations. Dorrien’s apophatic embrace of
panentheistic monism emphasizes the sovereignty of love. This framework involves the
universality of Spirit, the similarity of spirit, and the autonomy-in-relation of human spirit
for free flourishing. Hauerwas’s cataphatic proclamation of Jesus’s universal particularity
stresses the sovereignty of gift. This framework involves the universal particularity of the
triune creator, the creaturehood of humanity, and the friendship of human creatures with
each other and God.
These divergent positions give dramatically different responses to the state’s
sovereignty and its mechanisms. For Dorrien’s position, the state’s limited sphere is part
of how the Spirit’s transformative love is realized. For Hauerwas’s position, the state’s
hegemony makes it a negative force that demands a shift in divine sovereignty, as seen in
Dorrien’s account where Christianity may be critical but is fundamentally integrated into
the state’s project. So at work in the fracture between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions
are two vectors: political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, and divine
sovereignty acting on political sovereignty.
Because of political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s positions are put in irreconcilable contradiction. But they can be seen as
contrary, in a place of creative and interactive tension, if they are freed from the specter
of state hegemony. Williams’s work on transforming state sovereignty provides that
release. Williams’s horizon of trinitarian mutuality and plenitude in love-gift, which
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frames his theopolitics, offers critical help for the development of Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s projects. That re-framing and developing, in turn, can support a fresh
discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s contrary positions. Through such a
discussion, then steps can be taken to address the fracture at the heart of their
disagreement.1150

1150

For the difference between contradiction and contrary, see Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto:
Toronto University Press, 1990), p. 10, chp. 3, esp. p. 71. What differentiates Doran’s account of contradiction-contrary from mine is
that I have not aimed or tried to resolve the Dorrien-Hauerwas tension with Williams, a third.
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